Book Discussion: Impossible State by Wael Hallaq

Okay. So we're recording, and I would request that you turn on the camera when you want to when you wish to speak. Obviously, I'm not making it mandatory, but I would appreciate it if you turn on the camera. Okay. So chapter three talks about the separation of powers, and it's broken down into three sections.

He talks about the modern state, how it's how the separation of powers is presented, the characteristics of the separation of powers in the modern state, and then he talks about the paradigm of the Islamic governance. And he proceeds to compare the two. So it's quite a straightforward presentation. So I will without further ado, I will leave it to the floor. I mean, to everyone.

If you want to let's just maybe start off with the characteristics of the rule of law or the rule of state, you know, as discussed in the first segment of the chapter three. Anybody? So what what would what would be what would be the characteristic of the separation of powers? I mean, sir, if it feels like a rhetorical question.

Assalamu alaikum. I I have to admit, once again, I have not actually read the chapter, so I can't actually contribute very much. But, you know, according to the discussion, I might have some thoughts or input, but I don't I don't know what he said with regards to the separation of powers of the state. But just the question itself indicates that that he's first of all first of all, he needs to decide whether he's talking about a nation state model or a particular model of governance, particular model of political model, because not every political model has the same not every nation state has the same political model. Because by like, I I think I might have mentioned in the chat at some point, by the very specific understanding of what a nation state is for example, The UAE is a nation state because all citizens are Emiratis.

They all come from there. Their heritage is from there. Their language is the same, and so on and so on and so on. But they don't have a model of government that's anything like a European Western model, barely resembles the European Western political model. So it seems to me like he's conflating these two terms, nation state with a a particular political model.

So when you when you just by asking about a separation of powers, that already is assuming that there's one particular government model and political model that that must be followed by the nation state, which is a fallacy.

I believe This is according to his book, the impossible state. He refers to the what is called the paradigm the location of the paradigmatic modern state to being in the Euro American context. That he's he's clear about that. There's no ambiguity about that. So, basically, if you wanna put it simply, that's the developed world and the developing world.

So the the developing world does not fall into that paradigm because it doesn't

So so he shouldn't really talk about the nation state then. He should talk about Western political models, specifically Western Western Western models of government.

Yeah. I suppose I suppose that's that's because it's in the details. You know? When he talks about it, you get the the you understand what he's trying to talk about. But if you just simp if you just simplify it as, oh, nation if you wanna pick on the word nation state and then beat him up over the semantics, we're not gonna get anywhere because he has an intention in pinpointing on the nation state, and that is

Yeah. I'm sorry. But but it's not semantics. It's it's words have meanings. Words have actual definitions.

And if you're if you're deciding that I'm going to use this definition to mean something else, or I'm gonna use this word to to mean something else that has its own word Mhmm. We're not we're not talking about, you know, potatoes, potatoes. These are two different things. I mean, a nation state is one thing, and it doesn't imply actual actually, by definition, it doesn't imply a particular political model. That's all I'm saying.

Okay. But I'll I'll leave it to the people who've actually read the book.

Can you leave can you try to unmute, Karim? I think he he might wants to say something. I think that's the option to unmute.

There he goes. Okay.

Yeah. I agree with you that, like, he has a particular political model connected to the nation state model. Like, it's not and I think in chapter one, he tried to, you know, convey this idea, right, that it is like, because I understand the two points. Right? I understand, like, mister Shahid's essentially, exactly.

Right? Like, the the conclusion would then be the, essentially, you know, nation states that are Muslim nowadays are, you know, They cannot see we cannot reconcile the two. Right? That's one, like, conclusion if we consider this perspective. Right?

But I think he's just trying to, you know, talk about the way it is in the West. Right? Like, that's as you said also, like, I agree, like, especially connected to this Westfall peace, right, treated what was it? Like, in eighteenth century where they essentially decided how the nation state should look like. Right?

Like yeah. So the exact like, I I gave you the two points, but I don't I think we should, like, try to see what he means, right, by using the word. I understand words have meanings, but to be a bit open minded, I feel like yeah. I don't know. It's kinda hard.

Yeah. I'm sorry. I just wanna add also. He seems to also

You muted yourself. Yeah.

Sorry. I just wanted sorry. He muted me. Anyway, what what I wanted to add was that the the he seems to imply that you just on the by virtue of its model, the Eurocentric model, Euro American model, is just a futile attempt to just try to Islamify that model. Just by design, it's just a futile attempt.

