Middle Nation Book Discussion: The Crusades Through Arab Eyes: Session Two
Okay, everyone. Welcome, everyone, to the second book club of the crusades through Arab eyes authored by Amin Malouf. Last time, we had stopped at the point where village Arsalan, the Roman sarduk sultan, had lost his city of Nicea to the combined forces of the eastern Romans and the Franks, both because of his underestimating of the combined forces size and regularity in terms of the army. It was a regular army, not an army of peasants like the first wave of invasion. And because of the intense rivalry that was taking place in Anatolia between the Muslim rulers the Turkish Muslim rulers especially, so there were two main strong dynasties ruling there in Anatolia.
One was the Roman Seljuks, of course, and the other was the Danish dynasty. So as we as I mentioned, Khaled Jaros Salaam lost his capital of Nicea. He it was besieged by the combined forces of the Romans and the Franks. He realized that it was impossible for him to break the siege because of the the the the difference in in war style that we mentioned last time because the Franks were were higher highly sophisticated in their in their way of defense. So they were mainly defensive so that they wore armor from head to toe.
Their cavalry wore armor from head to toe, and their mounts even wore armor. So it was especially difficult for him to break through. After that, he he was he he determined that his most valuable asset was not the cities he was able to keep because let us let me remind our listeners and readers that the Turkish tribes and the Turkish warriors were essentially Steppe Empire people, meaning that they were on horseback day and night. They they they were very sophisticated in that kind of war style, and they were fast warriors. They had their own tactics of feigned retreat and hit and run, that kind of thing.
So speed was of the essence, and they were always what can you say? They were always on horseback. They could they they they used archery was was one of their main was one of their strongest assets. So just to sum up this point, it was made the decision was made by that was more important for him after he had determined that it was that his his family was safe. It was more important for him to to keep the warriors, to keep the army intact than to keep the city because the city was just recently acquired by his father.
So it it it wasn't, like, a lifetime ago. It was very, very near. So cities come and go in in his own logic, and I think it was the right decision to make. And so he just what he did is that he moved his capital from Nicaea to Konya, which is far further to the east and more central in Anatolia. He did yeah.
He come to an an agreement with his rival, the danishment, to stop hostilities. Not only did they stop hostilities, they agreed on a on an alliance in order to face the grave danger that was now posed by the Eastern Romans and the Franks because they determined that the sea a sea of hostilities or a a truce was known was no longer enough. They had to work together to to face this new danger. So they determined that they would face the Frankish army after they had lost the city of Nicea near a city called Durelio or Durelium depending on the on the region you're uttering the word from. And in this battle, it was determined that the Muslims would lay in wait for the army of the Franks and use the element of surprise against them.
So and his and his army, they waited for the Franks in in a in a certain mountain pass, and they used the element of surprise against this army. However, again, the Muslims still were not fully adapted to this new style of warfare, this new defensive style of warfare. So at the beginning of the of the of the of the battle, some of the Frank's army had sustained losses, but it was apparent that it wasn't enough because, again, the the the the armor of the Franks was was very, you know, I mean, it was very strong. And so many of the arrows that were shot by the the the Muslim army simply deflected, and it was also determined or it was also found out that this army was not the entire Frankish Frankish army. So another second army was coming.
So and his and his and his army or his generals found out that this wasn't was merely a a reconnaissance or more of, like, vanguard of the army, not the entire army. And so they they thought to themselves that if this was just the vanguard, then we would have serious trouble. This kind of of of armored troops is not going to be easy to deal with. And it it was yeah. It it it soon came apparent because the the Muslim cavalry engaged with the French cavalry, and they did sustain a lot of losses on their side as well.
So having a second component of the army made things seem worse for Khaleid Jaros Salaam. And to make things even worse, third third contingent of the army appeared behind the Muslim forces. So a decision was made again by Khaled Rasalam to retreat, and it was more of a panicky retreat, so to speak, since that even his his tragedy was left on the battlefield. So it was seized, of course, by French army, and now it became apparent that the the difference in style had to be adapted fully. Otherwise, the Muslim are and the Muslim the Turkish Muslim warriors would always sustain heavy losses whenever engaging with the Franks.
And the author made a remark that not not before four years would the the Muslim army in Anatolia exact revenge against the French arm. And so by at this point, we closed chapter one, and we also come to the conclusion that the French army did pass through Anatolia. They were able to make it to the far north of the. So they reached Antioch or the outskirts of Antioch, which was held by a by an and called Yarisien. And, before we, move on to Anklaq, I would just love to hear if our, speakers have any comments about this particular incident.
I really we really appreciate the summary. Just one of the things that stood out to me very, very briefly was just the, as you pointed out, the kind of warfare that Khilid Yer Salaam and Danishmended were were accustomed to, sort of cavalry archers, quick agile attacks retreat, agile attacks retreat, and just how strange it was, this this foreign force that seemed like they didn't care. So it's just kind of like modern analogy of tanks versus something else, you know, something that you're not expecting tanks and it's just like, oh, well, that's just one tank, but then all of a sudden you see a second, third tank show up. I can understand I can only imagine actually the fear that the generals at that time would have faced to have had such a plan and to have been so assured, to have had what they thought was the upper ground only to see that their calculations were entirely entirely flawed and wrong. SubhanAllah.
Just sometimes, honestly, reading this chapter, reading a lot of this book, there's a sort of empathetic dread that kind of you kinda feel like what what would have been going through their minds at that time and then, you know, to have abandoned I I don't wanna say abandoned, but to have had to retreat. But then as as we know towards end of the chapter, to have seen or have known that much of your army met their demise because of these these tactics. I can scarcely imagine the kind of burden that would have been. That was just something that came to mind when thinking about the end of this chapter.
Yeah. Absolutely, Rebecca. I mean, the element of surprise was I mean, you could extend this to to to comment or to make an a conclusion regarding the whole first invasion of the French. So the amount of surprise was then took all of the Muslim rulers in the region all of the Muslims in the region, generally, it took them by surprise. So it was a surprise in terms of who who those people were coming from, where they were coming from, and it was a surprise in terms of their, war style, their their have their heavy armor and that kind of thing.
So yeah. And it did help a lot in in in the way they were able to access the and to acquire cities. Karim or brother Karim, please raise your hand.
Yeah. It's it's a great point. Exactly this one. And I wouldn't say it's just the surprise, but I think it's a lot of, like, kind of psychological warfare. You you you feel like the it it like, realistically, the Arabs or the rulers of that time, they could have immediately destroyed them.
You know? Like, they they didn't have the numbers. They didn't have the economy. They didn't have, like, the resources. You know?
Like, these people who came, the French, they could have been eliminated from the start. Right? But you can feel that there is this, as you said, psychological paralysis kinda, like, you know, who are these barbarians, these, you know, blonde guys with long hair. Like, I feel a lot of it was just psychological rather than realistically somehow, you know, physical or material strength or you know? So that was just a point that I wanted to highlight that sometimes we are defeated just by our perception of something rather than the reality of something.
Right? So I think that the rules of that time should have been, you know, more based or should have tried to be more grounded in the reality rather than in what was being made up in their heads. You know?
