Middle Nation Content Talks | Iran & the Axis of Assistance
Welcome. Welcome. Happy to have you here. Looking forward to today's controversial session. This topic is gonna be pretty heavy.
Lots of stuff to cover, different dynamics to cover, inshallah. So hope you enjoy it. Hope we all keep an open mind. I just wanted to give a short introduction. So, you know, as the title of the space shows, this, space will be about the video that brother Shahid has uploaded yesterday, which is Iran and the access of assistance.
So, you know, this is a very important topic because it is an important regional player, and we need to understand what his intentions are, what his relations are, what is his role in the future global, you know, order. So, Inshallah, I think this is very important to address, and that's why we have all the space to cement our understanding, to reflect on it, to try to question our own biases, inshallah. So it's very important, and this is our motivation and my motivation to hold the space. So, hopefully, inshallah, it will achieve its purpose. So without further ado, I'm gonna play the video now, inshallah.
So enjoy listening to it, and let me know if the sound is unclear or something in the content group. Thank you very much, and enjoy, and see you after this video. K. Brother Shahid joined us, so he can listen to himself once more.
Well, you know, there's a whole narrative a whole narrative that has spread over the Middle East, the Israel Palestine conflict, the whole Middle East. And it's like a canvas onto which a very different picture of the situation has been painted than the reality of the situation that's underneath the canvas. And everyone talks about the situation based on what has been painted on the canvas, and no one talks about the reality that it's covering. And I'm talking about Iran and the so called axis of resistance. This is a carefully crafted narrative designed to obscure the reality of the region and the relationships in the region.
Look. I was 10 years old when the Iranian revolution occurred, and I was following events even at that time, news. At that time, it was a big story in America, especially with The US hostages, you know, the embassy hostages and so on. So I've been listening to this narrative ever since for forty five years. We've been told for forty five years that Iran is just about to wipe Israel off the bat.
Israel has told us this, Iran has told us this, and America has told us this without interruption for nearly half a century. And for at least the last twenty years, Iran has been two weeks away from possessing nuclear weapons. So in other words, supposedly, Iran and Israel have been on the brink of catastrophic total war since I was 10 years old. Well, that's quite a wide brink. No one ever stepped in to try to ease the tensions either.
Isn't that something? I mean, for half a century, these two countries have been allegedly engaged in hostilities in technically a state of war, and there's never been any negotiations. You know? No memorandums of understanding. No truces.
No nothing. And no one, not The US, not the EU, not the United Nations, not even Jimmy Carter, has ever made any attempt to try to bring these two sides to a table to try to take the region back from the alleged precipice of war. Now look at any other major conflict. The US and The Soviet Union during the Cold War were on the brink of nuclear annihilation, but still they found a way to negotiate. India and Pakistan, sworn enemies with nuclear weapons pointed at each other, still they sit down and talk.
Even North Korea and South Korea who are technically still at war. They've had countless negotiations, but here with Iran and Israel, nothing for almost half a century. This is virtually unheard of in the history of global politics. In almost any conflict and every conflict around the world when the animosity drags on for too long, international players step in. Mediators step in.
They try to bring, you know, both sides to the table to try to broker some kind of understanding. If only for the for the sake of regional security, the UN, the EU, somebody comes in, but not here. There's been no major international push ever to resolve this supposed intention, not from The United States, not from Europe, not from the United Nations. Why is that? Why has no one ever tried to ease the tensions between these two nations?
And yet somehow, without any peace efforts, without any negotiations, somehow, without any attempt to avert this catastrophic war that they keep scaring us with, war has never happened either. It's remarkable. Well, I'll tell you why. Because Israel and Iran have a symbiotic relationship. Not a genuinely hostile relationship.
No. They both have a common interest, which is to divide and undermine the Arab world, and that's exactly what they've been doing for decades. This is a toxic marriage of convenience. I'm not saying that they like each other, but they're useful for each other and useful to America. Or, anyway, that's the way it's been.
That's that's that's been the case for a long time. I mean, many things are changing. As I've talked about many times, the regional and global order world order for the past fifty years is no longer viable. And we're in a period of transition, and it's a very rough transition. And it's a very dangerous transition, particularly for Iran.
It's a very dangerous transition for Iran, and I'm not sure if they can transition. You know, after 1979, Iran made a very public commitment to a particular style of government, a sectarian religious style of government. And then they had an accompanying ethos as a nation with that. And that locked them in to a great extent on how how they have to present themselves to the world and how they have to interact with the world and and in the region. You know?
In the early days, during the time of Khomeini, it was even more radical than it is now, relatively speaking, and maybe even more genuine than it is now. But even then, even when they presented themselves as anti West, anti Israel, anti imperialist, and so on, Even at that time, Iran was still always pragmatic and practical and practiced realpolitik. You know, for the first ten years of the so called Islamic Republic, at the very same time that they were calling for the destruction of Israel, they were buying weapons from Israel and engaged in high level military intelligence cooperation. In fact, the more they cooperate and the more they coordinate, the more they have to proclaim their hostility. It's a performance to mask their pragmatism.
They were fighting Saddam Hussein in the nineteen eighties and buying weapons from Israel and getting weapons from America, sanctions notwithstanding, and anti American, anti Israel rhetoric notwithstanding. In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, there were a lot of resistance groups fighting them in Lebanon, Sunni groups, secular groups, and other Shiite groups. But Iran created Hezbollah, funded them, armed them, and trained them to the hilt to where they eclipsed everyone else. This gave Iran the ability to dictate and control the resistance to Israel. It also gave them the ability to sow a sectarian division in Lebanon, radicalize the population, and exacerbate the civil war, all of which increased their influence in Lebanon.
And it undermined the Sunnis and undermined the power and the authority of the Lebanese government. I mean, the fact of the matter is Hezbollah has killed many, many times more Lebanese and Syrian Sunnis than they have ever killed Israelis. This is just a fact. I mean, if we were to go by the body count, we would have to conclude that Hezbollah's main mission has been against Sunni Muslims, not against Zionists. You know, the government of Lebanon, by the way, has always traditionally, historically, and now been much more aligned with Saudi Arabia and supported by Saudi Arabia and supported by The Gulf.
Iran has not really invested much in Lebanon outside of Hezbollah. In fact, Iran has primarily only been investing in militancy across the region, not in infrastructure, not in hospitals, not in business, and so forth. And that's been enough for them. That's been enough to make them useful until now. So they were able to basically take control of opposition to Israel in Lebanon in the eighties.
And then in the nineties and the early two thousands, they provided the most significant funding for Hamas in Gaza in the early days, thereby giving them control to one extent or another over the opposition to Israel there. They also funded the Islamic Jihad in Gaza at that time. So they established their their whole over opposition groups, over opposition to Israel, resistance to Israel in the North and in the South. And then they more or less lost interest in supporting Hamas once Hamas came to power in Gaza. This this people overlook this.
When they became a government, when Hamas became a government, when the blockade was imposed, and when active resistance operations were no longer their main concern and they just had to survive, at that point, Qatar took over, and they became their main supporters. It's because of them that Hamas was even able to have an administration in Gaza for all these years. Once they posed less of a threat to Israel, Iran lost interest. It was no longer important to them to control them. Now you might interpret this as being because Iran was just so committed to militant resistance against Israel that when Hamas became a government and necessarily deemphasized active resistance operations, Iran was no longer interested.
But you might consider the fact that between the creation of Hamas and 2007 with Iranian backing, Hamas's main method for confronting Israel was by means of suicide bombings, not by sophisticated technology. Meanwhile, Hezbollah was being armed to the teeth while Gazan resistance fighters from Hamas and Islamic Jihad still had to strap on bombs and deliver them with their own bodies. Now Iran did help them get the their first Assam rockets. But compare the Hassan rockets with the missiles that Hezbollah has and and that Hezbollah had at that time. No.
In my opinion, it looks like Iran was controlling the resistance in Gaza, not empowering it. They were restricting the resistance, and they armed and funded Hezbollah in Lebanon to the point that they became a a a rival state in and of themselves. They became a parallel power structure in Lebanon, and no one else could emerge in terms of resistance. It's also worth noting that most outside funding for Gaza in terms of infrastructure, hospitals, schools, clinics, and so on, that's also come from The Gulf countries predominantly, not Iran. And the same goes for Lebanon.
Like I said, spending and investment in terms of things that that that promote social stability, all of that's coming from The Gulf. I'm saying that Iran has only ever acted pragmatically in the region for the purpose of increasing their own influence and undermining the stability, the unity, and the security of the Arab Sunni Muslims. And part of that has been to gain leverage and control over the anti Israel resistance in the region. This is simply irrefutable. And in this regard, Israel's interest and Iran's interest coincide.
Now this will sound conspiratorial or maybe even insulting to Iran if you are fully and heavily invested in Iran's rhetoric and in that narrative that they're standing against Israel and they're standing against the West and so on. This is the narrative that Iran, Israel, and America have committed to, and it gives Iran credibility, which increases their influence. And it gives Israel the perfect pretext for their claim of being under a constant existential threat, a claim which serves the purpose of the American military industrial complex funneling billions of taxpayer dollars into the weapons sector to protect Israel supposedly. It's a symbiotic relationship, mutually beneficial for all three of these countries, Iran, America, and Israel. Iran has been extremely pragmatic and cunning and strategic, and they've actually positioned themselves as much more useful to America and to Israel than threatening.
That's why no war has ever actually broken out in fifty years despite all the hype. That's why Iraq was attacked after nine eleven instead of Iran, why Baghdad got shot and odd instead of Tehran, why Saddam Hussein was the one who got hanged instead of Khamenei, and why basically delivering Iraq to Iran's sphere of influence was not an accident. All this time you thought that that The US and Israel were trying to contain Iran. No. They have observably and demonstrably done nothing but expand Iran's reach.
That's not accidental because they are useful, not threatening. Not threatening anyway to to America, not threatening to Israel. No. This is why the missile attacks in April and this week were coordinated, were orchestrated, and were choreographed, and why they did not result in any deliberate casualties, and why very little damage was actually done, because this is a form of political or or geopolitical theater. Now having said all of that, this is just to give you an understanding, a more accurate understanding of the role that Iran has actually played in the region for the last fifty years because it's radically different from the narrative that we've all been fed for decades.
However, as I have talked about many times, the global order is changing. Everybody's role in The Middle East is being altered, including Israel and including Iran. The BRICS aligned faction of the OCGFC, as again, I've mentioned many times. I've mentioned it repeatedly. They appear to be supportive of Mohammed bin Salman's vision for the Middle East, which will mean stability and end to conflict development across the whole Arab side of the Mediterranean and so on.
Now in my opinion, at least three elements in the region will need to be removed for any of this to work, elements which have, until now, defined the region. They are Zionism that has to go, militancy that has to go, and the sectarian religious regime in Iran. So for the first time in fifty years, it's actually possible that Iran might actually be in danger. I don't think anyone seriously wants regime change in Iran to happen by means of war because the collateral regional damage will be so massive. But for the first time in half a century, it could it could really happen at this point.