I mean, it's just a waste of time. You know? That's why it's impossible, But that's just me. I mean, that's what I think he's implying in the book. I'll mute myself now.

Yeah. I I actually I I muted everyone because I it was the only way that I could see how to do it, that would also give me the option to enable people's ability to unmute themselves. So that's why that happened. I apologize. So, hopefully, everyone should be able to unmute themselves, inshallah.

If not, say so in the chat.

Yeah. We can. We

can. Right.

Yeah. Just to add a few things concept of of the nation state. I mean, he he talks about essentially what happens in in Western countries and in America to a great extent. And he basically says that the legislative the the judiciary and the executive powers are intertwined. And the the the two, you know, the judiciary and the legislative powers, they serve the interests of the people in power.

So there's this framework that they cannot escape. And, you know, that is the the will of the of the state, essentially. So they are influenced by the the powers that that are in charge. So let's say I mean, we we saw in America what happened with the abortion laws when the Republicans came into power, obviously, the the laws changed and vice versa. So I I think that's one of his main main points about this that there is no real a real separation of of powers in in the West and that all these different branches of governance, they exist not to serve the people, but to serve the the people in power, really, the power.

And that's one of his main arguments. And he he goes on to say that yeah. So I I did highlight this. He says, since judges as a rule and on average have proven more commonly dot dot dot, willing to strengthen the arm of the state in its in its encounter with dissent. This argument will become all the more poignant once we discuss the counterpart to this brand of judiciary, Muslim judges.

So, yeah, basically, that is his main point in in this particular part of the chapter. I think I've summarized it correctly.

Yeah. I think that's that's that summarizes the the the chapter pretty much. And and he he he he says he does also point out that there are exceptions where, you know, where justice is served, but mainly, you know, it operates just to serve power. That's his complaint about the the the the the powers in the nation state with its backbone being the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. Okay.

So shall we proceed then? I mean, I think that's pretty succinct. I mean, it's it's it's pretty clear. Then maybe we can proceed to the paradigm of Islamic governments governance that that he has outlined.

Yeah. But just if I can just to yeah. Just one more thing. The like, he approaches it, like, theoretically. Right?

Like, we have to also keep in mind that his idea of the nation state is not what is practically being applied. Right? Because he says, like, it's even inconsistent with reality, right, that they talk about the separation of powers, but that is essentially not the case in any country. Right? So, like, when you speak about nation states, he probably speaking about the, like, ideological nation state, right, not what reality is.

So, yeah, that's also something I think that should be cut off. Like, if we maybe go to the theoretical aspect of life nation states and consider it from the theoretical part and ideological, then it might not be compatible with Islam. But in the practical sense, it is easy to apply it with Islam. Right? Like, that's maybe just a thing that I think.

Okay. Can I clarify Karim's point? You're saying that okay. He has already pinpointed that the separation of powers and the way it's designed by design, it's just imperfect or or just it's impossible to follow even practically for the modern state modern nation state model. So since it's just not applicable practically, then, therefore, we should be able to adopt with I mean, Islamic I mean, Muslim governments could adopt this model because it's just, you know, just adopt the the the I mean, is that what you're trying to say?

I I'm trying to understand here that since it's already imperfect in its application

Well, what I'm trying to say is that, like, the theoretical model is not compatible with the Islamic way of governance, like, with the separation of powers. Right? Like, if we consider it according to the theory of a nation state, that it has to be separate and so on, then probably, yeah, that would not be applicable with our like, with the Muslim perspective. Right?

Yes. But

as we keep in reality, that essentially the legislative is part of the executive, is, you know, connected to the judiciary, then this reality can be normally used in the sense of or on the context of, like, Muslim governments. Right? Okay. That's what I mean. Like, that he's the theoretical model that he's presenting is probably not compatible, but in reality, it could be used.

Right? Since even the nations here don't follow the theoretical model. Right? That's what I might like.

Okay. Can

I can I can I just ask a question since I haven't read it? What exactly does he say is the problem with the separation of powers? Why why does it inevitably serve the interest of power? What's the what's the reason for that? Why why does he think that the separation of powers doesn't work?

You know, forget about the Islamic context. But even within the so called nation state context or the western context, what is the what is the flaw in the separation of powers? And how does he explain that? He doesn't think problem.

Yeah. Sorry. Okay. Go.