Absolutely. Yes. For sure. Some narrow interests, unfortunately, did take precedence over the eminent threat that was the French. And it it again, many factors can be can be attributed to that.
The first of which, the cultural superiority of the Muslims, for example, because the Muslims at this point in time, they were the the the most superior culture on the planet, I believe. They had reached a level of, what could you say, cultural supremacy over all the the the other cultures. They had translated the sciences from every other region. They had explained them. They had added their own ideas to them.
Maybe political fragmentation was there, but cultural homogeneity was rampant throughout the Muslim world, meaning that you you could have easily lived in any place in the Muslim world and didn't feel that there was any significant change. Aside from that, this place was ruled by Fulan, and this place was ruled by another person, and that was it. But culturally speaking, it was the same all over aside from the, of course, the environment differences or the geography differences or the norms of this place or that place. So this was one aspect, this cultural maturity or culture's cultural superiority. The other aspect was the narrow interests, like I said, the two presidents.
So these these rivalries between the Muslim rulers in some places made them think that those invaders were temporary in nature, meaning that they were a metric to be dealt with easily, swiftly, and it didn't take any precedence as opposed to the danger posed by our own rivals who were more permanent in their situation and more permanent in the in the way that we have to deal with. So, yeah, unfortunately, they they underestimated the threat, and they just yeah. It was a blunder on their side.
Yeah. And if I can just add, you know, like, when we look back at it, we view it as kind of a religious war. Right? But they did not consider it, as you just said now, the they thought it was just, you know, some attack from some people. Like, they didn't see the holistic picture of it.
Right? It was just, you know, one part, one city, and they didn't see the whole picture, I feel. Right?
Yeah. Absolutely. They they failed to to to put it into perspective, so to speak. And, yeah, no one no one's perfect. No one's perfect.
And I think we were talking about this earlier in the group that Allah it could have been that Allah had decreed that the ummah, although we had achieved this sort of cultural superiority, but there were many aspects that the had needed to reawaken, like, their their sense of of of of of, I think, the the sense of of cultural superiority had sedated the oomans somewhat. So Allah decreed that they have to be put under under strain and pressure to revive some of the aspects of the imam and the faith and aspects of taqwa. And, like, our said that we as an ummah, we we do well under pressure. We strive under pressure. So puts some some puts some of us or or all of us to the test, and we we we then do our best.
The is is is able to to to pass the through the current test as they did through the last test one thousand years ago. So now we're going to to to trace the steps of this Vedongi army. Now they have reached, as we have mentioned, they have reached the north of. They were at the outskirts of Antioch as whether they've aptly said. And so right now, the people of Antioch, as we have said, they they were under the rule of named.
And we I think it's it's worth to to explain here at this point what dynamic topic is and what it meant in the context of the time period. Okay. So as as if you if if any of our listeners had listened to the previous episode, we had explained that the the the most the strongest Muslim dynasty that had come in the Muslim lands since the time of Abbasids was a dynasty called the Seljuk Empire, an an empire that originated in Central Asia. Their capital was Isfahan, and they were able to extend their borders from the peripheries of China in the East all the way to Milad Hashem and Anatolia in the West. They tried to take Egypt, but they couldn't because Egypt had a Fatehman dynasty that was ruling it at the time.
And so in in in essence, they were able to strengthen somewhat even if symbolically the Abbasid Khalafa in Baghdad, and they were able to to face some imminent threats like the the the eastern Romans in Anatolia and some of
the
Shia dynasties ruling in in the Muslim part of world. So this dynasty, the Sardik dynasty, didn't stay intact for long. So the the the dynasty was first first called the great subjects, which ruled the entire land mass mass of land that that I I had mentioned right now. But after the third monarch after the third monarch, the Sultan Maliksha, this dynasty somewhat disintegrated in in the different regions. So we heard about the we started hearing about the subjects of Asia, the subjects of Iraq, the subjects of the subjects of Anatolia, the German subjects, and so on.
And so this disintegration was a result of many factors, the most important of which was that you couldn't they couldn't sustain this this rapid expansion forever, and centrality was something difficult to maintain in this day and age. So you have to remember this was a thousand years ago. So centrality and central state power was something that was not was, again, was not achievable for a long period of time and that they would age. There was no technological means back then to to maintain this centrality. And the second part is that the house itself was there were many factions within the house, and this in in the end, we have to remember that this was a militaristic dynasty somewhere.
And they established something very important that we have to take note of that would shape this the the the the Muslim world, at least in The Middle East for the for the next maybe half a millennium, for the next five hundred years, which is that they had established something called the warrior king model. So before, the Muslim rulers didn't necessarily have to lead armies on the battlefield. Some would, some wouldn't. It was okay either way, but it would it would it would perfectly be it would be perfectly well for the caliphate, for example, to lead the army themselves or to dispatch someone, some of their a general of theirs to lead the army on the battlefield to either, you know, face a revolution and internal revolution or to make some incursions into the enemy land or enemy territory. But with with the coming of the of the Seljuks, the Turkish Seljuks, this model was no longer sufficient.
The the the the the king, the Sultan, would have to lead the army on every single campaign because this was a a display of strength on their side, and it the the the times necessary to that kind of thing. So we would always see in later in later dynasties, either the Ayyubids, the Mandukets, the Zengids, that the warrior king model was a firm a firm aspect of the institution itself. The second thing is that because of this nature
of
the dynasty, it's it's it's it's it's being militant or militaristic to be more accurate, many of those emirs and many of those sultans would die on the battlefield, and this meant that many of the children those monarchs or children of their of those emirs would be orphaned at an early age. And so in order to mitigate this crisis, so to speak, those sultans and emirs would assign some tutors for their children who would take care of those children and face them and qualify them to lead the state on afterwards when they are yeah. To hold the state affairs and have them lead the state afterwards when they would come of age. And those tutors would be called. Okay?
Of course, because powers is is very what would you call seductive, those would usually marry those children's mothers, and they would then take power for themselves, and then they would bequeath those states or those titles or whatever they have acquired to their own children, their own blood children from their from their own prodigy. Yeah. And so those would frame also would be some of the the the main traits of the of the era, the. So this was a an era in the in the Muslim Middle East. So when we, of course, talk about for the, for example, the Sankets in in the the writers of the time would refer to them as the of the And, of course, the same could be said about the, maybe somewhat less, but it it it's perfectly plausible to call them that as well.
So this is the the the the the origins of the word utabic and the origins of the title itself. And so whoever was holding a city in Ladishem was an utabic. It could be the city of Antioch, which is our main focus for today. So it was under Anutabek named Yalisian who had served the Seljuk house for many, many, many years. But eventually, he took powers took the reigns of power into his own hands, and he held up the city of Antioch.
The second thing is that Antioch had been had had changed it had changed rulers for much time for, yeah, for for many times in a very short period of time. So they had been in Muslim hands first, then they had been it had been conquered by the Eastern Romans, and then it had been taken back by the Seljuks in October, and then it was now under invasion from the Franks back in October, which meant that this change of of rulers meant that the city was itself unstable. However, the city had very, very, very strong walls. It had around 360 towers to boost. It had a strong garrison.