I personally don't think that it will. But for the first time, it is a possibility. I think that Iran is making what you could call good faith gestures even though that's a pretty grimly ironic term to use in this case. Gestures of good faith to try to show Briggs and to show the OCGFC that they can cooperate. Like I said, they boxed themselves in with their staunchly ideological posturing and public ethos.
And now they have to try to prove that they can pivot away from that. I think this is why they allowed the assassination of Ismail Hania and why they cooperated with Israel in the pager attacks, which is Israel does not have the intelligence capacity to have done that alone. No. And it's why so many senior Hezbollah officers have been successfully eliminated by Israel and why Hassan Nasrallah was sacrificed? Because, yes, I believe he was sacrificed.
Because, look, it has been an understanding for decades between America, Israel, and Iran that Hassan Nasrallah was not to be killed because they had a belief that that were he to be assassinated, it would necessarily result in escalation and retaliation by Iran, and nobody wanted to see that happen. Because, again, for the sake of their image, the yon necessarily would have to do that if Nasrallah was murdered. However, now I believe that everyone agrees that these groups, both Hamas and Hezbollah, have to be dissolved. Well, you can't just disband them. That's not feasible.
So you have to dissolve them amidst the fog of war behind smoke screen, the the screen of gun smoke. And no matter what anyone says, the killing of Hassan Nasrallah was a massive blow to Hezbollah. And the fact that Iran retaliated for Hania, the pagers, and the killing of Hassan Nasrallah altogether in one visibly dramatic but practically unsubstantial attack, well, that says volumes. It says to me that Iran is trying to not only distance themselves from these militant groups, from both Hamas and Hezbollah, but especially Hezbollah, but they're actually cooperating in their gradual elimination. This is what the this is what's going on with Israel and Lebanon right now, in my opinion.
The idea is for both Israel and Hezbollah to get involved in a grinding stalemate that will weaken both of them. Their airstrikes in Syria are also mostly targeted towards Hezbollah targets. And Bashan al Assad has not responded in any meaningful way. These the the the locations that they're targeting are not being defended. I believe that Israel has been given the green light, not only by The US, but I think that this green light has been given by The US because Iran has signaled that they will not seriously respond.
And this is to demonstrate to BRICS and to the OCGFC that Iran is ready to play ball, and they're ready to participate in this new vision for the region. By doing this, they think, and they might be right, that they can save themselves from regime change and from actual war and invasion. Now understand, I don't think that Israel or, anyway, Netanyahu, I don't think they understand any of this. They're doing what they're doing because they're psychotic fanatics. But after decades of dealing with them, everyone in the region has fully understood how to predict their behavior.
And predictable behavior can be manipulated, and I think that Israel is being manipulated. They truly do not understand that all of their actions are doing nothing but weaken them. Their belligerence and their hubris is causing them to think that they're winning, but they're doing nothing but lose steadily. You know? Iran is not making any decisions today without consulting BRICS partners first.
They're talking to Russia. They're talking to China. They're talking to Saudi Arabia, and the whole region now is following one playbook. So the advice that Iran is getting from these other countries, these BRICS nations is all based on the grand strategy for achieving regional cohesion and stability and prosperity. And I think to a great extent, America's reactions are also being guided by the BRICS aligned OCGFC and by Saudi Arabia and by The UAE because the neocons, the political faction of the military industrial complex, their influence has decreased considerably over the last several years.
Not to mention the fact that even for the neocons and even for the Zionists, destroying Iran is not a long term profitable idea. As I said, Iran posing as a the big bad threat to Israel has been an incredibly lucrative premise for The US and for Israel. So if Iran is destroyed and either becomes an occupied country or gets shattered into a chaos and becomes a playground for militant groups or what have you, it will be significantly reduced as a plausible threat. So I think that for even the most warmongering faction in The US, which is the neocons, I think even for them, they understand that destroying Iran is something that they can always talk about, but they should never actually pursue in real life. I mean, maybe only Lindsey Graham is dumb enough to really think annihilating Iran is a good idea.
I think even those who want to still try to hang on to the post World War two world order understand that Iran has served as a valuable asset to Western imperialism and has maintained a beneficial balance of power in The Middle East for them and has been a source of division and destabilization alongside Israel. But for the more forward thinking officials in The US, war with Iran is understood as the worst possible move they could make. The only question is whether regime change can be achieved without war in Iran. That's an open question. Like I said, I think the Iranian government is trying to save itself from regime change by proving that they can abandon their historical role in the region and actually start cooperating with the Arabs and with The Gulf.
And the Arabs and The Gulf are reciprocating in good faith by declaring their neutrality. They they said that they're not gonna cooperate in any attack against Iran Because the priority for them now and the priority for Briggs and the priority for this faction of the OCDFC is to isolate America from the region and try to reduce American interference as much as possible. But the Iranian regime has a lot of baggage. I mean, I think they're trying to jettison some of that baggage now, but it remains to be seen whether or not this is gonna be sufficient. People need to understand that that that there's only one permanent power game in the Middle East, and that's between the Persians and the Arabs.
Every outsider, whether it was the Crusaders, whether it's the colonizers, whether it's the Zionists, the Americans, or even the Russians or the Chinese, Alsiders are all viewed as transient players in the region who are basically only tools. They're either tools or obstacles or weapons or or impediments of some kind that have to just be factored in by the indigenous people when they strategize how to achieve their own dominance in that permanent power game between the Persians and the Arabs. Now Iran has heavily relied on being aligned with the imperialists covertly for decades. And while they have enjoyed significant expansion of their influence as a result into Iraq, into Lebanon, into Syria, into Yemen, and so on, the boogeyman role that they have historically played is working against their long term interests now. And the countries that are really leading the the the effort for remodeling the Middle East and who have a real vision for the region is the Arabs.
And they're pursuing it by means of money, not militancy, by means of diplomacy and politicking, not collusion with the colonizers and subversion of out of governments, by building unity, not sowing division, promoting stability, not disruption. So Iran has a massive amount of adapting to do. I wouldn't be surprised if maybe within the next five years or so, maybe sooner, maybe later, depending on several variables, I think we'll see Iran actually proposing their own normalization with Israel. I'm quite sure that that's the endgame. If the Saudis, for example, are unable to successfully pressure for the establishment of a Palestinian state, well, then Iran can offer normalization on the same condition as the Saudis, meaning the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Or maybe they can demand a one state solution in exchange for normalization. But either way, normalization is actually the best card that they're still holding even though, you know, a huge amount of preparation domestically would be necessary before you could get the the population to accept it. But their proxies are gonna be ground down over the next few years, and they're gonna have to completely modify their national ethos in order to participate in the regional BRICS project. And if they don't normalize with Israel, then the GCC and Turkey are gonna get the lion's share of the economic leverage over Israel and over Lebanon and over Syria. And all of the gains that Iran has made in in in the expansion of their sphere of influence is gonna evaporate.
And their sphere of influence has always been their main concern. Let me be clear about that. I'm not saying that Iran has been working with Israel and with America because they love them. No. They've been doing it for very pragmatic reasons.
Now that might be incredibly offensive to to highly ideological people, but this is how states operate in real life. Iran has been operating this way pragmatically for the purpose of expanding their influence, and they have been quite successful. And part of their strategy has been to mask their violence and their destabilization against Arab Sunnis by means of loud but factually limited opposition to Israel and by posturing as Israel's big boogeyman without ever seriously posing a real threat to Israel to the point that they can actually launch hundreds of ballistic missiles against Israel without causing any major damage or casualties to Israel. But it has to be understood that none of these parties are friends. I'm not suggesting that America, Israel, and Iran know.
They simply have had aligned interests. Like I said, Hezbollah has killed Sunnis by orders of magnitude far more than they killed Israelis. And if you add to that the Iranian backed militants in Iraq and then add to that the Houthis in Yemen, where the number of Muslims that Iran has killed directly or through their proxies is off the charts. And through these means and through supporting Bashan al Assad against the majority Sunni population of Syria, Iran has been able to simultaneously divide the region, destabilize the region, gain greater influence in the region, strengthen Israel, collaborate with the Americans against Iraq, against the Taliban, against Syrian rebels, even against Turkey, all while maintaining their image as defiant of the West. And with them and their proxies being able to call themselves the axis of resistance.
And there's many people who genuinely believe it's true. All I'm asking, resistance against what? Resistance against who? Again, this has worked for them very well up until now, but it's not gonna work anymore. Ending Zionism makes the Iran sphere of influence unsustainable.
Ending militancy makes, you know, sphere of influence unsustainable. Because these two things have been the key factors in how they achieve it. This sphere of influence. Regional conflict ending makes their sphere of influence unsustainable. You can't keep a sectarian armed parallel government in Lebanon whose whose only rationale for existence is opposition to Israel.
If you wanna participate in a in a in a project for regional stability and prosperity, which includes integrating Israel into the region and includes a permanent resolution to the Palestinian conflict. So most of what Iran has depended upon to build this sphere of influence is becoming obsolete or is going to become obsolete. I don't know if the so called revolutionary Shia government of Iran as it is currently configured. I don't know if they can make the transition. But, frankly, whether or not they can convince BRICS and whether or not they can convince the OCGFC that they can make that transition, that might just be their best bet for averting regime change by means of either war or assassination or color revolution because I think that these are the only options that they have with regards to the future of their of their state, the future of their government.
But in in the long term, Iran does have to prove that they can play ball and that they they can approach the region in some way other than through the creation of malicious.
To everyone who joined. Welcome to our space. I hope you enjoyed this video recording. Thank you very much. Okay.
So to to anyone that joined us today during the video, we will basically look into this misunderstood role Iran has played in The Middle East, and it has played this role for the past basically fifty years. So, you know, contrary to this public narrative of hostility, Alludes that the relationship between Iran, Israel, and US is one of the strategic manipulation and pragmatic alliances. Alright? And these are rooted in some mutual benefit between these three parties. So we need to reassess Iran's traditional influence strategy, which was basically until now built on conflict and resistance.
Iran, based on what brother Shahid analyzed, is forced to either adapt to this new global order that is coming, or it will risk collapse. So before we start, we were thinking, inshallah, to mention couple of notes about, you know, open mindedness. Right? We should spend a couple of minutes thinking about this, especially in relation to this topic. Right?
Because it is on one part an emotional topic. It is on one part, especially given the situation that we are seeing with Palestine. A lot of people are invested emotionally. So we need to, you know, as inshallah Muslim brothers and sisters to remind ourselves what is the purpose of this. Alright?
We're not trying to blame anyone for stuff. We're not trying to shed a negative light, a positive light. We are just stating facts. Yeah? And facts, as Ben Shapiro says, they don't care about your emotions.
Alright? And I don't like that guy, but it's just funny to think about it in relation to this topic. So, you know, open mindedness, it's not just about hearing other perspective. That is kinda easy to a certain degree. Right?