Go ahead. Go Go ahead. No. It's fine.

No. No. No. I spoke enough.

No. From my understanding, what he's trying to say well, it it's top bottom. So whoever is the executive or whatever is the legislative say in the in the state nation state, every other everyone else follows. So if it serves the elites, whether it's in legislature or judiciary or in the executive, then the the other two will follow. So if it's serving the rich, then the loss will be towards them.

That's what I what I thought was what he meant. But then, again, it will come back to the question, okay. Fine. To him, the West or the the nation state is basically serving only its own interest. And that interest is anything but God or anything but related to religion.

So as in as far as a nation state, he defined it as when you are serving or you are ruling or you are legislating, whatever it is, but it's something outside god, outside the religion. This is how I see him defining it.

Can you hear me?

Yes. We can, sis.

Think that Halak makes it very clear in the beginning of the book that he is only, excuse me, using the definition of nation state as it has been used in the West since the enlightenment. He recognizes how limited that is, so he is letting everyone know that that's the foundational definition from which he is working. He speaks as Usted earlier said, you know, words have meanings, and this is very important. He states that, literally, language is structured in the West to support the foundational meanings of nation states since the enlightenment, and you cannot even discuss the subject without the language that you use reinforcing the belief system of the West around the superiority of the Western nation state. He he wrote that.

So we we understand from the beginning, you know, if we read the beginning that he is in a very limited box, and he recognizes that this is a very limited box from which to discuss these issues. He goes on with talking about the separation of powers and the fact that in in actuality, it doesn't exist, and it it really cannot exist in the manner that the the West claims it exist. So, you know, I don't really think that he is the source of the confusion. He's identified the source of the confusion as the fact that as defined, the the only foundation, to establish the correctness of the model of the Western nation state is itself. There is no corresponding identification of it.

There's there's no validation of it outside of itself. So as we read, we understand that that this is a self validated principle that the rest of the world does not engage with and that we are purely looking at the West and the rest of the world through this very, very myopic, you know, limited lens.

Yes. I I I I agree with Wahida. I mean, in that he talks about the modern state as a consequence of linear historical time frame. And then in in when when talking about the the Sharia paradigm paradigmatic governance and basically the Muslim way of governing ourselves, it's it's it's outside of history and that, you know, our our values transcend history. Our, you know, our management transcends history.

You know? That that that's something that he's he's pointing out that that, you know, what we value three hundred years ago still matters to us today.

Yes. Yes.

You know? I mean, that's that's the distinction he's trying to make here. You know?

Yeah. Exactly. Yeah. No. No.

No. Continue, sir. I disagree.

I just wanted to I just wanted to add on to, you know, Bahida's very, know, detailed explanation that that's that's very well presented, and and that's pretty much what I've gathered from the book as well.

Does he does he happen to give any examples practically of what he regards to be a modern nation state? I mean Like, actually exist in the world?

Well, I mean, he he says that it it's, you know, America and Europe that that these are the, representatives of the nation state, the European nations, and, The United States. And I I'm actually reading this as a warning to us to not follow in the footsteps of America and Europe. I mean, he he every principle thus far that has been presented by him of the nation state, and we're not talking about the states themselves, but the principles that are enumerated in the so called western nation state system. I mean, he's essentially trashed it and said, you know, this is not operational. And while it has some benefits, what we need to do is interrogate those things which are clearly not beneficial to societies, why they're not beneficial, and and perhaps find a way to mitigate them or present a a new concept of how people live together in a geographical area under laws.

But as as a Muslim, thing that's very, very clear, if it hadn't been clear to me before, and and it was through middle nation made very clear to me. But if it hadn't been, this book shows that it does not matter what the paradigmatic state is or its laws because those laws are subject to violence, and this explains why Israel, South Africa, and the Third Reich existed. They are nation states with constitutions and laws. And yet these horrible examples were allowed to exist and interact with the other nation states of the world as equal nation states. And he he makes that point that that this essentially torpedoes declaration that the Western nation state is the most civilized form of groupings of people in a geographical area.

He names those three states and, you know, and says this. So it becomes very, very clear, and then I'm going to shut up, that if one does not have a foundation as sister Salma said, you know, you you have to have a a foundation that is the same going forward, backward, sideways. And if you do not have that, then your laws can radically change and really do great harm to populations of people. No matter what happens in the Muslim world, the Muslim can always hold the Quran and say, you know, I have these rights according to our creator, and no one can deny that. We all fall short, but we can always point to that.