It was not the largest garrison there was, but I think six to 7,000 soldiers meant that it was a very strong garrison. And if you add that to the walls, then you had nothing to be afraid of, and Yenoscan knew that very well. Also, it's worth mentioning that this city boosted around 200,000 a population of about 200,000 people back in the heyday of its of its cultural thriving in in the in the Roman the the unified Roman empire. But now it merely boasted about 40,000 people, which meant that there was a lot of space within the cities itself. This meant that there was space for other agriculture within the city walls.
They didn't have to leave the city to to plant their food. So this all added to the advantage of having the ability to withstand a siege or a prolonged siege for a long period of time. So Yad Vecen was, in fact, in a very, very strong position. There was was you know, there was there was there were many indications that the siege and the unfortunate eventual loss of Antioch could not have taken place. Allah decreed that this had happened.
And so when Yalishian knew from his eyes or sorry, from his fights that the French army was underway, He began immediately to send delegations to the different rulers of to, like, seek their assistance sorry, to seek their assistance in helping him withstand those this Frankish army. And I can't compete, but I would like to hear if our beloved speakers have anything to add about Antioch before I continue about the situation in Ledshan at the time.
Yes. And then this is some are we getting into the the siege of of Antioch, or are you just made context of of Antioch? As we as we talk about the siege from the the the film, just the Frankish siege, one of the things that really stood out to me was I'm probably gonna butcher the the pronunciation. Know it's a Turkish name. I believe.
I know in Arabic text it's so it gets confusing for me. But any Turkish listeners, forgive me. The what I found very interesting was how he was thinking ahead of like, okay, as you mentioned, it's it seems to be an impregnable city. About 12,000 meters, I think, becomes like two farsakh is how long the walls were, which is say one one point two kilometers. That's I don't I don't know for my American any American listeners or British listeners.
Let's do some really quick calculation. About point eight of a mile, I think. So it's very, very long. But obviously, if there's any internal disrepute or any discord within the ranks, anybody that's manning the turrets or the wall has let the enemies in. So one of the things he did, which I found very interesting, was he sent the Christian residents out on some tests.
Because I think by this point in time, there was some whispers and some word of, okay. This is Frenzy army is march eventually to to Palestine. That was our stated goal, at least, from some of the spies and some of the this is what what had been told to Evangelize Arsalan back back in oh, so I'm forgetting the name of the city. But by this point in time, that was kind of known. Right?
So their understanding was that, okay, maybe the Christians will be on the side of the fringe. So just in case, sent them out to to do a task and then he before they came back, he didn't let them back into the city and told them that, look, Antioch is yours, but you're not allowed back in because you I need to you need to leave it to me until I figured out how to deal with the fringe. I just found it very telling because they asked him like, who's gonna protect our women and children? And he said, I will. Like, I'll take care of them for you.
No harm will befall them. And I just found that to be the kind of nobility that even despite something in wartime, which is gonna be such a hard decision to make, but it demonstrates his nobility and it's the kind of nobility that even before this and after this is entirely foreign to the Filanj. This is something we don't see at all, this kind of nobility from from the so I just wanted to point that out as something very interesting. There's a bit of foreshadowing there too. And the reason he did this was to avoid any internal issues and a bit of foreshadowing eventually the downfall of Antioch does come because some treacherous treason.
Absolutely. Yes, Tanya. This is a very interesting point to make. Thank you so much for bringing it up. So we have to put into context that citizenship was not an existent what would be called was not an existing existing concept back then.
And so it was only natural for the Christian residents of the of the city of Antioch to be of to to to work to come under the suspicion suspicious eyes of Eurasian because at the end, they identified identified themselves as Christians who their whose ultimate loyalty belonged to the Eastern Roman emperor and that they were they were, like what would you call the the I think it's the the people in the church. It has a certain terminology that I'm not sure of. So they were, like, the the the people of the church of of of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church. And so here's what brother Hodaifa is is is pointing out, which is that he wanted to to mention how the Muslim leaders would treat their Christian citizens, so to speak, in in in in in contrast with the way the Christian leaders would treat their Muslim citizens throughout the the the world. There there's a huge difference.
So they did come under the suspicions of Genesean, but he he did the least amount of damage to them and to their families. So he just told them that I I need you to be outside the walls, the the French war won't hurt you because, so to speak, they are coming to rescue the Christians, so they didn't need to to to to fear them. And if you're afraid for your children and women, then there's no there's no worry, and you don't have to worry about them. I will take care of them. And he did yeah.
I mean, he did the he he he did good on his promise, and he didn't, you know, do any harm to them. So this is very important for our listeners and readers to understand the difference in context between and the difference in treatment between our Muslim leaders and the Christian Muslim leaders. Brother Karim, how do you handle this?
Yeah. This part is like I would be a bit cautious, you know, because, like, I you know, of course, hindsight, you know, but in reality, you know, these Christians, quote unquote, like, I think that the leaders should have tried to understand the situation a bit more because, you know, like, for example, in our context today, I feel it's very similar to, for example, ascribing to Jews what the Israelis are doing. Right? And I feel that there needs to be some distinction because, like, for example, the Orthodox Christians that were living in those areas were very different from the Christians that came from the Roman Empire, right, from the French. So, like, you know, to be just and to be to stand with the truth, I think there needs to be a bit more curation or a bit more analysis into the reality of things.
Right? Because, like, lumping them together, I do not think it's really as just as it could be. Right? And I'm not saying I would have acted differently in that situations. Again, you know, of course, there were aspects that were taken into consideration that I do not know about, and he knew the people, of course, you know, so very easy for me to talk about it now without being there.
But I just feel that even us now with the situation we are currently facing, we should be able to make a distinction between, you know, unjust people of the book and just people of the book. And I think in that situation, there was a bit, like, assumption that their loyalty will be immediately with the oppressors, whereas I do believe that they the Christians themselves that were living there felt loyalty more to the Muslims that were, you know, taking care of them and how they behaved with them. Like, even the Christians, when those French came, they were, like, bewildered. Like, what are those barbarians? You know?
Those are not Christians. Alright? And as we will see later on in, you know, Jerusalem and so on. But, yeah, that's just my point. Like, to be fair and to take something from it for today's time, I do believe that maybe it's not with Christians nowadays, but more about, you know, the Jews and how we view them.
And I do believe that to be just and, you know, to because we will be held accountable for our actions and, you know so I do believe that we need to make a distinction between parties that just claim some, you know, alliance and parties that are being, you know, fair and yeah. So that's just something that I tried to that I was you know, that came to my mind when I was reading it because I felt like they have been thrown from one side and from the other as well. Right? Like, I don't know if someone had that similar feeling a bit. I don't know.
But just from me reading it, this is my somewhat reflection on this part.
Absolutely, brother Karim. Yeah. And you you made a very interesting point. But, you have to remember our stats very earliest comments in this space, which is that those rulers were not. They were they were not angels.
