Sudan, UAE, KSA; Leverage and Hedging

I feel like my last video update on the situation in Sudan was a little bit confusing. That's partly because the situation in Sudan is very complicated and it is confusing, but it's also partly because I rushed. So let me try now to convey my thoughts a little bit more coherently, I hope, inshallah. First of all, there are two concepts that you should keep in mind when we're talking about this situation and really when you're talking about any geopolitical strategy type scenario. These are the concept of leverage and bet hedging.

The first concept, leverage, relates to the influence that one country has with another country because of the value of their relationship. The second concept, bet hedging, has to do with the way countries deal with each other when their relationship has become ambiguous. Both of these concepts play a huge role in both The UAE's and Saudi Arabia's relationship with The United States, with Russia, with China, and of course, with Sudan. Now the next thing that you need to keep in mind when talking about Sudan or any other geopolitical situation is the truism in geopolitics that there are no friends and there are no enemies. There are only interests.

And these interests will determine who is a friend and who is an enemy, and these are not static states. Someone who is a friend today can be an enemy tomorrow and can be your friend again the day after that depending upon what interests are involved. Now The United States has had a very close and long relationship with both Saudi Arabia and The UAE. Both countries have been loyal client states of America for decades, and they have been duly rewarded for that. For reasons that should go without saying, both The UAE and Saudi Arabia are extremely important strategic allies for The United States in The Gulf and the region overall.

Now over time, as trust has developed between The United States, Saudi Arabia, and The UAE, America has seen fit to grant both countries enough latitude to enable them to pursue an expansion of their own sphere of influence. And this was always with the implicit understanding that The UAE and Saudi Arabia would, use their influence in the region to essentially manage The Gulf and East Africa on behalf of The United States or anyway in a way that would protect American interests in that region. And The UAE and Saudi Arabia have not wasted this opportunity. They have been aggressively expanding their presence and their influence across the region. Now this aggressive expansion, which would normally not be tolerated by The United States, has been acceptable to America because they themselves have become interested over the last decade or so, interested in scaling back their direct policing of the region.

And again, because they trusted The UAE and Saudi Arabia to more or less manage the region in their best interests. However, over the last few years and particularly after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, ambiguity has crept into their relationship. Both The UAE and Saudi Arabia have actively pursued strengthening and deepening their ties with Russia and China. And they have also, as we've all seen and noticed, begun to conduct their statecraft with increasing independence. Nevertheless, they have continued to demonstrate sufficient regard and respect for American interests such that America has not yet categorized or classified them as a lost asset.

And so the relationship remains valuable to The United States. Now because of their increasing regional influence, both Russia and China have identified The UAE and Saudi Arabia also as important allies for them since both China and Russia are tremendously interested in increasing their footprint in The Middle East and Africa. So they naturally want to partner with the most influential player in the region who isn't America since obviously America doesn't want them in the region. So The UAE and Saudi Arabia are essentially presenting themselves to The US, to China, and to Russia, essentially as a sort of management broker who can balance everyone's interests. Neither China nor Russia nor The United States are in a position to demand that The UAE and Saudi Arabia cut ties with all of the others because the relationship is simply too important to risk alienating the Emiratis and the Saudis who could potentially scupper their interests in the region.

And all of them, Russia, China, and The United States, will be inclined to see, The Emirates and Saudis influence and control strengthen and grow in the region because they are managing America's and China's and Russia's interests in the region. So the stronger The UAE is, the stronger Saudi is in Africa and in The Middle East, the more they can feel that their interests will be protected and secure. And it relieves China and Russia from being in a position to be in direct competition with The US. There's a moderating force there that is trying to balance everyone's interests, and that's The UAE and Saudi Arabia. So as long as The UAE and Saudi Arabia have dominant control and influence, theoretically, everybody can get a piece of the pie without there being a risk that one party dominates more than the other.

So you see The UAE and Saudi Arabia have leverage with China, with Russia, and with The United States because of the influence that they have built in The Middle East and in East Africa. And by that leverage, they're not only able to make Russia, China, and The US tolerate each other's presence. All of them have a stake in seeing The UAE and Saudi Arabia be stronger and have greater control and influence. Because a stronger Saudi and a stronger Emirat in Africa and The Middle East is in everyone's interest or so they think. Now given what I've just explained, what do you think China, Russia, and The United States would prefer to happen in Sudan?

A transition to a democratically elected civilian government determined by the population or the installation of a president who is managed by The UAE and Saudi Arabia. Obviously, they would want to see tighter control over Sudan by their management brokers, The UAE and Saudi Arabia. And, obviously, The UAE and Saudi Arabia would like that as well. None of these parties want to see democracy in Sudan because that would potentially ruin everything. So I believe that The UAE and Saudi Arabia proposed a solution to the threat of democracy in Sudan, which was have the rapid support forces overthrow the government.