People in secular nation states have no hard, fast, immutable foundation. And his calling out of Israel, South Africa, and the third Reich by name is simply the proof of that. And now I'm going to shut up.

And sister Samira needs to talk to you as her hand up.

Yes. What I found in the book about the nation state, what he described as the western or the or the European model, we I don't have an issue with that. What

I

found it hard is when he's comparing it with the Islamic governance, where he calls it governance, fine, but he's I think if we look at it from the perspective that it's a historic governance and not at this moment well, he said that early on in the book that there is no nation, whether it's in the Muslim or whatever, that is observing the sharia the sharia governance or the Islamic governance as he calls it. Because he says that wherever the sharia does not operate or in whichever territory, it is relegated to a secondary inferior status, which he he mentioned as in currently what the Muslim countries are. They relegated the sharia law into a secondary or inferior status, then that territory is a dar al harp and not and therefore, it's a potential subject to conversion by peace or by war, which is the rulings of the Sharia. And it it cannot be a dar al is at Islam, which is in which a territory in which Sharia is applied as a paradigmatic law and how it should be. So according this is where I have a problem with Wa'az.

How he described the nation state, the western, the European okay. We can accept that. We can see that. But then to say that there is no state at this moment, a Muslim state that can fully state that it is observing the shari'ah, that is where I had a problem in in in his book. I'm trying to reconcile myself with that.

Yeah.

Yeah. Sorry. I obviously, again, I'll repeat. I haven't read the book. But if if he's saying that, that's incredibly problematic.

And it's taking first of all, Dar Al Har, Dar Al Islam, Dar Al Kufr, or whatever what what what what have you. These aren't actually shari delineations of territories. This is something that came much later, and it and it was only ever created with regards to the issue of pajra. And have never really agreed. I mean, there's there you can say a a majority opinion, but there's no consensus opinion.

There's no about what actually constitutes Dar al Islam, Dar al Imam, Dar al Kufr, Dar al Khab, and so on. There are some who say, and it is the majority, that it is the lands in which the Sharia is the law of the land, where the laws of the sharia are implemented. But then even within that, there is disagreement as to to what extent and which laws that need that that qualify as being having established that the sharia is the law of the land. So it doesn't nowhere does anyone ever mean every single law of sharia must exist in a land in order for it to be a Dar al Islam, Dar al Imam, because that hasn't existed since Medina in the time of and. But then there's other folkaha who've who have said, it's wherever the Muslims are safe to practice their deen.

It's wherever the Muslims are a majority. It's wherever the signs of Islam are apparent in the land. He's taking he's taking one opinion that is among many opinions among the with regards to what constitutes a land of Islam. And, you know, I'm I'm I I I hate to keep going back to this, but if he's using America as an as a nation state, By the classic definition of a nation state, America is not a nation state. It doesn't meet the qualifications.

Maybe it meets his personal idiosyncratic definition of what a nation state is, but The United States Of America does not meet the the classic definition of what a nation state is. The people do not have a common heritage. There's many, many different cultures, many different it's a very diverse population. It's it's a it's a population of entirely entirely immigrant population, some willingly and some unwillingly immigrant. You could say, like, the Scandinavian countries, You can call those.

And some of the Eastern European countries, maybe where brother Nagel is. These are the you can say these are nation states because the people all have a common history, a common heritage, a common culture, and so forth, common language. This this is this is one of the that that's what makes a nation by the classic definition. So, again, I'm I'm I don't you know, I hate to harp on this, but he's he's using the word nation state, in my opinion, incorrectly. And if he wants as as I said, if he wants to do a critique of the Western model of government first of all, there isn't one Western model of government, but if he and and also The UK.

The UK is not a nation state. I mean, how can you say that The UK is a nation state? It's it's North Ireland, Northern Ireland, it's Scotland, it's Wales, it's England. Which one of those is is the nation? They all have different culture, different heritage, even even linguistic differences.

So, I mean, this is this is an aspect of a nation state. So I'm not sure, you know, what is the point of of avoiding saying I'm criticizing the Western model, the Western so called democratic model, and insisting to to say that it has to do with the nation state. And then if he's making this right modern state about

I think he doesn't use nation state. Okay.

You can say modern state. I suppose. But, I mean, that's those are two different things. I mean, as I said, nation state has a meaning. It has a classical meaning, and it's it's it's quite simple.