Right? So they had to act within the real politics context of the time, which meant that they had to take the precautions. They had to make some what we might call grotesque actions. Although, to be very fairly to be very, very, very honest, this was the least grotesque action that they could take against some, not all of their Christian citizens at the time. I mean, I have to remind our audience that the Muslims sorry, the Christian families within the walls and the Christian men outside of the walls, they were not harmed.
The only people who harmed them and killed them were the but the Muslims. They didn't do anything to harm any of the Christians outside the walls or inside walls. So lumping them together wouldn't be the most accurate word, but, yeah, he he putting them under his suspicious eyes, of course, it could have been yeah. Mean, some some other actions could have been taken. Although I to be honest, Allah, what else could have been yeah.
What else what what other actions could have been taken by us, Yan? And you have to know you have to understand that this was a very this was a desperate man at a very desperate time. So, yeah, I mean, I believe that he handled it pretty well given the context and given the circumstances. But, of course, right now, we have first of all, we have the benefit of hindsight. And second, we also understand that sometimes lumping together your own residence with the external enemy could actually backfire and harm the cause that you are defending instead of, you know, achieving the greater good.
So thank you so much, brother Kring, for your for your thoughts on this. Really appreciate it. Brother Hatayfah, I'm sorry. I know your hand was raised for a long time. Sorry.
No. No. That's no worries. Just to sort of dovetail off of what you both were saying and to remind you of that word that you were looking for the the term, I believe it's or adebs of the Nazareth and Nazareth Christians. Because just to contextualize as as you were mentioning, as well as brother Kareem was saying, it's a well received point.
But I I also sort of fall a little bit more in the camp of thinking this was actually him acting out of a degree of nobility because the Romans, the Byzantine Empire, this I believe seated in constant Constantinople at this time would Constantinople at the time as well. And and this we're talking about these events, contemporaneous to these events. They originally had Antioch, and the Seljuks took it over. And they had always said that, look. Well, this is our city.
We're gonna get it back, which is why Yahushiyan Yahushiyan, he had mentioned to the Christians, this is your city, but you have to let me take care of it. So he actually affirmed that, look. This is your city. I have no intention of barring you from it, but I need this sort of security because he thought maybe their loyalties would lie towards the Byzantine forces. Now they didn't actually they weren't actually necessarily Byzantine forces, but he had no real way of knowing that.
That would have been the most astute conclusion for him to draw based off of induction and deduction. That's what this was. But what I I wanna add just to that point of noting out the nobility of him just being like, we'll take care of your families, and he did was also out later on, and then we'll ask one brother Omar just a little bit later on in sort of what happened at the seat of Antioch. Yahya Yahya Yahya had spies that would infiltrate the Phrenji camps and report back to him about what was happening. Most of those people were those same local Christians that he had said you cannot come back into the city and they did this to curry favor with him, which is just testament to his nobility and the fact that they they knew that he would be receptive to it.
They wouldn't have done that if they had felt like, okay, now I can turn against this man by like saying this thing, sort of playing double agent, you know, going back to him, but actually reporting back to the about certain things. They still wanted to be with him in Antioch. So I think they even well understood why he did the things that he did and appreciated his caretaking of their families, their women, children. So just something to point out there about maybe sometimes we sort of anachronistically think of how things could have been done. But, you know, like, every place has a has a way to speak.
There's a way to carry yourself in every time, and so every time dictates the affairs. And and those times are just, I think, a little bit different from how we perceive things in this day and age.
Yeah. Absolutely, brother. And well, Yoni, I'm just I think we we can, like, add this final point before that we move on, unless any of our other speakers would like to add, is that I personally don't know if there's any way we can understand the true motives behind those, Orthodox Christians, spying on the phrenergic camp. So, again, we have to be realistic. So, we and Middleton Nation encourage the the the adoption of radical realism in our takes.
So, yes, it could be the case that they wanted to curry favor with Yarisian and to tell him, look, we're on your camp in your camp. And it could be simply that they were so afraid for their you know, so concerned for the safety of their families, their wives, and children that they would do anything just to make sure that those didn't enter the city, didn't massacre those people, or that the Yarisian didn't threaten them in any form. So they would they would be willing to do that kind of thing. So because you have to understand that they were shocked by the Alessian did what he did. Maybe possibly, we as Muslims have to maintain that out of nobility, perhaps.
However, they don't really know that. They don't they don't have any way to to to to be sure that this was the case. So to them, it was just a shocking event that they were now outside of the walls. Their families were inside of the walls, and they were under the protection and the control of the Alician. So we, of course, as Muslims, know that Alician or any Muslim ruler would never harm them, would never put them, you know, any any would never do them any harm, but they didn't necessarily have that confidence.
The only confidence that they had is that they had been with Muslims for a very lengthy period of time. So, yeah, that could be reassuring, but this is a war. We're in a we're in a time war. So many of the long established concepts really do get shaken in times like these. So the true motives, to me at least, are still, you know, under the hood because no one really knows what was going through those men's minds.
Okay. So I think we can move on. So yeah. So the as brother mentioned, the had come with a with a scheme by which he would was able to keep the Christian men the Christian residents of Antioch out of the city because he had suspicions about their true loyalties. And so now the were there.
They they siege to the city, and they they were the the siege of Antioch began. Earlier, had sent his son, to the different rulers of in order to ask them for immediate immediate military aid in order to face the the Fekanji army. Now the context in Bereldesham was a bit, you know, sad. So as mentioned, there was a house in Bereldesham, an overall arching house in Bereldesham called the of Bereldesham. But the most the strongest rulers of Bledshem were two brothers.
They were the sons of Tutish ibn al Barslan. They were the grandchildren of al Barslan, the second bornarch of the great seldugs. So al Barslan had two sons, Maliksha, the last great seldug, and another son called Tutush, his brother. And those two emirs of Aleppo and Damascus were the sons of Tutush, so they were the grandsons of al Barslan, as I mentioned. So the greater the elder son was called the one, and he was the ruler of Aleppo.
And the younger son was called Bukap, and he was the ruler of Damascus. Now one would think that those two brothers would have at least amicable relationships, but, unfortunately, upon ascending the throne of Aleppo, had four brothers sorry, had
three
brothers, one of which was Dukak. And upon ascending the throne of Aleppo, Rinon appeared that those brothers might challenge him for the throne, so he ordered the three of them to be executed. Two were executed indeed, and the third, which is Dukak, was able to escape with for to to escape with his life, and he headed to Damascus where he was welcomed by his skarism and installed as the ruler of Damascus as as being an emir of the of the. But, unfortunately, the the the the act by which Rugwan had started his reign in Aleppo had alienated Lukak from him to the to the to the most, yeah, to the most conflicting type of relationship. They they couldn't stand each other's guts, those two, because Ferdinand feared that always Bucock was looking for the throne of Aleppo, and Ferdinand always in was always fearing that Ferdinand would simply kill him and seize the masks.