But it is about being humble, right, that we may not have all the answers. You know, we are, like, constantly required to step beyond the comfort of our own assumptions. Right? And we need to deeply consider the viewpoint of others even when they challenge our own deeply held beliefs. Alright?
And this is basically the foundation of some sort of wisdom of some sort of intellectual growth. Alright? Like, if you're not open minded, you will not know that you are wrong until it's too late. Alright? But even more profound are the teachings of our beloved prophet Muhammad Right?
Many of the hadith encourage us to, you know, seek knowledge, sequence them, And this is regard regardless of where it comes from. Right? We need to be open with new insights no matter how unconventional they might see. And, you know, even the Quran itself reminds us, right, to think critically, to reflect deeply, and to be humble in accepting what is true. Allah tells us in Yeah.
And this verse emphasizes that to be guided by Allah means to listen, right, to consider, and then to choose the best path. Right? This is the true open mindedness. It's not about blindly accepting or blindly rejecting, but trying to filter information through this lens of humility, through intellect, and most importantly, of course, through Islam itself. Alright?
And this is always just about you know, this is about being just. Right? It's about being fair. And the only way we can as Muslims be fair and achieve this is by trying to view everything as objectively as possible. Alright?
So, you know, this is not a sign of weakness or doubt. It's in fact a sign of strength. Right? It signifies that we are mature enough to try to learn, right, that we have the courage to grow, that we, inshallah, have the wisdom to admit that my perspective is not the only one that exists. Right?
You know, the guy next to me might know it better. So, you know, and the prophet engaged, and we see this in the, we see this in different hadith when engaged with different people of different strata, of different faith, different opinions. He always listened and responded with patience, with wisdom, and especially with profound insights. Right? So, you know, I would like also brother Shahid to maybe or anyone else from our speakers if you wanna add something to this point just before, you know, we head into the deep waters of the ocean.
I would just maybe spend two more minutes thinking about why it's so important. And what is the purpose of this? Right? You know, brother Shahid can somehow just give two, three sentences based on what was your motivation and how do you view it, how it should be perceived, how it should be received.
Okay. Well, the purpose of it is the purpose of pretty much all of the videos that I put out, which is just to try as best I can, as best according to my own understanding and observation of, you know, fifty something years to understand the reality of any given situation. If you don't understand the reality of of any given situation, then you will make wrong judgments about it. And in terms of your own strategies and your own approach, will make mistakes. So it's very important to have a to try to have an accurate understanding of the world and of any particular or any given situation whether you're talking about an individual or you're talking about a nation or what have you.
If you listen carefully to what I said in that video, all I said is that Iran operates the same way that any other state operates, which is pragmatically to secure their interests. That's all I said. But there are people who have a need to believe in an idealized version of a country. And this this happens to, you know, to people of with regards to any country. The most prominent example, of course, is Americans about America where they believe they need to believe that America is this beacon of virtue and wonderfulness and justice and so forth.
And when you when you have become indoctrinated to that sort of a propaganda about your own country or about another country, well, you will never understand what they do. And then when you find out what they do, you'll feel betrayed, and you'll feel that that country is, treacherous and diabolical and so on. Now what I'm talking about with regards to Iran is not to suggest that they are treacherous or diabolical or any of those things, but I'm just suggesting that it's a normal country, that it operates like any other country does. And I think that they have done it extremely, extremely well. The the strategy that they have, adopted over the last forty five so years, nearly half century, has served them very well.
And they were in a tough position, after 1979. They were in a very tough position, and they have been able to function, they've been able to survive, and they have reached the point where they're thriving, to one extent or another, and they have in fact, increased their sphere of influence, in ways that you could not really have predicted in 1979, they've been very successful in their strategies. And I think that, if you have a need to believe, you know, this this is this is the the the response that I get when I talk about Iran. If you don't believe, Shahid, if you don't believe that Iran is valiant and noble and virtuous and perfect and wonderful, well, then you're just biased against Iran. In other words, if you don't have an irrational pro Iranian bias, then you're biased.
So this this reveals itself that the person who's addressing you is themself heavily propagandized and indoctrinated and has an emotional need to believe something. I don't. I don't have an emotional need to believe anything. Not about Iran, not about Saudi Arabia, not about America, not about any place. As a Muslim, you have to tell the truth, and you have to try to understand reality, again, as I said, as best you can and be realistic.
And understand, in this particular case, as in in in in any analysis of any country and any policy that any country adopts, you have to understand that, countries operate as realists. They operate, pragmatically and practically and realistically, given the options that they have. And Iran is no different. They're no different. But if you have the need to believe in a sort of a myth of an an idealized myth about Iran or anywhere else, you will be categorically wrong in your assessment of that country, whatever country you're talking about.
Shukran. Thank you, brother Shahid. Exactly right. Like, this is exactly what it's about. Right?
We are trying to find the truth, inshallah. And, you know, we are human beings. Human beings sometimes fall into mistakes. That's normal. Our father, Adam, fell in slipped into a mistake.
This is what happens. Right? We are not saying we are a 100% true in everything, but we are trying as best as possible to be objective to assess things for how they are, inshallah. So exactly when approaching the controversial topics, especially like the one we are dealing with today, we must embody everything that brother Shahid has said. We need to be radically open minded inshallah.
Sorry, sister Waheeda. I don't know if you are open mic by mistake. Or
No. I I feel on the way. Can everyone can you hear me?
Yes, sister.
Okay. I just say bravo to brother Shahid for this video. I was in my early twenties when the Iranian Islamic revolution took place. I watched the whole, crisis with the hostages, watched them being released, and watched the solidification of the new Iranian government after the release of the American hostages. I would venture to say that a great deal of, if not most of the people who have been commenting so negatively on brother Shaheed's stake on this situation, are much younger than I.
For years, I watched this, and I recognized after fifteen years of all of this saber rattling that that's just what it was. It was saber rattling on the side of The United States, on the side of Israel, and on the side of the Islamic Republic. Just saber rattling. I have watched The United States send troops into so many nations on so many pretext over these fifty years. Where did they not send troops?
They didn't send them into Iran that, you know, the Israelis didn't go into Iran. The Israelis didn't bomb Iran. The Israelis bombed everything and its brother except for Iran and Saudi Arabia because that's just a no go because it's where our holiest cities are. There are a whole lot of us, and everyone knows that if you bomb Saudi Arabia, all bets are off, bend over, kiss your behind goodbye because the Muslims are going to go crazy. So I have watched this, and I came to the conclusion a long time ago that this was, as brother Shaheed says, political theater and that it was helping the military industrial complex to have American tax dollars transferred to it on the pretext of having to shore ourselves up against the Iranian threat, which has turned out to be nonexistent and the same with the Israelis.
The the this it's kind of to me ridiculous to continue to believe the myth that has been put out there. How many times does the shepherd boy have to cry wolf before we figure out as his lock increases that there is no wolf? And why people are so angry with brother Shahid and calling him, you know, a turncoat and a Zionist? Tell me what damage has Iran really done to Israel. Iran can send missiles into Tel Aviv.
Iran has the capability to obliterate Tel Aviv, but Tel Aviv is still standing. Iran threatens to obliterate it, but Iran does not do so. And I understood that it would be impossible for that region of the world to gain stability with essentially an anational military as the second strongest military to Israel in the region, meaning Hezbollah. I I knew they couldn't continue, and I knew that the state actors in the region did not want them to continue. People do not willingly give up power, So I didn't expect Hezbollah to ever to ever say, well, you know what?
We're gonna give up our guns, and we're gonna fold ourselves into the Lebanese military. So this is what is happening. This is essentially a necessary cleanup because it just the region cannot continue the way it has been continuing. Right? Anyway, that's that's my take on it, and, maybe I'll come back later on and say a few other things that are going on here in America that I think people don't pay attention to and should.
Thank you very much, sister Wahida. Okay. So let's get straight into the video. Right? We've been waiting for it.
So, Okay. So right from the start, right in the first part of the video, our brother Shahid, he kind of challenges this narrative. Right? The Iran and Israel have been on the verge of this catastrophic war for almost half a century. And we can see continuous claims in the media, in the news, right, that Iran is this major threat to Israel's existence.
And there is always yeah. There was this funny also thing, right, where it's on the brink of possessing or using nuclear weapons, the scary word, right, that is used often. But this conflict has never actually materialized. Alright? And sister Wahida also spoke about it now beautifully, so we understand what is being said.
Right? So, basically, what brother Shahid implies is that this narrative has been constructed and sustained deliberately, right, and has been actually shaping perception for the past five decades. My question is to our beloved speakers. So if Iran has consistently been portrayed as this imminent threat to Israel and without any direct military escalation, what purpose might this narrative serve for Iran, Israel, and the Middle Eastern landscape?
Yes. Assalamu alaikum, everyone. Thank you for joining us today. Yeah. As as established in the content, Iran was supposed to be America's staunch enemy for the last fifty years, yet somehow America continuously accidentally bolstered Iran's regional influence.
And, again, I mean, we we are talking about a a a pragmatic state here, which is just operating to exist and and and creating its own narrative. And it started out hot because when the shah was overthrown by the ayatollah, it was unthinkable that they would be linked to the West in any way because everyone viewed the shah as a reinstallment of western influence after they ended the rule of Musaddak. But slowly over the years, a pattern emerged, subhanAllah. Somehow America and Iran seem to always have shared enemies. Of course, Iran can never be right, so America would swoop in, attack, and create this power vacuum that somehow always got filled by Iranian backed militants.
The pattern made those two a de facto coalition, like a good cop, bad cop routine routine. They both had the same goal, but seemingly have opposing views. So so when it comes to us perceiving Iran, it's it's quite a complex thing. Any group trying to assess this is left genuinely dizzy by this pragmatic way that Iran operates regardless of what point of view you look at it, whether a Muslim or an Arab or a Persian. But from an Arab point point of view, do they forsake all the Arab rulers and look to the Iranian power to restore Arab sovereignty while casting aside their own leaders as traitors.
It it it casts quite a mirage when when Iran is the one carrying the proverbial sword, so much so that that the Arabs are blinded to the good that the leaders are doing, whether it be an MBS who has been vocal for for Palestinian sovereignty, making it clear that he will have nothing to do with Israel. All the Arabs have been on the same page. Even in the United Nations here recently, we saw them speak out loud about how they're united, but most people are looking at Iran because of the narrative they've created. They're the ones with the sword. Ultimately, regardless of what angle we view Iran from, two things are clear.
They are extremely clever. They understood the covert methodology of the West and played their role to a tee, growing their power and crowning themselves the heroes of all Muslims. And the second thing is once the fog clears, there isn't a chance for such a regime regime to continue existing. The same clever planning that got them to where they are will be their undoing. The ironic parallel of Iran and America isn't just the covert nature of how they rose to prominence.
It's also how easily it all gets dismantled once you see the pattern and the evidence becomes irrefutable. The future of Iran, whether independently or part of a greater regional union, cannot involve the current regime. How that happens is a matter of time to tell. Thank you.