But one of the factors of that is people have a common heritage, have a common culture, common heritage, common language, common history, and so forth. And that's not the case in countries like The UK, The United States, Canada, Australia, or what have you. And it is has even become less and less the case for a country like Germany or France. So, you know, it it you know, I I don't mean to nitpick, but, again, these these these words have have actual definitions, and and his his definition is not the classic definition. But then if he's saying if he's if he's expanding it to to to say that any country where the where the sharia is not the sole source of law and the sole the the the exclusive law of the land, well, we haven't had that anywhere in in the history of Islam for a thousand years, for more than a thousand years.

So he's he's as I as I said in the in the chat at one point, he's basically just a a very complex, sophisticated intellectual version of and and the the takfiri wal wal jihad groups in Egypt were Hadi types who make takfir on all the Muslim governments. But he's just very says it in a very sophisticated academic way. And that's it for me.

I think Karim wanted to had his hands raised. Let's can you can you unmute yourself, Karim?

Yeah. This was for some time just to the previous question about the separation of powers. Right? Like, because mister Shahid was asking where does he see the problem. Right?

So I don't think he sees a problem in it. Like, he says the separation of powers is a good thing, but he sees the problem with the way it is being applied that is essentially not being applied. Right? And he said that the best separation of powers that there is is in the Muslim model. Right?

Like, he's trying to essentially, that, like, yeah, the nation state theoretically could be best represented by the Sharia. But in reality, how it's applied, it, like, is the opposite trend.

Yes. That's that's the that's basically his conclusion in the chapter. So he he cites, like, you know, some of the I'm not hugely familiar with a lot of the people he references. You know? Like, Foucault, I've heard of him, you know, but most of them, I have had to Google them, you know, and I'm not actually familiar with them.

But the conclusion is he highlights thinkers and philosophers who lament the imperfection of the application of the model, you know, the ideal that they have written on paper. And he claims he concludes that this ideal is present in the Muslim covenants, in the Muslim paradigmatic formula. You know? We we we have it. You know?

If only they knew. You know? It is that's the conclusion that he he he's had. I mean, as for the point about him characterizing the, Shushma, the the the absence of sharia being the the the I I I I fail to see how this this takfiri element I'm I'm so far, I have not seen it. Okay?

He has chapter three, he has identified that in Muslim governance that like like, this is the point that I've highlighted. I know I'm hosting, and I'm supposed to wait for everyone to talk, but I'll point No. Go on. Go on. Point I'll just point out this here that he talks about the siyasa sharia, that that the least you can say is that we have had a badly governed form of siyasa sharia.

That that means he's he's he recognizes that we've we have had in the ideal that we've had with the Muslim the Sharif paradigm, we've had badly government badly managed governments. So by that identification, if you wanna find flaws in the way it's managed today in the Muslim countries, you can you can that that fulfills the I mean, you you can fall into that into that category. You can't actually, you know, categorically put them in the you know, you can't make fear of them, you know, because he's identified it in the in the past that he's idolizing. You know?

See, I think I I I I really I still have a problem with with this because first of all, he's he's assuming that there is an Islamic system of government. He's taking it as a given that there is such a thing as a as a system of government that is mandated by the sharia. The sharia being not. There's two different things. There's the Sharia, which is and there's the which is rules extracted from the.

And in the Sharia, there is no political system, period. There is no political system. There's no governmental system that was revealed by the Quran or the Sunnah, Period. And by saying what he's saying, it's as if there is one. He's taking it almost as a given as if there is one that actually is mandated by the sharia, and there isn't.

What there is are rules in Islam and then an Islamic approach to trying to administer and manage the affairs of the ummah or the the the Muslims in any given territory and an Islamic approach to trying to implement those rules as best you can. So if he wants to call that badly managed or badly done, well, okay. You're right. You have a right to your opinion, but this is this isn't this isn't an an an Islamic way of understanding the issue, in my opinion, which, of course, it wouldn't be because he is a Christian. So he I I I feel that he is that he is fatally handicapped in providing a proper analysis of government in the Muslim world according to an Islamic point of view.

Just to add on to that, I think I think based on the voice note that I sent earlier, I think his Christian ident his him being a Christian is is form I mean, he's forming his opinions based off his off of his Christian faith, I think. And just the the the you know, calling out the system, calling, you know, out the oppression that's meted up by the by power, you know, the the whole scenario of Nabiisa, you know, confronting the the money changers. I I I think I'm not very familiar with the with the Christian narrative, but just the the money changers or the or the the collectors of RIBA, I think, and just that that imagery. You know? And and I think he has that in in his framework when he's approaching this.