And, of course, as our listeners might now have reached, the conclusion was that this deeply weakened the the front in the to the point that when to first to the in Damascus because he had very serious concerns about the one's intentions in Aleppo. He feared that the one would want to extend his own power over Antioch, and so he feared he he reckoned that asking Dukak first offered them for Damascus first to come to his aid since Damascus was further, this would lessen the, what would you call, the the aspiring the aspirations of the talk's takeover Antioch. Although he had been the father-in-law the father-in-law of the one, this didn't mitigate any of his fears. So he first sent to to the cop in Damascus, and the cop was very afraid of leaving his city of Damascus undefended and taking his army out to to aid Antioch. He feared that Vedon would use this advantage or use this opportunity to take Damascus in his absence.
So he would go out in aid of Antioch, but at the first sign of problem, when he first met the the the Ferengi army that was, you know, executing some forays to to get food or or and and to get food and supplies. Although the one had sorry. Although Dukak, the ruler of Damascus, had the numerical superiority and the elements of surprise on his side, he was he made a blunder, and he couldn't, you know, capitalize on those elements at all. And the he lost some of his men, and that was more than enough for him to retreat back to the masks. So that meant that he was eventually essentially leaving the.
He didn't he didn't come to his aid, which, of course, boosted the morale of the, but at the same time, it it drove despair into the people of Antioch. So upon failing to receive the aid, Now had to make the humiliating request for aid from his son, Dol, which is the one, the emir of Aleppo. And so, of course, kept son in his court, and he kept asking him why didn't they ask for the the and that kind of thing because he knew. And, of course, had to, you know, grind his teeth and take all of the insults, all the all of the insults and just, you know, and keep keep keep up with the with with with one's sarcasm because they needed his assistance. And on the other side, one had to had to provide assistance because the were were now starting to make incursions into his own lands because Aleppo was less than three days march from Antioch, so they were very near to his own possessions.
And so he understood that not helping Galician was essentially going to hurt him as well. So he provided he he he got his army out in order to provide assistance to Galician. But, again, he made some strategic errors and some military military strategy errors, which also caused the to to win the battle before it even started with the. So, again, despite the numerical superiority and despite having the advantage of the terrain, both and failed to counter the the. And, again, this boosted the morale of the of the siegers and drove to spare drove to spare to the hearts of the besieged.
And so Yarisian was now left all alone. He he he realized that none of the rulers of Viladishan because those were the two strongest rulers of the of. The only remaining ruler in in the Muslim lands that was able to help him was the ruler of Al Mosul, which was the the pearl of of of of the region of Iraq. It had the resources. It had the the economic resources and the economic thriving that would enable its from assisting him.
And that and that was the context by which we can explain why Bledishan was not in a situation where it could help Yarisian and his what do you say? In his depending of the city from the branch, at least from the the the side of Bledishan. Of course, some interesting points to make here is that, yeah, there were there there came together several factors that is envisioning the city. And we have to understand that the procedures, they suffered famine, they suffered extreme weather conditions, and they were in the danger of encirclement, but none of this helped lift the siege of Antioch. The internal conflict in the house and the military and the and the, you know, the the rising rivalries and constraints between the one and the, all of that helped turn the situation for the French favour, at least from the point of view of the.
Before we move on to campaign, does anyone want to add anything to that from our global speakers?
Yeah. This is just one of the things that really stood out to me when when reading this passage and thinking about it was how that that disunity that that we're talking about, it it really rears its ugly head. And that just thinking of contemporary context, you know, just thinking about the value of having unity when facing a common enemy and how to the diplomacy that's necessary to make it clear that this is a common enemy. You know? I think at that time, you had the clock not necessarily seeing it as a shared threat and maybe just saying, hey.
This is something that, you know, you have to deal with over there in Antioch. Why do I need to get involved? And even the same thing with the one, he was not at all interested in any sort of loyalty or alliance. The from my reading, the the reason that he really joined the fray was that the Thranji army was so starved of resources and they had pillaged the land and forged it around Antioch so much that they couldn't find anything more until, as was mentioned, Aleppo or had a which is their had a the one was seated. It was only a three day march from Antioch.
So, eventually, the Fernji camps and and sort of sort of squads, cavalries, I'm I'm the words are failing me, but they had reached into lands that were his domain and had started to pour a forage and pillage. And so then when he felt his land friend, he said, oh, let me get in on this. But even then, you see how without that firm conviction of needing to face this enemy and having a loyalty and having a unified front, these these these whispers, these superstitions, these unnecessary unfounded thoughts get into the brain, which which is what, at least in the reading, I was characterized obviously telling of history, this this book by Amin Arlov. But the way that it's portrayed, you know, they were just so fearful of what they had heard of these well armored and knighted sort of brutal fighters that even though they had the numerical advantage and if they had just stood their ground front and back, they would have they would have probably defeated the front right there, you know, along without any conviction, this spineless man, he just he just retreats. And so just thinking in contemporary context, think of how oftentimes we have calls of like, hey.
We have to fight this enemy or that enemy. But if there is internal disunity that those plans will will crumble from a realpolitik perspective. And so that's where I I see some of the diplomatic efforts, and I see some of the things that I know a lot of people in contemporary context are quick to dismissive. Oh, this is just more words. This is more they say, you're just doing the summit here.
You're doing that. But having that level of unity is key and crucial to be able to then, with a unified front attack, how whether it's militarily or diplomatically, however the attack is to be made against a common enemy, that unity is going to be one of the key foundations upon which that's that's going to either succeed or fail is how I read a lot of this.
Yeah. That's a great point. And exactly, like, when you look at it, right, you appreciate how much the Muslim world is united now compared to those times. Right? Because, subhanAllah, like, I'm not saying that people don't have you know, states don't have their interest and they don't have their own spheres of influence, and they don't wanna, you know, expand on that sphere of influence.
But it makes you really appreciate that, subhanAllah, the times we are living in this unity that we are seeing among the leaders of the Muslim world. It's something beautiful and something to be appreciative of. Right? Because when you compare it, it's always good to compare these things with different periods because people always romanticize their history and how we were, you know, united under the and, you know, all of these kind of rhetorics. Right?
But when you look at it, like, was it really how it is in your imagination, or is the reality now even more pleasing than what the historical fantasy you have in your mind? Right? Because when actually reading history and seeing how it went, it wasn't how you imagine it. Right? It's not, you know, this fairytale that people have in their mind.
And even in that time, it's very interesting that there was a khalifa. There were actually two khalifas. You know? So it's not like there was no khalifa and only khalifa would solve it. No.
There was a Khalifa. There was a Khalifa in the Fateh state in Cairo, and there was a Khalifa of the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad. So there were Khalifas. But you can see that even, like, having Khalifa does not guarantee that there will be unity, first of all, and it does not guarantee victory, and it does not guarantee success. You know?
So for us today having what we have, even though we might not call it, it's something much better than when we even had and, you know, the state was disarrayed. Right? So so I think that people when reading these kind of times and the history, they really need to reflect on today's situation and appreciate what has been built and where we are and how united we are and how, you know, diplomatic we are and subhanAllah, efforts, how they are coordinated, and it's just amazing. Right? So I think, you know, we should really be appreciative of the times that we are in compared to different times that we're in the history.
Absolutely. Brothers of life and Kareem, you guys both made some excellent points there. So yeah. I mean, the context definitely matters. This lack of unity, this lack of vision, and this lack of seriousness in confronting the situation definitely led to some long term damage left to the Muslim heartlands.