Thank you very much, brother, sister Wahida.
Yeah. I just want to thank brother Ali. What he said is really, really accurate, I believe. And I'm just going to say this. I have a wide specter of people in my family, all of whom I associate with closely.
Among those, one of my orthodox Jewish relatives who is an Israeli, Israeli born and bred, and whose home I have been to and, you know, more than once and whatnot, and who I see with my Florida relatives when I go and visit them, this man said to me in an extended conversation I had at my sister's house a few years ago. He said to me, you know, I really like Iranians. And while that may not seem like, a major statement, I know what he does for a living. So I understood the circumstances under which he had been dealing with Iranians. Okay?
This is a person who was in the Israeli military security establishment and has been for decades. The reason that he lives in South Florida is because America's military central command known as Cent Tom is headquartered there. So, you know, I have known for years that, Israel had close dealings with Iranians, and and people just don't realize this. I essentially locked up on that fact in a very direct manner simply because this is a member of my family. But what Ustad says is correct.
What brother Ali said is correct. And, if you just look at the amount of time, the number of decades that have taken place in which Iran just plays the part of the boogeyman, but yet doesn't behave as a boogeyman, you'll you'll understand what's going on. Thank
you, sister Raghida. Yeah. Brother MJ MG, please.
Everyone. So I'm going to talk about I mean, we've we've we've already went very deeply into the topic of Iran and the access of resistance or assistance. I want to be as constructive as I can in with this issue. Think one of the problems that we have faced, I would say, as the Arab world, Muslim world, particularly the Arab world, the the geographic area of the Middle East is that we are very emotionally driven by our reactions to what what we hear from the
news, what we hear from
the events, and so forth. And this has cost us for decades a lot. A lot in terms of for a variety of a lot in a variety of aspects, aspects, emotionally, politically, and strategically, most of all. Because this has cascaded not just between the masses, but also all the way up until even some segments of the leadership across the region. Iran, the Arab world, whichever one you would like to choose.
And this has caused a lot of diplomatic fallout between all of these countries together. And we need to change the way we look at the world. We need to change the way and how we perceive events. When I'm when I'm talking about the GFC in this context, I'm talking about those that are aligned with the neocons. For decades, they don't think the same.
They don't think as emotionally as we do. They think in terms of strategic outcome. They wanted a region for decades with a landscape that is constantly in animosity with each other. So they might help Iran at some point in time, but then later they might help other groups at some point in time. So it is not about are they together with Iran?
Are they are they not? It's about creating a landscape where the the animosity is is is away from the core issue that is playing the region. And you would find that, let's say, the regime in Iran collapses, they're going the the NEOCON aligned OCGFC will try to start another Arab spring in the Arab world because they don't want these two they don't want these two blocks in the region to be coalesced, aligned on a particular strategy. So I'm not talking here about, oh, we're going to be hostile towards Israel or we're going to take a more soft pass. No.
It's talking about generally a a a strategized approach, one that we all commit to regardless what it is, and we fulfill it. So they don't want that. It's not about who's hostile and who isn't. It's about organizing and agreeing on a particular approach that we take. At the moment, until very recently, until the China managed to get South Saudi Arabia and Iran together, there was a divergence in terms of the strategy towards the Middle East.
And at the moment, there's an aligning of the vision that we see. So we need to look at this from that angle. And, of course, we have to understand also the geographic factors that are involved. Iran is capable of being, quote, unquote, hostile to those who perceive it as hostile or not. To Israel is also there's a geographic factor that aids in that.
They are very far away from Israel. They have very rough terrain, and they they don't fear the idea of one day they will wake up and find Israel the Israeli army in Tehran. That's not the case with Jordan. That's not the case with Egypt where Sinai the North Of Sinai is very flat, and you can find them in on the Suez Canal. So there's lots of things that you need to think about.
Strategy of nations play a role in that. The geography of nations play a role in that. And you have to understand that before you start, how we say, making a or in in one country or another. You have to understand countries and nations within their rightful context and within the historical experiences that they've been through. So that's all I can say from that angle.
And if anyone can care to contribute, you're more than welcome.
Thank you very much, Habibi. That was great, and especially how you tied all of these. Brilliant mind. So, you know, like, this is basically this supposed animosity is primarily you know, brother Shahid emphasizes that it's a strategic tool to somehow manipulate regional dynamics. Right?
So I would like to ask, how does this orchestrated strategic, you know, presented as hostility? How does this arrangement serve the individual goals of the parties involved? Right? So we are speaking about Iran, Israel, and basically The US. Right?
When we talk about Israel, it's just a puppet of, you know, some bigger factions at play. And already brother MG spoke about the neocons and so on. And we'll get to that later. But what, you know, does this arrangement and the goals, what implications does that have for the stability and unity of The Middle East?
Well, you know, first of all, I I wanna just clarify something also, which is that any state with ambition, with expansionist ambition that wants to increase their sphere of influence, they will have animosity to anyone and everyone who interferes with their sphere of influence. If we talk about Iran's hostility or animosity towards Israel, Israel is to one degree or another a competitor for influence in the region. So the the you know, it's not it's not this is the this is the thing. When you're when you're talking about states and the behavior of states and the policies of states, we're not talking about, you know, friending and unfriending people on Facebook. It's much more nuanced and complex than that.
So what what my argument is is that Iran does not pose the threat or the danger to Israel that we've always been told that it does. And America knows that, and Israel knows that, and Iran knows that. But the expressions, the public expressions of hostility and threat and and all of this sort of bombastic language, that is performative, pure and simple. It is performative. That doesn't mean, as I repeated many times in the video, that doesn't mean that they like each other.
Of course, they don't like each other. No state likes another state unless they can have their way and get what they want from that state, and even then they only like them insofar as they can get what they want. This is about interests. Mean, I repeated that many times in the in the video. With regards to, like, for example, how this how this hostility, these these expressions of hostility have, for example, benefited Iran, well, gave them the ability to have Hezbollah and basically give them the ability to have influence in Lebanon, for example, that they would not they would not otherwise have.
The same in Syria. The whole as Ali was saying, the whole basis for and as I said in the video, the whole basis for their the expansion of their sphere of influence has been based upon their proclamation of their hostility to Israel. That gives you or any state that that that builds its influence on that basis, that gives you a vested interest in maintaining that country. You have to maintain that threat. You have to maintain that animosity.
You have to maintain that antagonism because that's the whole basis for what for the rationale of your existence. I mean, Hezbollah doesn't have a reason to exist except for the animosity to Israel. And like sister Wahidu was saying, they don't have a reason to have refused to give up their weapons, for example, when when all of the other factions in in Lebanon were supposed to give up their weapons, Hezbollah didn't. And the the rationale for that is, well, we have to protect Lebanon from Israel. Their their influence is based on the animosity, the public animosity, the expressions, and the the official antagonism between them and Israel.
This has been the whole basis for the for the expansion of their influence except for with the only exception being the the destruction of Iraq. That that was just gifted to them by the Americans. That was just gifted to Iran by the Americans to to basically hand Iraq over to Iran. But their influence in Syria, their influence in Lebanon, this is completely based upon the perpetuation of Zionist threat. They, I mean, you know, changed my mind.
That that's that's the whole basis for it. And like like sister Wahidu was saying, if you like like with with Hezbollah and and Iran's relationship, if you care about Lebanon, why don't you invest in Lebanon? Why don't you why instead of creating a a a parallel group, instead of creating a a a, you know, a sort of a shadow government, why don't you support the government itself in Lebanon? If you if you wanna send all of your weapons and your arms and whatnot, why to Hezbollah? Why not to the army of Lebanon?
Why don't you wanna strengthen them? You know? And this is this is where the sectarian nature of their policy comes in. And this is this is just an an observation. It's not making a judgment about it.
It's not saying this isn't an anti Shia anything, but this is the position of the government of Iran. It is a Shia religious regime explicitly, and this is this is their priority. And so if you're analyzing their policies, you have to understand it within the context of their own reasoning, and their reasoning is to support their particular ideological belief and to and to try to get to increase the influence of that ideological belief. And they are, as an ideological belief, a minority in the region. So they have to come up with some way of how you spread that, when the when the region is not receptive to it, and and one of the ways is by posturing and posing and presenting yourself as this big hero to rescue the Palestinians while you have not rescued the Palestinians in fifty years.
The only countries in the region that have ever actually gone to war with Israel And on that list, Iran is not there. Egypt has done it. Syria has done it. Lebanon has done it. Jordan has has participated in that.
Even Saudi Arabia has participated in that back in the day. So if you're looking at countries that have actually who actually have a record of going to war with Israel, Iran is not one of them. And and they're they're very interested, as I said, in spreading their particular ideological belief system. And this, again, is explicitly stated by them and and by Khomeini upon the founding of the republic that they wanted to spread this. Now how as I said, how do you spread that in a region that is not receptive to it?
Well, you have to present yourself in some other way that is more admirable and likable and so on. And and this this in fact was one of the things I didn't even mention it in the video. This was in fact one of the reasons why they had a split with Hamas because at the time of the this is when it was sort it sort of was the straw that broke the camel's back as they say, because they still had although it was drastically reduced their support for Hamas after they gained power in Gaza, they were still supportive in in one way or another. But once the civil war broke out in Syria, well, they wanted Hamas to support their position in supporting Bashar, and Hamas refused. They they didn't accept that.
And this was sort of the straw that broke the camel's back, so it was an ideological issue for them. And and as I say, you present yourself as as this hero of the Palestinians, this valiant, wonderful, noble liberator of Palestine with no results, by the way. But you you you present yourself as that, and that makes you appealing in a way that you would not be appealing otherwise on the basis of the fact that you have a minority belief system within the region.
Brother. Thought brother wanted to speak, but I feel he just oh, he's here. Okay. Welcome, brother. Happy to have you here.
First
and foremost, we appreciate I'm I'm not gonna go on for too long, but I do want to make a couple of points. You know, Middle Nation has created a platform that is predicated upon spreading an analysis that is meant to be as objective as possible, which means full analysis. And there is there has been a conflation with Iran attacking Israel and Iran attacking Israel to help Palestine, which is something that we all want to see happen. It is an emotional one for anyone who doesn't want to see the genocide of of our Palestinian brothers and sisters in faith and in humanity. This idea of someone finally standing up to this bully that has not been stopped.
That is an emotion that all of us can relate to. But Iran did not do that to help Palestine, and that is something that we can objectively say is true. Otherwise, they wouldn't have waited this long to do it. They wouldn't have waited for the death of of two of their, commanders. They wouldn't have waited if it was about Palestine, it wouldn't have taken this long for that to happen.
And I think that is an objective analysis, and that doesn't mean that we are anti shady, that there's this unit now is the time to unite. Unite behind what exactly? And forgive my tone. If it appears to be harsh, then please do not judge me harshly. But let's just be very candid and open and honest with each other.