And so

What what I've seen him say in interviews, sorry to interrupt you. Yeah. But what I the the the references that I've seen him use in interviews, again, confessing that I haven't read the book, but what I've seen him say in interviews and what you've mentioned here, the the the references that he makes are mostly to leftist seems to be mostly to leftist Marxist or so called neo Marxist thinkers. So I think it's it's probably fair to to say that he's if if he isn't himself a leftist, quasi Marxist, whatever, he's influenced by his thinking. And maybe he's influenced by maybe even the liberation theology of the the leftist Christians of the seventies and eighties.

That's very possible. He identifies as conservative. You know? I think that's also very clear in his, you know, self identification. But I think that's pretty

Well, I mean, if he want if he wants to be taken if he if he wants any Muslim anywhere in the world to take his critique seriously, he has to identify as conservative.

Alright. So any anybody else have anything to add?

I I do have a few comments, Salma, if you don't mind. So Please. I I took some exceptions with with his assertions in the in the second part where he talks about Muslim judges and how they were entirely separate from sultans and how all the legislative and judiciary power in across the Muslim world stemmed organically from the community. I mean, I don't think that is wholly true because we we we we had a case here, like, in in the Balkans where it was a land of Christians, then the Ottomans came and conquered. And the Ottomans obviously imposed a certain law or or a certain interpretation of the Islamic law onto the population.

A portion of them converted. A portion of them remained Christian. So he is saying on the one hand that such imposition is not Islamic, But practically speaking, in in order for a government to function properly, they do have to impose certain laws and regulations, and they do have to be centralized at least at the beginning of a of an empire or of a rule. Okay? And another thing, so he he does he does mention that, yes, there was some, you know, abuses of power in in the Muslim empire, especially in the in the Ottoman because that's the the closest to the, you know, state model that we have.

But on the other hand, he says, yes. Okay. That that happened. But everybody could go in front of the sultan and present their case, which is not really the case. I mean, in theory, yes, but that's not what happened.

What happened was, especially during the later stages of the empire, and I'm not you know, I don't have a an axe to grind against the empire, I mean, to to be honest. So I I I I this is not, you know, personal or anything. But the the fact remains that the empire violated Islamic principles and the Muftis or the Qadis did not really have any power to exert their influence with the Sultan to change certain practices. The most notable one for which we still paid the price, to be honest, today is the the case of the Janissaries. So what the Ottomans did, they went into, you know, Christian villages.

They essentially abducted Christian boys, you know, brought them back to Istanbul and trade them to be servants of the empire. So that was done not to spread the so called metaphysic of the Sharia, which he talks about. That was done in the interests of the empire just as certain practices today done by Muslim rulers of the nation states are done in the interests of the state. So I don't I don't quite agree with his say with his assertion that it was everything that the empire did was in the service of the sharia. That's not true, and I don't think it is practical to think of it like that because every form of governments, you know, every power did certain things to remain in power, not necessarily to, you know, to conform to all the, you know, to all the aims of the sharia.

So, you know, that's my two two cents on the topic. I I do think he idealizes the past, and he unfairly criticizes the the present in light of past events. Yeah. Yeah. I'll just stop here.

Yeah.

With with with regards to that, of course, you're you're absolutely right. And I think that another thing that should be pointed out is that, to a certain extent, the decentralization of the Muslim empire and the relative autonomy of certain territories and bodies and so forth, that was just a function of practicality because you didn't have the power to rule the entirety of the territory that was under the under the Muslims from a from one central authority. You didn't have the ability to actually impose that in every corner of Muslim territory. So there had to be a certain degree just as a function of practicality that that that the and the judges and the and so forth and the local or the governor or what have you had a degree of autonomy just by necessity. Simply, you know I mean, we know, like, for example, when when the Crusades happened, they didn't even know about it in Baghdad until it was they they had already reached Palestine.

This is this is just a matter of practicality and the and the and the period of time that they were in in terms of the limits of their their ability to actually enforce centralized authority. So I think that to a certain extent, the decentralization isn't a model of an Islamic approach per se or a Sharlay approach, but just pragmatic, practical reality of the the times that they were in in Allah.