That's there's no way around that. And if you got if any of our readers who have read, like, the Christian sources or the Faraji sources, like, now in or no. Not not now. In this is getting this is getting destroyed destroyed, as we speak. You will see in the in the financial sources just like designers, which is that they it was against all odds and that kind of thing.
No. You simply found a very, yeah, suitable environment for that kind of occupation to take place. If the environment was not suitable, you you you could never have achieved what you had achieved. It's as simple as that. Because back then, as now, the numerical superiority was for the Muslims, but the lack of unity in some parts, even Yemen.
The lack of unity during the the Faraji occupation was what was what caused it. And right now, the the the relative weakness of the Muslim states against the West is what allowed it to happen. So this this what would you call it? This against all odds kind of story is really you know, I mean, it's very unrealistic, and it's it's not simply not the case. So this propaganda campaign right now is getting lifted.
And that our current Muslim leaders are achieving what we can call the most cohesive interaction amongst them in a very, very, very long time, maybe since the inception of of the of the modern nation state model. And maybe the the only time that this was achieved was during the nineteen seventy three war when the Muslim leaders were really working together in harmony. So So does any of our speakers have anything to add?
Yeah. I think just to sort of dovetail off of that point when we talk from the preoplite perspective, as our brother rightly pointed out. Just thinking about it in contemporary context, it becomes even more crucial just what what gets said and and why why it gets set to the the point there is not I don't think they were actually that surprised. And I believe that it was calculated and it was allowed. Why?
So that they could say this that the rest of the people can hear and see, look, these people say one thing but do something else, and this is how evident it is. And this is to a country that quite clearly has not been an aggressor in that conflict in any way. So it just goes out to it just goes to show it it it feeds into a propaganda. The propaganda is not necessarily a negative thing as I shout out some of the other topics that we've covered in this channel, but just that information that becomes necessary to rally the troops and to gather around a shared understanding of a an an enemy that never they say. You know?
Yeah. Absolutely. We've had established this early on. Maybe during the first episode, our listeners will recall the famous quote by the the historian Tacitus, which is, you Romans create a desert and call it peace. So this is not a a contradiction on their side.
They really have this different psyche. It's a psyche different from the the entire world, which is that they when when they say peace, they don't mean peace like we mean peace. It's not the same. They they they essentially mean subjugation, domination. They essentially mean a desert on on our own side and thriving harm on their side.
And so this is how they act. This is how they think, and this is how they behave. So at hundred eleven, even now, the the entire world and the the real international community, not the West, which is United States, Europe, and Canada, and Australia, that kind of thing. No. 01/1990 something countries are coming to their to their to the conclusion that the West is just a a plague to the entire world, to the entire planet, and they can be possibly serious about their, quote, unquote, their statements.
All of their statements are just to hide something or to achieve something. They're they never mean the same things as as yeah. They never say the words and have the same meaning that we have in our own minds. Yes, Karim, please.
Yeah. And I I don't wanna, like, say for what happened at that time, but I think that our leaders understood the lesson. Right? And that's the most important. Like, the history should be as a lesson for us.
Right? Whether you know? So I think the, you know, compared to what it was, it's completely different, and we understood who we are dealing with already at that time. Right? And as you just mentioned, they are the same, you know, as they were one thousand years ago.
Right? Their approach is the same. Their barbarism is the same. So you can see that the mistakes that were done one thousand years ago have been mitigated and have been avoided by the leaders currently. Right?
Which is now what else do you want? Right? Like
Yes. Okay. So moving on, in sha'Allah, understanding our speakers have anything to add to that. So now we move to campaign in order to aid in order to aid Antioch. Carbucka, the of Mosul, and now we understand the word and the origin of the word and the context within within it operate in which it operates.
Karbuka was the was type of Mosul. He could feed a strong army relatively, 50,000 strong, and he moved out from Mosul to the aid of Antioch. However, he didn't he wasn't doing it out of of pure Muslim lira, so to speak, aiding our Muslim brethren solely, at least. So he had aspirations in the, which is perfectly fine, you know, from from a perspective of intentions, of having intentions, that's more than fine. The problem is, as we should see, the way with which he dealt with the situation and how he made his intentions known.
So he, since he was the strongest player in the field, he first felt that he was able to dismiss some of the consultations of his generals regarding the move towards Odessa, for example. Now in order to put in context the problem of Odessa, Odessa was a county that have been recently established by the French, and it had been established in the I don't know what to say, in the most self evident western way possible, which is some month some some knight called Baldwin had moved to Edessa. Edessa was ruled by an Armenian house, and this house had a ruler called Taurus. He was an Armenian Christian. And Taurus had no children of his own, so he offered to adopt Baldwin as his own and make his make him his his adopted son so that he would inherit the the county or the city after he was after he passed away or died.
But Baldwin, as as as a true Christian Western European knight, killed his adopted father and his adopted mother and took took the city for himself. He he couldn't he couldn't wait for his father to die, so to speak, and so he took the city for himself. And now he he was perfectly content to to to to establish a county in Odessa, not to go to go and save Jerusalem. And I want our speakers to understand this perfectly well. It didn't give anything.
It didn't provide any military assistance to the rest of the crusaders, to the rest of the in their in their campaign, in the rest of Galatia, either in Antioch or in Jerusalem or any any other place, in Tripoli or any other place, which tells you a lot about the true intentions of many of the knights in this so called invasion. Okay? The problem for Karbuka was that Ada Adessa was on along the way to Antioch, which meant that if Karbuka didn't deal with Adessa, at least from his own perspective, his rear would be exposed to the of Adessa while he was while he was fighting the besieging Antioch. So he reckoned that he had to deal with Edessa first and take it from the Farronch before moving on to Antioch. Of course, his generals told him that Antioch was facing great great threats, and it had been in under under an an imminent danger, which was the taking of the city itself.
I mean, Edessa was already taken, so there's nothing that we can do to Edessa. It was strongly walled. There was a garrison of and so it would at least take a very long siege. Right? But Antioch was still in Muslim land Muslim hands, so there was something that we could do to Antioch.
However, he was adamant in his position that I I have to protect my rear from Adessa before moving on. So I'm not a mill I'm I'm not a military strategist, to be honest, and I really want to hear our speakers' thoughts on this. I'm I'm, like, I'm unable to make a a very concrete decision as to whether he was right or wrong in his attempt of sieging sieging Edessa before first lifting or helping lift the seat of Antioch. I think both points of view were equally valid. So what do you guys what do you guys think?
Yes, brother.
And, actually, will you allow me to make a comment on on Baldwin and his savagery before we attack this, or shall we talk about this before we we come back to that? It's up to you.
Yeah. Sure. And if you can make it short because it's it's like Baldwin is is he's a creepy guy to say the least. But yeah. Sure.
Go ahead.