We all have this want to see an end to a an atrocity that none of us thought that we would live through, that we would ever see in our lifetime, lessons that we thought that as a collective, we've at least learned this much. When we talk about the West, we talk about their ideology because we know the ideology drives their politics, the hedonism, the secularism, the barbarity that has defined the West for a long time. So when Shahid makes that analysis, we say that's correct. We know that in The UAE, there are ideological implications, the history in the region. You know, in modern, terms, we you know, you'll hear people talk about the and how that plays a role in governance.
When people talk about the the The Gulf countries or they talk about Saudi, they don't eliminate these aspects of the ideology from also how the region is, how they navigate their we know they're one in the same. We talk about China. We know that their ideology plays a role in that. So why all of a sudden when Iran launches missiles into Israel, which Israel is doing what they're doing not merely to get new land and new property, but because of an ideology? Zionism is an ideology.
Why now all of a sudden for Iran do we separate their ideology from their motives and what they're doing? And why is now all of a sudden calling that out, disuniting the Umba? Why is it right everywhere else? Everything else is right. You see people say, I agreed with Shahid until he said this about Iran.
If you wanna cheer someone standing up to the bully, well and good. But this has, by the way, been a very long time coming. It's been a calendar it's almost been a calendar year since October 7, and this did not happen because of October 7. We can be objective, and we can be analytical of that. And it doesn't mean that we're dividing the ummah.
It just means that we are calling a spade a spade. So I I find it very peculiar just as, you know, leading in that that now all of a sudden, there is this sort of, pushback. Now has always been the time to be united is always now, but we cannot unite upon falsehood. We cannot unite upon someone's delusions. We can't unite upon what someone feels, is is more correct than than this, that, or the third.
That's that's actually what creates the fracture. So I just wanted to to lead in and and say that. The second thing I want to say as an aside, then I'll I'll shut up because I feel like I've already spoken too much, but is that, when when you look at every platform of analysis, almost none of them give a a a reasonable means for their audience to engage back with them. They don't have open group chats where you can message them. They don't have, you know, they're not doing lives where you can just be commentating and and tuning in.
They don't do that, which shows you that a lot of these people who are doing this analysis aren't necessarily particularly, bothered even with your with your feelings or your as if they would check the comment section of their videos and even respond to you. So the fact that this space is even being created in the first place is a testament that there is a desire for a greater good, a higher level of understanding. And I just want to encourage everyone to operate sincerely and upon that good faith, that's that's been clearly shown. You know? If it was about the popular sentiment, then anything could have been said after that or silence would have even been better.
So just please I I encourage everyone to just have that sort of, objectivity. And I just wanted to lead in with that because, you know, it's it's important to, everyone wants to talk about uniting in the stuff. Where is the? Where is the positive assumption? Where is the, you know, giving the benefit?
Where is the even just the pragmatism to just say, you know, I can at least see where that's coming from as opposed to this emotional, railing by really a vocal minority. You know? So I just want to, to to say that. Apologies for, if this was besides the point, but I I want to say that, and and I hope that it's well received.
Brother Ali, I think you wanted to add something. Thank you, brother.
Yeah. Brother Torabi touched on what I'm saying just with a different angle. I mean, if you if you look at how the West or America specifically expanded its its sphere of influence, it spent a lot of time demonizing communism and using that as a term to to expand its influence. Wherever there's communism, boom, we're gonna go there. Boom, we're gonna take over this country's infrastructure.
And it just happened over and over and over until America became the hegemon that it is today, using international law, etcetera, etcetera. Well, what Iran did isn't very different than that. They watched the game, they learned the game, and they followed the same script. Israel Israel was the common enemy, and as soon as long as they're fighting with the Zionists, they can expand their sphere of influence. And what do we say in America?
We say don't hate the player. Hate the game. So there's simply a player in a game that was created by the West.
Shukran. How are you, Shukran? Okay. The comments are on fire, so I'm happy people are engaging with this space. I'm sorry if anyone's feelings are hurt.
As we said, again, we're just trying to judge it objectively. Okay. So then just to tie it back, inshallah, to the video, and I'm not saying that you haven't been spoken about speaking about it. I just need to, just so we can go through every part and understand it in the bigger context. So there are then in the part, there were these transitional challenges, right, that Iran is facing amidst, again, this shifting global order and especially the shifting regional order.
Right? So brother Shahid in the video, he highlights how basically this Iran's commitment to this sectarian religious government, right, since the early or late seventies, it has shaped its identity. Right? And it has basically cons like, constrained Iran's ability to adapt, to change, to try to somehow reform. Right?
Because, you know, there's this path dependency. Right? They set out an image of themselves, and they have to somehow maintain it. But we based on different content and different spaces that we already spoke about, we know that the old world order is no longer sustainable. It's no longer valid for that region.
There are different plans. Right? And we know that the situation that Iran is in, it could make this transition to a new role specifically difficult for Iran. Right? And it might be even dangerous for the regime that is there.
So I just wanted to ask, like, given Iran's these you know, there is this deep rooted ideological framework that they are basing their policy on and their foreign policy. And there is this public commitment that they have held ever since the revolution. And, of course, maybe as brother Shahid mentioned, it might have been more genuine, more fierce. But I wanna ask, like, what strategic adjustments could Iran realistically pursue to try to somehow navigate this new emerging global order? And, basically, not just that, but how can it do that without losing its core identity.
Right? And we are not trying to change Iran what Iran is. We're just trying to see how it can fit into this new order in the region, how it can be a player, how it can be, you know, in this team, inshallah. Right? We do not hold any animosity towards Iran.
Right? This is something that needs to be understood. Right? A lot of people in the comments feel as if we are hating on Iran and on the people. Not at all by the like, the quite the opposite.
We are trying to see how inshallah, you know, Iran without any, like, violent means can integrate into this region. Right? How it can be a collaborative pro player with people who are around it. Right? Inshallah.
So, yeah, I'm asking what strategic investments or adjustments could Iran pursue to try to be part of this, to try to navigate this new order? And I see brother, MG has his hand up, so I'll be happy to listen to your suggestions, inshallah, Habib.
Yeah. Hello. So I think Yeah. I I think what we what we can get out of this is is we can we can infer to, basically, the the meeting, the the the, peace progress that China, wants to do between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And, one of the things that we can, maybe infer or interpret from it is that there could be a an approach to create a slow transition away from the, how you say, the popular rhetoric that Iran is is is is using because, also, we have to keep into consideration that if they abandon that popular rhetoric, that also could be a threat to to the system there.
So it has to be like a slow and smooth phasing out. And I think this would be the most logical approach from my viewpoint. I mean, it's it's it's at the end of the day, you don't want at the end of the day, Iran is a is a pillar of global stability. You don't want that country to collapse. It's it will create you will create a you will open a a a whole new can of worms of instability, and it's not good for anyone.
So I think the the meeting between China and Saudi Arabia and Iran is about how to make this transition smooth. Like, the I think, and I could be wrong, that there is a recognition by the Iranian authorities themselves that they need to make this transition. Because for them to sustain themselves in power, they need to make this, adaptive transition. And they want to do it, but they don't want to do it, very dramatically that it, it it threatens the stability of the country. So, again, this is my interpretation and feel free to add things
to I agree with that.
I I I agree. I I'm sorry to interrupt, brother. I think that they are making the transition. They are doing what what I think they are doing the needful. And I think with with joining BRIDGs and by the way, with with the rapproche mongers between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the that was not initiated by China.
That's been published a lot that that China is the one that brought them together. In fact, they were already in negotiations and they brought in China to actually help to give China more of a of a sort of prominence in in Middle Eastern politics, but the but the rapprochement was was taken was undertaken independently between bilaterally, I should say, between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is something that they were already working on. And I think that they with the with the joining of BRICS and now they're within this organization and they're getting very positive and cooperative feedback from the Arab world. I think this is extremely positive and good, and I think that the the history since 1979 has as I was saying, Iran was in a very difficult position.
Part of it was they were in a difficult position because of the nature of their government and the nature of their rhetoric, and then also in the nature of the ideologically expansionist strategy or policy that they wanted to implement, that this really rubbed the whole region the wrong way, and that created a lot of animosity. And then, of course, the animosity between the Sunni and the Shia was drastically and deliberately exacerbated by The United States in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan to a certain extent, but especially in Iraq, that they tried to create a much more severe and intense level of animosity between Sunnis and Shia, And I think that this this has been the the the sort of framework for regional relationships. And if if the Arab countries, if the Gulf countries and the Arab countries generally in the Levant, so called in are are willing to act on good faith with Iran, and Iran is willing to act on good faith with them and show solidarity and unity, which they are doing, I think that's very positive. And that will, inshallah, end this whole rift that has been the framework for regional politics for, you know, since 1979.
So I think that they are doing what they need to do, and I think as I said, like, okay, like what you just said, we're not hating on Iran. No. In fact, I am admiring Iran's political savvy that they have, exercised for the last almost half a century, and the way that they have been able to survive and the way that they've been able to thrive is quite remarkable. And if if you just take a very simplistic, you know, superhero version of of what Iran is, then you don't fully appreciate the the level of intelligence that they have employed in their relationships with the with the other countries in the world. And I I appreciate that.
As someone who who appreciates realpolitik and who appreciates, you know, objective analysis, my objective analysis is that the Iranian regime is quite brilliant. They're they're they're very very good at what they do, and I think that they're extremely as I say repeatedly again in the video, they're extremely pragmatic, they're very practical, and I think that they will be able to make this transition that is just a question of whether America will let them make that transition or not. Than the neocons, the the faction of the OCGFC that are aligned with the neocons. It's it's a question of whether or not they will allow that to happen or not. And I think that my personal belief is that it will happen, and I think that Iran will be be more integrated into the region and the the hostility between the between Iran and their neighbors and between Iran and the Khaleed will, inshallah, be resolved.
And I and I think that that Iran has proven, as I said, how pragmatic they are, how practical they are, and and how real realistic they are. And so I think that they're they're perfectly capable of making that change, although it it is going to be a drastic change in their posture, in the way they in in their posturing and in their the way they project their image to the world. But we did see some sign of this and and a degree to which it was actually the the region and the world generally were receptive to it during the time of Mohammed Khatami back in the, what, the nineties? In the the the late nineties, early two thousands when Mohammed Khatami was was the president of Iran, and he was regarded as this reformer and so forth. And at that time, there was kind of an idea that he might be a kind of Gorbachev figure for Iran, but it the the the the situation at that time, obviously, was very different than it is now in terms of it being a unipolar world, and there was no bricks, there was no, you know, rise of the global south at that time.
But I think that the global dynamics have have shifted and changed in such a way that it will be possible, inshallah, for there to be a kind of a moderating of Iran's the way they the way they position themselves and the way they project themselves to the world and that that their own domestic population, inshallah, will be receptive to that as well.
Brother Omar, I know your hand must be hurting. You have been raising it for some time.
No. No. It's okay. I mean, it's always a pleasure to listen
to brother Shahid. So am I audible?
Okay.