There's another point I I'd I'd like to mention here. So he acknowledges that Muslim scholars could have differing opinions. Right? And that every community every community followed a a certain set of opinions that adhered to the cultural customs to the, you know, to the cultural reality. However and I'm I'm not very slandering.

I I I do understand why they did it. So when the Ottomans arrived here, obviously, they did not they they could not rely on any particular set of customs because they were not Muslim. So they had to impose their own interpretations to Sharia. So the the that was followed here and that has been traditionally followed here is the which is perfectly legitimate. But to say that centralized power does not do that in in the Islamic model of government is simply not true because it is highly impractical to let the community organically grow, you know, from the beginning of accepting Islam and to organically figure out the nuances of the sharia without without any, you know, laws and regulations given to them by the sultan is simply impractical.

So I I I I again think that he he he nitpicks. He chooses specific examples that suit his narrative, and he deliberately obscures the other ones that that don't. Okay? So that's my critique of him. I mean, otherwise, I do agree with his, like, overall understanding of the aims of the sharia.

I mean, he he he does give a a good view of that. But in in terms of the applicability of the sharia in in the modern times, I I I think he's just wrong, really.

Which then brings us to the chapter four where he covers the legal, the political, and the moral. That's the title of chapter four, so I hope that's that's more to be elaborated on that. And, obviously, you know, further on on chapter five and six and seven, but let's it seems like, you know, we've come to a point where we have to explore chapter four next. So is there anything else by any by by the others who are present? Thank you all for coming.

Just any anything. You don't have to even if you have not read the book or if you have a query. I mean, for me, personally, when I came to the point on his when he started to distinguish or categorize the Darul Haq and Darul Islam. You know? I felt that it was rather uninformed of him, and then I just I just let it slide, so to speak.

So because it that it's like a it's it it comes to a point where we it's an interface, you know, between interact like, you're Muslim, the army interacts with the you know, you're you're expanding. Right? So you're it's just an interface where you deal with this situation, and it's not really applicable now, is it? I mean, you know, so I just skipped I I as in I didn't really dwell on that, but I'm glad Shahid, you know, covered that point about that being not a found fundamental, you know, consideration that we should be taking. Is there any clarifications that anyone needs that the on the on the things that

Yeah. I just will add something that I heard also in one of his interviews that he's working on a book on, I think, how the modern Islam can be applied in governance or something like that. I think he's working on on on that book. And he said it's quite extensive, and it's 600 pages or something like that. So yeah.

So I'm hoping he will clarify more about how sharia can be applied in this modern time according to him. Of course, not a I don't know how he's gonna do that. But according to him, how the sharia of or the Islamic governor can be applied in in in our modern state.

I'm sorry. I find that so weird. I just I find

I find that so weird

that that that that a Christian guy is is going to tell us how to implement sharia. I I I can't wrap my head around that. Sorry.

Well, he's that passionate.

No. The nerve. The nerve.

Which is even weirder. Which is even weirder.

I I really think that when we are critiquing Halak, we should remember that this is a Palestinian Christian man who was educated in the West and who works in a major Western university who is living the inadequacy of the governmental and social system here and who recognizes that he is an Arab and that the the national and cultural foundation of the Arabs is Islam. And so as an Arab, he must look at Islam and the Sharia for his people's salvation because he does not want to see his people's religion and culture, the culture and religion of the vast majority of them subsumed under this increasingly horrific system that he is living in and witnessing. So I I think if we view him like that, we will be more charitable to him because he works some block from where I live. I can walk to Columbia University from where I live, and I live in Manhattan. And the thing that are happening here that are unconstitutional, they're against the New York state constitution.

They're against the charter of New York City. They're against the constitution of The United States. The things that are going on here are really, really bad. I mean, really bad. And and he doesn't want his people, the Arabs, to continue to look at the West as as, you know, something they should follow.

And so I'm giving him credit there. I believe he's doing the best he can to scream, don't follow these people. These people are crazy here. I'm living in this and do it in such a way where he can still continue to earn a paycheck. You know?

And and he can remain free of being locked up as a closet terrorist as other academics have been from his background or deported. You know? And just off the top of my head, can think of professor Samuel Adian, what they did to him. I mean, it's it's just outrageous. They used the fact that his wife visited Columbia University, the mayor of New York literally used that as the explanation for the horrific police raid recently on the university and the peacefully assembled students that was so bloody and violent that it shocked the whole city.