Noam, just one of the things that really stood out to me was just as you mentioned, you know, how he made no plans to to go towards Jerusalem. It was clear he just wanted to just wanted to take this power. And what really stood out to me when I when I first read this story, one of the things that jumped out to me was just the difference in how when you don't have a guiding principle, how things just sort of fall apart and then you're just left to your the savagery of the some of the the more savage elements that that a a those things can those Western cultures and and traditions can cultivate. And I was thinking of the very, briefly from the Tafsir of Ibn Kathir, sort of the background to Surat al Fir and the invasion of the people of the elephant. Very briefly in that, essentially, the king of the then king of Abyssinia, also known as Nagesheba, is a different one, Negus, which is sort of an honorific title.
He had sent two of his generals to the land that is now known as Yemen to liberate it from some some ruler there. And there were two of them, also known as Erit and Abdroha. And when they finally liberated it, what did they do? Instead of just, like, liberating it and just taking control of it, running back to Migas, they turned their two armies against each other. And they said, now who's gonna rule this place?
So there was obvious infinitely treachery just like with with Baldwin, how he, you know, curried favor and then just slaughtered the the people. And what I find very interesting about that one is in the case of and and Abraha, said, okay. Let's just fight one on one instead of pitting our armies against each other. So they agreed to that. When got the upper hand and injured and wounded Abraha, one of Abraha's spearmen came in and finished the job for him in, again, a sort of disloyal, dishonorable manner.
And so I was just thinking of that sort of infighting and the seizing of power for no reason other than that while abandoning the end goal. That's what I was thinking of when I was king of Baldwin. So I just wanted to sort of put that out there as a sort of corollary corollary that I noticed. And then to attack you or or to to respond to your question also briefly, Middle Nation had shared I believe the brother Karim would have shared this this map that sort of contextualizes and places a little bit of where Edessa was on in the path from Mosul to Antioch. So it does sort of make some sense to be worried about being attacked from the rear.
But then at least in the book, we're we're given the advice of the Emirs, makes a lot of sense, which is like, look, they only have 3,000 soldiers. We have tens of thousands. They're not gonna dare to attack us. And as we know, perhaps with hindsight, the man was not very interested in it anyway. He just he just wanted his his seat of power.
I can understand why there would be some fear of that because the tactic that the Muslims wanted to use, for example, at Wizaridwan and Yahweh Syam, that was the tactic they wanted to use. There's a pincer movement flying them from the front and the rear. But I can also see how it seems like maybe he was just he thought, oh, there's only 3,000 people. I can just take this city. That would become a seat of power for me, and that will allow me to exert some influence over.
So this kinda speaks against the disunity. The fact of just wanting to rush to the aid of Antioch just wasn't quite there. Because of the one who's a troublesome character, we we will continue to learn. So I can see how that might have been a bit of a motivation. Of course, we don't know for sure.
I'm reading into things here. What seems to me like would have been a more prudent tactic at the least would have been to deploy some people in the rear or have them stationed just in case there is any affront coming from Edessa. And then they can be prepared and send word to the rest of the army that could maybe return because they had enough people, it sounds like, to actually do that. Maybe just have a sort of floating full scouting unit or something. But I guess I'm not a strategist either, but that's the first thing that comes to mind of of how that could have been tackled.
So because of the fact that he stayed there for three weeks and delayed for so long assistance to Antioch, which was in dire need of it, it speaks to me it seems to me to be more of a just a sort of a I don't wanna say lustful powerless, but it seems like he just got sort of shiny object syndrome. It's like, oh, is this a possibility now? Because, again, it would have helped exert influence over the troublesome with one.
Yeah. Absolutely. I think he he wasn't hiding his intentions from the onset. Right? He he was adamant to make everyone know that he was the boss since he was able to keep the largest army.
And, again, this is not in of itself a problem. How you handled yourself in front of the other emirs and how you handled yourself in front of the generals and how you presented your arguments, the most successful I think the most successful statement in history were the ones who were able to convince their subordinates of their vision and make it their own. Right? Even if they had unvirtuous intents, that's not because, again, in the end, we are all humans, and we're not perfect. We're not.
Right? But the the the the the the best statesmen were the people who were able to navigate the corridors of power in subtle ways in order to to achieve what they want without having that kind of behavior erupting. So Kurvuka was able to alienate his own generals, and by this, by making his intense known, he was able also to alienate the emirs of with one in the the top, right, which will be apparent in the in the, quote, unquote, battle that took place in in in front of Antioch. Right? Because he asked the the emirs of to assist him in the campaign, but he didn't he didn't really ask.
It was more of an order. And, again, they couldn't say no because he had a stronger army. But that kind of relationship, this the situation was very dire because now Lukak, the emir of the Mosque Of Damascus, was secretly scheming, telling the other emirs and the other generals that this guy is here to stay, and we're better off with the than with him. So this gives you an a picture of what the situation like, what what the situation was like within the Muslim camp. They weren't it wasn't exactly a homogenous army at all.
And when Yalisian had finally understood that he wasn't able to take a dasa. Brother Hadeifa's take, which is that if you knew that from the onset you you were able to move on to Antioch without having such a grave concern about your rear, then why didn't you move on from the first I mean, why didn't you move directly onto Antioch? You didn't have to to move to to Ada to Ada. Because eventually, you you went there anyway. Right?
But as I as as I mentioned, him not making his intentions subtle at all and ordering people around and telling them that I'm the boss here. I have the strongest army. That eventually led to the to the demise of the of the morale of the other Emirs and feeling that they were better off with the French. Imagine. They They felt that they were better off, again, because they felt that the financial was something temporary.
Even if they took Antioch, that was not a big problem. Antioch was in Christian hands or in in in enemy hands, like, fifteen years ago, so it wasn't really some some deeply rooted possession of the Muslim the Muslim rulers. At least that's the way they felt. And so they thought that, yeah, we're better off with the than with is more dangerous to our own power structures than the. Now when when when the people of Antioch were finally in the in the most desperate they were ever they had ever been, a resident of Antioch and a Muslim, no less.
He was called. He had a quarrel with Yerushian, and he he didn't like Yerushian's behavior towards him. And so he made the made the decision that he would betray Antioch and show the the the how to enter the city. And I think I think we need to pause here because this is going to be end for today's discussion in before the ultimate plunder of the battle of Antioch by. So, this this resident of Antioch, so to speak, by his tragedy, he allowed the within the city.
Of course, they they massacred the people of the city. They couldn't take the the the castle or the fortress of the city because son was able to hold it with his men. So the the the French, of course, took the city. They killed everyone, every single one. Okay?
And this goes on to prove that if you have a cracked internal front and and if if you're if you're the people are not unified in their vision and in their defense of the city, no matter I mean, I I don't I don't really know what kind of quarrel had with Yereseem that would lead him to to surrender the city essentially to the because it would take Antioch was retrieved by almamluksultan, I think, in December. Okay? We're talking about October. So it was more than one hundred and fifty years before the Muslims would would be able to take Antioch again. So there's a famous word and and a famous sentence in Islamic literature, which is and you as a Muslim should be very, very vigilant in your defense of Islam.