So I'm just we have to reiterate simple facts here. Okay? So I think it was stated before in many videos of brother Shahid that okay. Guys, states are not moral actors. Okay?
And they should be viewed as such as such. So you cannot expect states to to act based on slogans and, you know, famous lines and so on and so forth. That's not what states exist for, and that's not how states survive. States survive by maneuvering, by real politic, by taking the right decisions at the right time. So whenever you feel like a state is pursuing some sort of slogan, it's not because a state is actually believing in that slogan as much as that state is just finding that pursuing that slogan isn't in its interests.
So this is a very important reminder that we all should be aware of. That's why, like brother Shahid said, for example, Iraq was targeted and Iran was not targeted because Iraq, Saddam Hussein, he made all the wrong choices and they ended up removing him from power while Iran was making the right choices and so on and so forth. Any state during this period of time, which is the first the first years of the twenty first century that made the wrong decisions usually didn't you know, it didn't end up well for this for this state. It's very important to assert the reason of state. Okay?
It's a it's a fact as simple as as early as, you know, states were there from old times, from ancient times. So does that mean that religion has nothing to do with state politics? No. Of course not. It has something to do.
It's a very important decision making factor, but it's not the only decision making factor. At the end of the day, the state needs to preserve itself in any way, shape, or form. So it's important to put that to put that in mind as well. And the second point that needs to be made is that you cannot judge a state's actions in the meantime. Of course, we're we're we're speculating and we're guessing, but if you listen carefully to the video Brother Shahid has has made, he's made that assessment after forty five years of decision making by Iran.
So he's had quite some time to make his assessment, to view the body count, as he said, to view the long term strategy, and it it wasn't something that was made after five to ten years or even twenty years. No. It's something after almost half of a century. So we can sit down, calculate, and and have a very, very comprehensive assessment of Iran's long term strategy during the past half a century. And because we have we happen to know that any state, again, is moved by the reason of state, we can say that that the the the decisions that were made by Iran as a state led to some instability in the region, and that's perfectly unavoidable.
It's a perfectly unavoidable assessment to make. So we have the luxury now to say that, okay. We feel that Iran is making changes, that it's pivoting because we suddenly see changes in policy. Okay? And, again, we need to be very calculative, very calm, not propagandized, not, you know, not reacting to simple data dis and data that.
We have to view the the actions and the policies being made in light of the grand picture, like brother MG has been wonderfully describing a while ago. So these are two important points to make. The third point is, again, the reason of state dictates that stability is the way forward for the region. Okay? Because at the end of the day, money talks and money talks loud.
Right? So when we say that the Khalid or The Gulf or the the the major power power players in the region feel that they have a better set of rules to govern the region than the set of rules that The US has has been putting for the past thirty to forty years, for example. And they happen to believe that these sort of rules include pumping money all over the region so that it's stable, so that there is a Belt and Road Initiative made by China and they want in on it. This is a very important part of the of the of the of the of the game. And so as brother Shahid has said, Iran felt that this change in that this change in the situation in the whole region cannot it cannot allow Iran to maintain its current course because it will, in the end of the day, be viewed as the disruptor.
And it will will feel the vacuum because no one will be wanting to deal with them. They're they're just bad players, and we want stability, and we want good, you know, good roads, good merchandise, good business, essentially, in the region, and they're not having any of it. And so they felt that they have to pivot. And, again, this leads to believing that this is a good a good pivot on Iran's side. Because at the end of the day, our metric is a a stable region, a peaceful region, an enhanced region.
Right? So when we say that as a state, Iran made the decisions that led to instability in the region, It it's the same, calculative manner that allows us to say that now Iran is doing the right or making the right choices. Okay? Because as brother Shahid has said repeatedly in the video, they want to play bold. And since they want to play bold, it means that they want to change.
And this is a very important point that states that do not change, states that stagnate are doomed states. At the end of the day, a state has to change according to the the new givens in the region, and they have to make the changes as best they can and as quick as they can. So I'm not, of of course, really in on the details like brother Angie and brother Shahid are are are talking, but I I'm I'm admiring that they are willing, in fact, to change That a a state that was initiated in 1979 according to certain principles and certain, what do you say, foundational doctrines, if you want to say, that they are willing to change those principles and those those foundational doctrines in order to cope. This is a very remarkable thing that they're doing right now, and it truly deserves admiration. And finally, from my sport from historical perspective, when when when Sunnis and Shias, you know, had good relations, historically speaking, the the entire region was booming.
Like, the crusades, for example. The entire region when when when Salahdin and the the the the assassins from Alamut. Right? Those guys were the they were highly trained assassins, and they used to to to to to make high profile killings just to make to make a point of how terrorizing they are. Okay?
But the the the moment they cooperated with Salahdin, things changed for the better. So you have to put this in context that when the different sects of Muslims and the different states governing them, regardless of the doctrine, Sunni or Shi'i, when they had good relationships and when their interests were aligned, because, again, they're governed by state reason, it was a very a very important advancement for the region and for the peoples of region as a whole. So I hope I made these points clear enough, and, yes, Thank you so much.
Brother. Great minds to you and brother Emji and all of the speakers, brother Shade, of course. You know? No need to mention. I'm very happy that you are speaking up and saying this stuff because it's very important.
So thank you very much. So I would maybe just a bit you know, there was this in the video, right, brother Shahid highlighted again that Iran's narrow focus, right, on supporting the militant groups, right, the focus on militancy, basically, whether it was Hamas in the early days or later on Hezbollah in Lebanon. Like, it didn't invest in infrastructure, in development projects. It really just heavily relied on backing armed proxies to exert its influence in the region. And until now, it has been sufficient for it.
Right? It has, you know, served its regional objectives. Right? Until now where we have this, again, changing regional landscape. Right?
But, you know, like, how has this reliance of Iran on militancy shaped its long term influence in Lebanon and in other countries in the region? And I would like to ask, like, what kind of vulnerabilities, right, does this also create for a strategy? Because, again, there is this predetermination that it had set itself on that is very hard to get some, you know, rid of in some orderly manner. Right? Like, what does it say about Iran's objectives?
Right? Is it trying to prioritize influence, or is it trying to resist, you know, the threat that is there and as they're trying to present it? Like, I think even from the manner that it's selectively supporting more Hezbollah over Hamas, it illustrates, right, the strategic prioritization as brother Shahid alluded in the video. Right? So I would like to ask what implications does this have, right, for Iran, again, as this role that it took on.
Right? And what are the vulnerabilities and challenges that when trying to transition, right, from this role from this specific role? Because, basically, it has established itself as this player. Alright? So what can it do now?
How can it get rid of this? How has you know, what are the implications basically of this stance that it has taken? Right? And how will it be able to change it?
Well, if I may sort of address that, like I said, you you have to when you when you are actually a minority ideological belief in a region, and you want to expand your influence, and specifically you want to expand your ideological influence, That's very hard to do, and and and you don't really get a good response. Even even the Saudis, when they try to sort of push back in the day when they were really trying to push Wahhabism, they didn't really get a good response, And it it doesn't really work very well. Now, it it has worked better for Iran, but the the the the fundamental, as I said earlier, the fundamental basis for it working was the existence of Israel because it had to be it had to be positioned as as a resistance to Israel. So it has it has depended upon the antagonism with Israel in order to spread their influence, as I said, except for Iraq. But in Syria and Lebanon, it it it has been this has been the main way that they've that they've gained acceptance in the countries where they wanted to have influence.
And the the result of that in Lebanon, of course, has been extremely destabilizing. The the the situation in Lebanon became extremely destabilized to the point of even Rafiq Khari being assassinated with Hezbollah members being indicted for that. So it it has put them in a vulnerable position because it's it's contingent upon the same thing that Israel's existence is contingent upon, which is a continuous conflict. So if there is a movement in the region for actually resolving the conflict, that puts your sphere of influence and your, expansion, under threat. There's no way that you can maintain that, without conflict because that's been the whole basis for your appeal.
Let me put it this way. States have frequently backed militant groups, rebels, paramilitaries, and what have you. The US has done it. Russia Soviet Union did it. I mean, you you can look at the the Kurds, for example.
They were backed, and then they were dropped. The The US supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, then they dropped them. Pakistan supported the Taliban, then they dropped them. America supported the Contras, and then they dropped them. Syria, at one point, supported the PLO, Fatah, and they dropped them.
So, you know, even at one point, there was support within parts of the Egyptian government for the Ihwana Muslimine, and they dropped them. So it's not an unusual thing to happen that a state supports a militia or a paramilitary group or or what have you, and then drops them. That's a thing that happens all the time. And I think that that's probably what will happen, with Hezbollah at a certain point. And I think as I said now this is this is the part of the video that I will admit is conjecture on my part, which is that the assassination of Hania was allowed by Iran and that Hassan Nasrallah was sacrificed and that there was there was some level of collaboration or coordination or cooperation between Iran and Israel with regards to the pager attack.
I will admit that that's conjecture on my part because it just makes sense to me. Because I think that, as I said in the video, I think everyone understands. And and now that Iran is a part of BRICS, and is trying to participate in the regional project for stability and for conflict resolution, they understand that we have to get we have to let these militant groups go. And as I said in the video, the way that you let those militant groups go, you can't disband them because that would be very dangerous to your own to the to the image that you've created, so they have to be weakened. The leadership has to be removed, and they have to be weakened by means of conflict.
And the the the the positive side of that is that they can be weakened by means of a conflict that will also weaken Israel, because what Israel is doing is, weakening them tremendously. And as I said, a fanatic like Netanyahu doesn't understand that, just like some people maybe in the comment section think that whenever something explodes, it it equals a victory. Netanyahu thinks that that he's victorious. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, we won't know the numbers until later, of Israelis are fleeing. The economy is in a downward spiral.
The military their military capacity is weakening, and and globally, they're getting more and more isolated. So Israel is on the way out. This is this is all part of the process of of removing those three obstacles that I mentioned in the video, Zionism, militancy, and potentially the religious regime in Iran. But I think that, as I said also in the video, I think that Iran and as as I'm saying now, I think that Iran is trying to do whatever they can to say that that third element in the region can remain, and you don't have to regard it as a threat because the religious regime in Iran is pragmatic and we're able to work with everybody, and we we don't have a problem with solidarity with the other countries in the region. So they're agreeing in my view, they're agreeing that the first two elements do have to be removed from the region, Zionism and militancy, so that the broader project in the region can actually flourish and succeed.
I think that they are I I in my opinion, they are signed on to that project. And I think that the way of getting rid of the militant groups is to basically let them die heroically in a struggle against Israel. It sounds very heartless, and it sounds very ruthless, but this is politics. This is state politics. This is international politics.
And as I said, supporting and then dropping support for militant groups happens all the time, and there's no reason to think, again, that Iran is any different than any other state and that they make decisions on any basis other than sheer pragmatism and realism. And this is why I I I this is why I made the video to say that Iran operates like everybody else does. If you have a need to believe something else, if you have a need to believe in a superhero myth about Iran, that's up to you. But that's not doesn't even remotely approach being analysis.