They know that the RSF are dangerous and experienced fighters. They know that they're loyal, and they know that the RSF leadership has a lot to gain if they can perform a successful coup d'etat. I in mean, terms of their loyalty, we already know that they were fighting on behalf of Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen, and we know that it was in fact the RSF that has been blocking the transition to a democratically elected civilian government in Sudan by, rejecting the integration of the RSF into the Sudanese army, most likely because The UAE and Saudi Arabia wanted to hobble the transition process to a civilian government as long as they possibly could until they finally had settled on this plan to support a coup d'etat. As the designated brokers for all international parties concerned, Saudi Arabia and The UAE would have explained this project, the coup project, to The United States, to Russia, to China, to the Brits, and as we know they did, to the Norwegians. They could have presented the idea in any number of ways depending on what they knew the other party wanted to hear.

But undoubtedly, they assured every party concerned that the coup would proceed quickly and go without a hitch and succeed. My guess is that to the Russians and the Chinese, they probably said we might need your support if things go sideways. I mean, Wagner is extremely active in Africa and could potentially be deployed to support the RSF either with their own personnel or with other African mercenaries with whom they are connected in one way or another. Now to the Americans and the Europeans, they probably didn't broach the possibility that the coup might go wrong. They probably just sold them on the idea that the RSF is, in favor of democracy and that they are, battling radical Islamists and so forth because that's how you would sell something like that to the Americans and the Europeans.

So they probably presented it that way and said, you know, if things get messy, just, you know, don't do anything supportive of the regime and show your support one way or another rhetorically for the cause of the RSF because their cause is your cause and blah blah blah. And it is worth taking note of the fact that we haven't heard anything from the Western world condemning the coup and showing solidarity with the regime, which is conspicuous and unusual under the circumstances. Now when this proposal is presented to the Americans, because, UAE and Saudi Arabia have leverage, they'll listen and they'll accept it. But because there is ambiguity in their relationship, they will hedge their bets. The United States has very little to lose if Sudan falls into violence and civil war and chaos.

If a situation like that arose, in the wake of a failed coup, The US will still see that, China's and Russia's interests in Sudan are disrupted, which is all they really want. So chaos and death and destruction in Sudan are fine with them. But if by chance the coup is successful, well, The US wants to be on that team. They don't wanna be the only ones who are not supportive of the rebels who end up taking over the government because then they may not get their slice of the pie. So by being able to hedge their bet, they turn the situation into a win win scenario for them.

If the coup succeeds, they win. If the coup doesn't succeed, then they can activate their hedge and drive Sudan into chaos and violence, thus disrupting China's and Russia's interests. Even if they lose their own interests, it's fine. As long as China doesn't get any and as long as Russia doesn't get any. So most likely, The US approved of the coup, wasn't actively involved, approved of it, but reserved the strategic option of driving Sudan into civil war if the coup became too complicated because wreaking havoc is something that the US can do at very minimal investment.

So, basically, they agreed to bet on the coup, but they hedged their bet with the option to destroy Sudan. And that option probably includes throwing American support behind the Burhan regime if the RSF proves that they are unable to seal the deal with the coup and starts getting support from Russia and China. So then Sudan becomes a proxy war between The United States, Russia, and China. Now what The UAE and Saudi Arabia will do if the coup fails, it's unclear. They have a lot at stake, And they have proven in the past with both Yemen and with the boycott of Qatar, they've proven that when their influence is at stake, they don't know when to quit.

So if they did not learn their lesson from Yemen and from Qatar, then they may well try to continue supporting the RSF even if it's going badly. But if they did learn their lesson, then the messier the coup attempt gets and the more difficult it becomes and the less likely it is that RSF will succeed, if they learned their lesson from Yemen and Qatar, then The UAE will throw them under the bus, and they'll throw their support behind the Burhan regime and help them annihilate the RSF. UAE and Saudi Arabia have typically done much better at expanding their influence through soft power approaches. They don't typically do very well when they try bold aggressive moves. I think that they just tried a hostile takeover of Sudan and it did not go to plan.

And if they persist in this attempted hostile takeover of Sudan and it doesn't work out, if they persist for very much longer, then The United States will activate their hedge and Sudan will collapse into a full blown civil war. I think that The UAE and Saudi Arabia were either misled or they misled themselves by their own ambition into thinking that the RSF was more organized and more competent than they are. And it's also worth considering, and The UAE and Saudi Arabia should consider, that The United States may not be the only ones who are hedging their bet. China and Russia could very well also switch sides and throw their support behind the Burhan regime, which would devastate UAE and Saudi influence in Sudan for the foreseeable future. They would become redundant in Sudan at that point.

Now this wouldn't mean the end of the project by Saudi Arabia and The UAE to expand their influence, but it would be a devastating blow to its progress if they don't choose their next steps very wisely. Now, of course, the victims in all of this are the people of Sudan who are being denied the right to have any say in how they are governed and by whom. But unfortunately, that's the nature of geopolitics. If you're a weak country, you will inevitably be dominated by stronger countries. But I still believe that being dominated by The UAE and Saudi Arabia and by extension Russia and China is still preferable to being dominated by The United States.

It's just tragic that these are the only options available to Sudan at this particular moment in history, and we pray for the safety of our brothers and sisters there who just want to live their lives in peace.