Don't ever make a mistake of thinking that your own behavior does not affect the entire religion, the entire population of the Muslims, the entire because you never know. I mean, this guy, this man, takes the wiz takes the the the guilt of of of having Antioch being in enemy hands enemy hands for more than a hundred and fifty years. So, yeah, I mean, no matter how small of an act you you believe you're you're you're you're making, whether it be be in your work, whether it be in in in times of war, in times of prosperity or in times of war, you never know what you're doing, what consequences it might have for prosperity. So this man, he even, yeah, gave his own son as guarantee to the financial that he wasn't deceiving them or anything of them. So, I mean, there's no I I don't have any words to to say that.
No matter how strong your walls are, trajectory will always, you know, will will always defeat those walls. So, yes, brother, had your hand raised.
Yes. This part was really, really tough to read and what was even interesting was, as you mentioned, he so wanted to prove his point to the that, hey, I'm not actually trying to deceive you. I'm trying to rat out I'm being a traitor to Antioch. He as you mentioned, he gave his own son as collateral. Hey, if I do anything, you can just kill him.
Like, what what is this thinking? And I know in the in in the text it mentions that it was because he'd been accused of black market trading and Yahya Siyan sort of slapped a heavy fine on him, I'm gonna be honest with you. It just feels it feels like we're missing a lot of context. And I feel like it's one of those things that's just lost to history. Like, what truly motivated this man?
Is it really that simple? Because it says that the Finanj offered him gold and land. This man truly have so much dunya in his heart that he was willing to just for for the riches of the world, just betray his people and ultimately lead to the absolute slaughter of the women and children in his city because these francs were barbaric as soon as they came in. That's what they did. I don't know.
I also remember when I was reading this, just remember thinking what became of him? Did they actually follow through with their promise? Did they give him the golden land? Did they just kill him and kill his son? Because that's not beyond the francs.
But I don't know. There's nothing mentioned here, and I wonder if there's other sources that can be looked into that would give that information. But just to harken back to the earlier point that brother Green was making, and I'd love to hear from him on it, it was you know how Yadissian had sent the the Nazareth and Christians away and said, hey, let me deal with the French? That was the ironic foreshadowing that I was alluding to that in in the end, it was in fact someone from within that betrayed him, which is what he was worried about. He just came from the place he didn't expect, and it turned out that it was ultimately a a a Muslim.
It was that's just it's one of those things that just really sort of branches the heart. And and to to think of what Yaesuka must have thought in that moment is you know, I mean, it's just truly beyond me, honestly.
Yeah. Absolutely, brother Hadegh. Absolutely. Brother Graham, anything to add?
Putting me on the spot.
Sorry. Just did a little caution.
No. Any in the end, we hope the, inshallah, may Allah forgive him for you know, if he was you know, if he said All we can do is pray for his forgiveness. But in the specific context, I think, you know, that's why it's important to understand there are leaders and there are followers. Right? Nowadays, with social media, everybody thinks they can be a leader and everybody has, you know, his own geopolitical takes and what should be done and what not should be done.
This exactly shows us that leaders take into consideration the consequences of their actions and followers do not consider what are the ramifications of their decisions. Right? And here, it might have been just the case, like, you know, like, let me just, you know, get back to him. Right? Because he was fined for some of his trading activities that he was, you know, scamming people, I guess.
So he was, you know, levied a fine on him. But yeah. So his response would be like, okay. Let me, you know, get 500 people inside here. They will cause some trouble.
You know, they might cause some chaos, but, you know, we are, like, 40,000 of us. I don't think that 500 people will cause that much trouble. That's my assumption of what might have been going through his mind. Right? But that's exactly the simplistic understanding of us people, you know, you know, like layman, who do not see the context, who do not see what will be the effect of some decision, what will be the, you know, implications of some decision.
And that's exactly, like, a great illustration of, you know of course, I'm not gonna, you know, go into the treachery and everything. Like, of course, it's condemnable, all of this. But just basically seeing that this guy probably had no idea what he was setting up the next two hundred years for, as you said, brother Amar. You know? Like, when did we get Antioch back?
Like, I do not really think that fails, you know, some guy who was a blacksmith or something, would expect that leaving you know, letting 500 people come through a window would cause a seat for the next two hundred years, you know, for his grand grand grand grandchildren. Right? So this is a lesson for all of us even though even if someone, you know, from a leading position does something that harms you, you know, understand that there are circumstances that you do not see. There are things that if you do, they might cause much bigger fitna, much bigger trouble than what you're basically trying to achieve. So, yeah, that's my reflection on this point.
You know? Again, he was a Muslim. He what he did was a mistake. What he did was bad. I ask Allah to forgive him, inshallah.
Allah knows what was in his heart. But for me, what I can take from it is, you know, like, you do not I do not understand some steps that are being taken, but it's not my place to decide whether it's correct or wrong because I do not see all of the context. I do not see all of the ramifications. I do not see the future. So, yeah, one should always stay with his ruler.
Right? We have this in Islam. You know? Just ruler is better than a bad ruler, and a bad ruler is better than no ruler. So we have to take this into heart and into practice.
It's not just about saying it, but it's about, you know, living by it. And this is the case where we see that the person did not live by it, and we can see the consequences of that. Right? So, know, with Al Imran, and we can see this even nowadays. Like, do not ally people who are against you.
You know? These are your enemies, and Allah told us who our enemies are. You know, it's not up to you to decide who your enemy is. Right? It's you know, learn about them, what Allah said about them, and not what you wish to think about them.
And it's a great lesson for all of us nowadays. Yeah. So that's from my part everything in.
Yeah. I mean, I think there's a symbolism somewhat here, which is that the the Muslim Emirs of the Gadashem thinking that they were better off with the than they were better off with just because he was vain and he had un unhealed intentions of being the supreme leader of. And so because they thought that they could deal with the, which is the same thing that thought. Right? He thought that I would I I really hate the so much that I was.
I'd rather deal with than deal with him. So there's, you know, some hidden symbolism here right right there that I can't dismiss out of my head. And your your your you and brother had a point where spot on. You you have to always, you know, identify yourself with the with the with the Muslim leaders, not steep to provide your own as as brother hadith mentioned. Like, what were you thinking?
What exactly were you thinking? I mean, a fine in the black market, so you would surrender your city for that? One has no words. So I think we can we can, yeah, enter the space with that point, inshallah, today. Just a point to our listeners, I I really apologize.
My throat is feeling dizzy so much. I don't know why. So excuse me if I've been, you know, coughing or for, you know, taking my time speaking, but for some reason, my throat is is unwell today. So apologies for that. And another point is that I saw some people are requesting the mic, but it is an a medination principle that we only allow people to speak who are yeah.
And who have been known to be medination compatible, so to speak. So this takes time. We first have some sort of screening process before people are allowed to speak. So this is not in any any way to to to to to dismiss to dismiss you or to demean you or demean what you have, but this is not your conventional kind of space where a free for all, you know, it's not like that. We have our we have our own screening process, and that takes a bit of time.
But inshallah, if if you be patient and you wait, inshallah, you can take your turn and be a speaker among the speakers inshallah. So thank you all. Please inshallah, stay tuned for our next discussion, which will take into account, which will discuss the eventual fall of Antioch and the the atrocity that was committed in Maratha Nomad, cannibalism. So stay tuned, and see you later.
تمّ بحمد الله