MashaAllah. So exactly. Now we are at this point where we are basically trying to think about the future of Iran, inshallah. So and the present time, right, and how it's basically trying to readjust, right, and trying to fit with the agenda of Bricks and trying to align itself with Bricks' interest. And, basically, what we are seeing is that Iran is trying to somehow distance itself from militancy.
And, again, as brother Shahid said and brother MG before, that is trying to avoid this dramatic break, right, that could lead to some backlash. So I wanted to ask just my colleagues here. You know, considering Iran's involvement, historical involvement in this militancy. Right? And now it has been in this gradual dissolution of its own militant proxies.
So what does it what does this signify? Right? Like or what does this shift indicate about its sort of willingness to redefine, right, its identity, its especially ideological identity. Right? And, also, its geopolitical strategy in the region.
Right? And, also, what I would follow-up with a question by doing this, by trying to transition, by trying to shift, what are the challenges and possibly even some internal risks that Iran faces? What are the challenges by doing that, right, by doing this shift?
The the no. No. I just I was just gonna say the challenge is the the same as the people in the comment section. That's the biggest challenge for the regime in Iran. You you you you think that that you're supporting Iran, but you're making it very, very difficult for them.
You're forcing them into a position to play the part that you need them to play rather than being realistic and taking care of their own future. People in the comment section who are insisting on the the iron man role for Iran, you're gonna get regime change in that country if you don't stop. Well, if you if you don't come to your senses and start dealing with things in a in a realistic way, you're gonna bring the end of that country. You're gonna bring an end to that regime. If you if you insist on denying the reality that Iran is a very practical and a very savvy and a very realistic pragmatic country, and you force them into upholding the image that you have of them, you're gonna ruin them.
You're you are sentencing them to destruction, just to satisfy your own emotional needs. That's very irresponsible, and you couldn't hate that country more, than by what you're doing. The this is the threat that they face is the is is people who are ideologically blinded by their need for Iran to be this certain kind of way that satisfies your emotional needs. And and okay. To a certain extent, Iran has put themselves in that position by their own posturing and their own the the the ethos that they created for themselves, but they need to be able to transition out of that, and you need to help them with that.
You need to help them transition out of that if you want them to survive.
And, especially, we have seen that too, of course, you know, lesser degree, but this ideological handicap that, you know, countries then face at some certain point. Right? And exactly as you correctly highlighted, it's about the population. Right? SubhanAllah.
Cannot say it better, but it's a pattern that has occurred in different countries in the past, you know, even two decades that is being seen now. Right? And that's the biggest obstacle for some peaceful transition inshallah. And, yeah, brother Agi, please. I think you opened your mic before, but didn't get the chance to say something.
So if you wanna add something.
Yeah. No. I mean I mean, Iran has has has basically its investments have basically been very military industrial complex like. So so just like the MIC is not sustainable going into the future. I mean, it it requires for the conflicts to be perpetual for it to keep making money.
But in the end of the day, Iran is a resource rich country. It has the Strait Of Hormuz, and it's in a very great geographical area for trade between Asia and Europe and The Middle East. So, obviously, this is this is what they have to offer and this is what they will bring. The the biggest point I wanted to make, brother Shahid already kicked it for me, so he did took care of that, is that their biggest challenge is going to be that they have set themselves up as ideologues, and that's the one thing that they're gonna have to fight against moving forward.
Yeah. Yeah, brother. Robbie, I see your hand raised, please.
You know, I've I've seen this sort of rhetoric, this knee jerk reaction of, you know what? If you disagree with me, you're clearly a Zionist, which is absolutely insane. Or if you are saying this about Iran, then you're you're anti ummah unity, which is such such an emotional response that you can't even claim to be objective if you hear someone say something and then you immediately label them so you don't have to understand what was said. But let's just, for a moment, put ourselves in the shoes of people who do want to say that, no. Iran is finally doing something for Palestine while all these other countries are cowards.
Iran is finally sending up to Israel, which is an extension of the western hegemonic power in the region. Iran is finally doing it. If Iran was doing all of those things the way that people want to project their their personal wishes onto this country's politics. If it was really that, then Iran would get Iraq. I will say this again.
If Iran was really this thing that you that you want to believe 100% their motives, their their maneuvers, everything that they're doing is for Philistine, and it's independent of all of these sellouts and so on and so if it was really like that, then don't you know democracy would be, expedited shipping over to them immediately? Don't you know that? Haven't you seen that? Haven't you seen that happen in the region before? Now you may say, yeah.
But Iran missiles and stuff. Ahbab, my beloved brothers and sisters in humanity. Come on. But they will fight back, didn't Afghanistan? Didn't Iraq?
I know soldiers who went over there in operation Iraqi freedom. Are they free yet? You know? When all that democracy that was brought over to Afghanistan twenty years later, then we handed it back to the we handed it back to the Taliban. If Iran was everything that you want it to be, then don't you know that the that freedom would be brought to them with expeditiously.
So, I mean, I really I'm not gonna speak to the hyper politics because I'll be very candid. I'll be very honest. I'm really, I'm not a person who's online very much if really at all, but I find the averse response, the the availability heuristics that's just kicking in so fast and so hard to just be jarring. I find it to be shocking that, we're we're taking political maneuvering and trying to infuse our emotions into it like we're looking at actors on a screen. Like, we're watching, you know, two, sports teams competing, and and, you know, you're either cheering for the team or you're rooting for them to lose.
No. We're all cheering for the ummah. As I said earlier, we all want to see Philistine freed. We all want to see these really demonic powers ended. We all want to see that.
But it's not gonna come to fruition through through this, hyper fantasization of trying to make it seem like global politics is not operated rather, cruelly in the most calculated and beneficial way possible as was also pointed out in the video. They have been Iran and Israel have been on the brink of x y and z for so long. Now all of a sudden, you think that it's changing. Now all of a sudden that it's changed, they're just gonna be able to do this, and no one's gonna say anything. No one's come on.
Let's just be realistic. We ask Allah to to give us open hearts and open minds.
Brother Omar, please.
Yeah. Can you hear me? Okay. So regarding the the domestic challenges, I think those can be mitigated rather easily. I'm not saying it's going to be, you know, beds and roses.
But when you when you get that propagandized, I think you can make the transition. It's going to be bumpy and all. But at the end of the day, you can make the transition because, again okay. The a very important point here to make is that okay. So we know that the region is cooperating with BRICS.
Okay? And everyone seems to forget that BRICS is essentially an economic alliance. It's not it it started as an economic alliance. It's taking political decisions right now, but it started as an an economic alliance. And historically speaking, you know, economic alliances tended to fare much, much better than political ones because he who doesn't want money, essentially?
So it's it's more, cohesive, and it's more, what what can you say? It's it's stronger. It's a lot stronger at the end of the day. And it's a lot stronger because it promises everyone money. Right?
So if you are able to propagandize into Iran, into all those who subscribe to the propaganda or to the ideology that you built your foundational doctrine on, then you can easily say that, okay, guys. Look to the future in a matter of, you know, a decade or two decades tops. We are going to all be flourishing, and there would be lots of opportunities, lots of jobs, lots of market opportunities for everyone. So I think because a lot of people already subscribe to the ideology and blindly follow, then they can be persuaded in the other direction. But that's just me.
I'm I'm not sure if it if it's true or not. But if you promise money, who does who doesn't want money? Okay? If you promise stability, if you promise open markets, if you promise a region that's flourishing, economically speaking, an open market for all, and, you know, you have trading with your Islamic brothers and sisters and trading with Islamic countries, essentially the new Europe that's been circulating, then, yeah, who wouldn't who wouldn't want to subscribe to that? Right?
So I think, yeah, it it's going to be bumpy. But, again, everyone's loyal to the ideology, and everyone's loyal to the people behind the ideology. So when the people change the ideology, the the subscribers will will follow more or less. So it's going to be bumpy, and some people are going to get shocked. Sure.
But at the end of the day, I think the the the promised goal is much, much more sustainable, if you will. So I hope that answers the domestic challenge question.
Brother. And this is exactly something that brother Shahid has been mentioning many, many times. Right? You know, changes are bumping. Right?
It's a serious transition that all of the countries are going through. Right? It doesn't take days or weeks. It will take some months, some years. So inshallah, you know, the people need to keep this in mind.
And, you know, thank you very much for your contribution. You speak very eloquently, You add a lot of value to this space. So thank you, brother. Okay. I I just wanna hint, you know, brother MG, he, you know, hinted at something like the neocons and their interest in this.
Right? And, basically, when we are speaking about Israel, we need to speak about US strategy. Right? Because that's the only purpose of Israel, right, for The US. So, you know, there has been in the video in the latter parts, right, there was this discussion about the diminishing influence of the neocons, right, in shaping US policy.
And they are basically the ones that try to maintain Iran and this controlled adversary. Right? And it has been profitable for both US and Israel, of course. Right? So they also admit that this, you know, brother of Shahid mentions that they know that a full destruction of Iran would basically destabilize the region and eliminate its convenient role.
Right? And then, you know, he goes on to mention that while some aggressive factions, he mentioned this lady, they might methodically support the idea of destroying Iran, but they also recognize and deep down know that it's impractical and that there are a lot of strategic risks associated with it and also a loss of profits, right, which is the most important part for them. Right? So, you know, Iran has been kept in this position to play a certain role and to keep a strategic way of how business is basically done in The Middle East. Right?
And, you know, there was this unresolved question is whether regime change in Iran can occur without war or if it can has to be somehow, you know, in a violent manner, which we no one no one of us wants to see this at all. Right? So I wanted to ask, like, can The US, right, with how it's supporting the current stance and the current role of Iran, can it somehow support or, realistically, is there any option for The US to support a nonviolent regime change? And if so, how can it do that without undermining its own, you know, strategic interests in The Middle East? Right?
And, of course, we know that the Bricks are trying basically to isolate America, to remove it from the picture, and we all hope that inshallah, right, that will be firstly done through the elimination of Zionism. Right? But I wanna know what will The US approach to Iran look like in the case that Iran starts to transition, which it already is. But will it start to, you know, support covert operations inside of Iran? Will it try to support rebels as we have seen in you know, whenever a country tries to shift away from the influence of The US and especially from the influence of the neocons, these things start to happen.
Right? So, yeah, that's my question. Right? What will the stance of The US be in relation to this transition? Right?
How will it view its role in the region? How will it support or not support or go against or, you know, all of these questions related to this idea? Right? So if anybody wants to speak what they think, Alsister Wahida, feel free to continue.
The United States Of America is a vampire nation. We exist off of the blood of others. It would take a massive movement in our national political leadership and and economic leadership mentality to accept the spread of peace in regions on this earth where we have made our money through war and various kinds of economic instability. This nation's populace lives in an incredible bubble. We have very little actual real news here.
The news has devolved into, opinion. You don't get very much hard news. And, people outside of The United States really have no idea how insular we are with regard to our political, military, and economic viewpoints. So I do not expect, an American Messiah to appear and sit in the Pentagon with the other planners and and decide to accept, the changeover with regard to Iran. I believe that The United States will do what it can to put as many roadblocks, in place in order to prevent or at least drastically slow down this pass, positive change that that it can.
That is the way we have operated historically. I don't see any evidence of a change. And let me be, really clear because one of the things this video of brother Shahid's does is it attempts to shatter myths. I am an African American, a long time African American descended from enslaved people. I do not want my Muslim brothers and sisters throughout the world to make the mistake of believing that black American people are their allies.
I am an extreme anomaly amongst African Americans, and the vast majority of African American people are not the friends of the global South. The vast majority of African American people are completely willing to take part in any action no matter how bloody, no matter how surreptitious to guarantee a continuation of their way of life. African American people make those kinds of decisions. Biden is senile. Biden has had one cabinet meeting all year, and he turned the reins of it over to his wife on camera.
That means that the defector president of The United States has been Kamala Harris, The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Charles q Brown junior, is a black American. The secretary of defense of The United States, Lloyd Austin, is a black American, and the person whose job it is to block any ceasefire in the Gaza Israel situation is UN ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield. She is a black American. So the four top people, two men and two women, who are politically ruling this nation are all black Americans, and it is under their watch that this Gazan genocide was formulated, armed, and paid for. Understand that.
And, you know, so I no. I don't expect any kind of massive sea change, in America, and I expect us to continue to try to destabilize Afghanistan, Iran, the whole region.
Can I just address that? The the question as well as, I guess, sheikha Wahida's comments. In my opinion, America is already getting driven out of the region. Their influence is drastically decreased. If if America had the same power and influence in the region that they used to have, say twenty years ago, all of the people of Gaza would have already been expelled into the Sinai.
This is something that they actually demanded back in October 2023, and they were refused. And and they've they demanded many other things. They they then demanded for Egypt to take control over security in the Gaza Strip. They were refused. They demanded for the Palestinian authority to take over security in the Gaza Strip, and they were refused.
They demanded for all of the for the Gulf States to take over security in the Gaza Strip and they were refused. They they're not getting their way anymore, and the only one who is who is sort of going along with them now is Israel for obvious reasons. Now I think that we can we can look at the when when the announcement was made for the the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, America was not in the loop. And they basically found out about it after the fact, And their response was to sort of shrug their shoulders and say, well, I guess that's a good thing. They're not involved very much in what's going on in the region.
And I think that when the time comes and and Iran does because I think what Iran is trying to do is to avoid regime change by changing their sort of attitude and changing their position on things. They're trying to change with they're trying to change the regime without regime change. And I think that when when that occurs and it and and it occurs by maybe more dramatic policy decisions on the part of Iran, we'll probably see something like the same type of a reaction from America, which is just to sort of shrug their shoulders because no one really cares what you have to say anymore. And and you you are being ushered out of the region. So I I that this is what I expect, and I think that that one of the reasons for that is that, as I said, there are now sort of two factions of the owners and controllers of global financialized capital, and only one of those factions is tied to the military industrial complex or rather dependent upon the military industrial complex, and that again is the faction that is represented by the neocons politically.
But for example, if you look at BlackRock, the asset management company, everyone knows about BlackRock. They have ownership across every sector, every corporate sector, every industrial sector, every financial sector. BlackRock has interests across the entire economy, not just the military industrial complex. The military industrial complex is a page in their portfolio. And I don't think that they want to see their broad and diverse interests undermined for the sake of that one page in their portfolio.
And I think that we've seen the sort of a connection made between Saudi Arabia and BlackRock, between UAE and BlackRock, recently even between Egypt and BlackRock, and and that represent I'm just using BlackRock as an example because it's sort of a you can sort of say that that's the a symbol or a mascot of the larger and richer and more powerful and more influential faction of the OCGFC. And they are, in my opinion, from from what I have observed, I think that they are in favor of American isolation in The Middle East, that they're in favor of getting The US out because The US only knows one way of approaching international affairs anywhere in the world up until now, which is disruption. Disruption, destabilization, bombing, war, and so on. And that's against the interest of this broader faction of the owners and controllers of global financialized capital who are interested in developing the Middle East. Because if you look at, you know, that region, Be'lat HaShem, it it's just logical for it to basically be the center of the world economy.
It's the cent it's the it it connects Asia, it connects Africa, connects Europe with trade routes. It's it's resource rich. It it just makes sense for that region, and it historically has been the center of empires. It was the center of ours. It was the center even of the Roman Empire.
So the the that region is extremely important, and and it doesn't serve anyone's interest for it to be in conflict anymore, for it to be an endless conflict and to not be developed. I think that they wanna see development from Gaza all the way to Anatolia in Turkey. They wanna see that whole region developed. And I think that they will eventually overrule the the neocons. I think that because as I said, we're already seeing that they've that they've lost a great deal of their influence that because they used to be the only influence.
This is why America's policies have been what they've been because the military industrial complex was the single solitary engine of the American economy. That is changing, and it's also changing that that the owners and controllers of global financialized capital are now global. They are a national. So they're not, their their decisions and what they support, isn't, centered around what's going to be beneficial for The United States. They're only concerned about what's beneficial for their shareholders, and they have shareholders from all around the world.
So I think that these changing global dynamics will probably mute any response from the Americans when when Iran does sort of moderate their their position and starts trying to be sort of participate more in that in that regional project for development, inshallah.
I mean, Arab. I mean, I mean okay. So we are, yeah, I mean, kind of reaching the end of this session, but there are two main points or two questions that I still have in my mind. So I think I would like them to be addressed. I wanted to ask, like, what specific right?
Because we have been talking a bit in general, right, that, you know, it needs to leave this militancy, try to cooperate, try to shift, try to transition. But what specific economic and political mechanisms could Iran employ to still maintain it in its influence in the region? Right? And would these steps that you might mention just try to consider or, you know, follow-up with it, would these be enough to offset the potential loss, right, of the current power structures that it has? Right?
Because as you have said many times, brother Shahid, Zionism is becoming obsolete. Right? There it's not gonna be there, inshallah, in the next couple of years. So what will be the you know, basically, what will it hold on to? Right?
Like, what will be the support for its approach? And there is no more this hostile enemy. Right? Yeah. So maybe this question I would add also sorry, sisters.
Selma, I will let you immediately. Yeah. Like, what steps not not just economic and political, but, like yeah. Maybe. Okay.
Just, you know, to ensure its long term survival, right, and to move towards, inshallah, stable and, you know, to integrate economically and politically into the region. So if you have any ideas, feel free to share them inshallah.
Assalamu alaikum. Brother Karim. I mean, from the way it looks at this juncture, I mean, with all of the past couple of decades of the Iran's alignment with the region and and and its investment in perpetuating these sectarian divisions in the region, now that this is going to be fast, going to be obsolete, now it will be, like, really trying to look for a friend group, and the friend group is the bricks. So it would try to align itself with the Grand Brix plan and just, you know, toe the line. I think that's the reality that it has to face next because it has, you know, invested itself in this alignment with Israel and America for a long time now.
So now that this scenario is getting obsolete, so it has to align itself with BRICS and toe the line with BRICS. That's the future.
If Iran was able to sort of normalize with the region and integrate into the region and didn't have an antagonistic relationship with the region, there's no there's no limit to the amount of economic influence they could potentially have. This would be a huge boost for their for their economy, and Iran is bountiful a nation. It's an abundant, you know, there it's a nation of abundance. They have so much there. They have so many resources there.
They have so much that they have been sort of crippled in terms of their economic development and now it's starting to to thrive for the first time in many years. And I think that the sky is the limit. If they if they if they wanna have more, if they wanna maintain influence, I think that they can they can take a take a page from the book of the Khaleidj and and have influence economically rather than through militancy. They can they can have a great deal of influence economically through investment and so on, not to mention culturally. I think they can have a lot of influence.
If they if they, again, if they abandon the the idea of trying to sort of push their sectarian ideology in the region, then people will be more receptive to them, and they won't they won't be the animosity so much. And I think, as I said, if they're if they're able to reach their full potential as an economic power, it will be considerable. They have just just like immeasurably more resources naturally than any of the Gulf countries. So, I mean, they have they have great potential to to develop economically and if they if they are allowed, if they are able to have the room and have the space to actually develop even more economically, the sky's the limit, I think. And and and there there won't be any animosity towards them.
I think this this as I as I've been saying, the signs and the signals that they've been getting from The Gulf, and again, as Selma said, the fact that they're within BRICS, the potential is great for them. And now they I just saw that BRICS has set a rule that if you're a member of BRICS, you can't participate in sanctions against any BRICS country. This is gonna be incredibly beneficial and profitable for Iran because that's that's something that has really, really damaged them. They they've still been able to function. They've still been doing business.
And in fact, although people will hate to hear it, they have been doing business with Israelis, but they've been doing it through third parties, through Turkey, through Cyprus, through The UAE, and so on, and shell companies, and what have you. But if they can do things directly, this is gonna be just incredibly beneficial for them. And if if countries that are members of BRICS don't have to try to circumvent the sanctions against Iran, then this also opens up the opportunity for Iran to invest more in other in in member countries of of BRICS. So I think it's it's really good, and the sky's the limit in terms of the level of influence they can have once they're able to fully reach their their potential as an economy.
I would just like to add. I mean, sure. They're they were responsible for all these proxies that are in the region, but they could actually position themselves as a mediator in these regional conflicts and and simply start mediating these these conflicts that that they were responsible for previously in in Yemen, in Syria, in in Lebanon. And and this will rebrand them as someone who's trying to mitigate what they had previously done. America does it all the time when when their proxies get out of hand and they say, hey.
Pull the brakes. So Iran can do the same thing and and act as a as a conflict mediator. Okay.
So thank you very much, everyone. Of course, first of all, thanks to your great comments. We're I'm very happy that you share your ideas with us. I'm very happy that you can voice your opinions. Also, thank you very much to our speakers.
We basically covered what was needed from this video. Of course, you know, one can go on and on about this, right, because it's a really intensive and deep topic, and it's related to the whole region and the whole changing world order. So, you know, there are lots of and lots of aspects one to ponder about, but, of course, each of us can do this on their own inshallah. I hope that you benefited from this as much as I have. And I hope even our speakers learn something new inshallah.
Great contributions from everyone as always. So, you know, we go went over this historical perception that they have presented to us, right, about Iran and Israel and their relationship and this antagonistic, yeah, this antagonistic relationship that is even not probably there, right, we try to cover basically what is gonna be the new role of Iran in the new world order, inshallah. Right? How it can transition, how it can shift its way, how it can shift its deeply rooted ideologies. Right?
How inshallah, lots of stuff to cover, but we covered a lot of them inshallah. Thank you very much who joined. Thank you very much who commented. Thank you very much who spoke especially. So I hope to see you inshallah again next week, and take care, everyone.
تمّ بحمد الله