Middle Nation Book Discussion: The Crusades Through Arab Eyes | Session Six
Everyone. Welcome to the Middle Nation book discussion. We're discussing, as you know, the book, The Crusades Threw Arab Eyes by Amin Malouf, who is a Lebanese, I think, Lebanese French writer. This is our fifth session, I believe, and we're gonna take a sort of a different approach than what we have have done in the past just so that we can avoid any silences. Brother Amar is going to just talk about what this particular section of the book that we've that we've gone through.
And then if anyone has any comments or questions or points to add, then just raise your hand rather than him just opening it up to, does anyone have anything to say? If you have something to say, raise your hand, and he'll he'll he'll give you the mic. I just wanted to sort of introduce it because I find it really fascinating, and this is this is part of the whole reason why we're doing this why we're doing this book. Because, like okay. In in today's section, we were just talking about it in the chat.
There's sort of an overarching theme that you see developing, and it really runs through the whole episode, the whole historical episode, which is kind of this theme of what you could call, like, the war behind the war or the war inside the war, which is like the the struggle inside our own house, inside the the house of the Muslims. And that that that the struggle amongst ourselves really decides whether or not the the French, the invader, the crusader wins or loses before any battle even takes place. It's the situation within our own house that will determine that. It's the idea that sovereignty and economic sovereignty, political independence, and so forth really rises or falls based on the the state of our internal cohesion or internal fragmentation. Because when you go over like I say, when you go over everything that happened, and, like, particularly, it's really coming into sharper focus with these with the with with the episodes that we've recently gone through in this last section of the book.
You know? The sieges, the the the coalitions, the betrayals, the sort of you see these people emerging who are sort of gatekeepers. You have assassination. You know? And you start to look at it really I was just saying again in the chat, in the book discussion telegram chat.
And if you're not in there, you should join it. Someone can can maybe put a link to it if we haven't already. It's it's not it it it's not just a history that you're reading, or in fact, you can read history as an allegory. And I think this is part of the reason why Allah tells us to always look back at stories before us, the the look back at the nations before us, the peoples before us, and the history, to study the history, because it really represents an allegory of the modern era. You know, the the the crusades were not just a a clash between the Europeans, the French, and the Muslim world or in Islam.
It was also a test for us whether our own societies could coordinate and and and cooperate and have solidarity, work together, cooperate and so forth, without there being divisions, without people being individual leaders being driven by ego, driven by suspicion, driven by very sort of small minded or short term minded power interests, their own self interest, and so forth. And that's why I say, like, this this book, and and as I say, especially this particular section that we're into now, reads like an allegory of the modern age. I mean, if you if you exchange or you swap the the French with any external pressure and, again, it's on on any people, not just the Muslims, but any external pressure, colonization, Western pressure, so forth, you know, sanctions, debt traps, propaganda warfare, proxy conflicts, corporate capture, economic sabotage, and so on, the inner mechanics are the same. It's the same situation that you're dealing with across across time. And and every era produces the same sorts of archetypes.
You have, like, the coalition builder who tries to think in sequences and tries to secure the the long term agenda while trying to sort of strengthen the rear before marching forward. You have gatekeepers who are actually even more afraid of allies than they are of their enemies. You have opportunists who would rather make a deal with an outsider than even share a little bit of authority with their own perceived local rivals. I mean we see these things happening in the current age. These are these are like archetypes that appear throughout history.
And I think it's good for us to sort of, like, identify these archetypes, have a sort of profile in our own mind. I'm not necessarily saying that you have to write it all out yourself, but in your own mind, form a a sort of a a vision of these archetypes that you find in these stories of in these stories of history, and then recognize when a state or a leader or a people or your own self reflects some of these whether positive or negative traits that you find in these archetypes. So as we're going through all of these points, brother has several points that we're gonna recap. Don't just think about it in terms of what happened in history. Think about it in terms of what type of leadership is this.
What leadership archetypes, what leadership strategies are we looking at in history? What kind of society is this? What kind of instincts were being followed by the people at that time? What were the power dynamics at that time, and how did they interact with each other? And it's very easy for you.
In fact, it'd be very difficult to not see this. It's very easy to bring that forward into the twenty first century and into the the current dynamics that we're facing. Because the the fact of the matter is we talked about this in the last discussion that was just recently uploaded on the channel about the idea of history repeating itself and that history repeating itself is not inevitable. But one thing that is inevitable and one thing that does repeat throughout all of history, of course, is human nature itself. Our our nature our human nature is the same now as it was a thousand years ago or two thousand years ago, but how we how we manifest that and how we regulate that hopefully has evolved.
So this is one of the chapters in history that teaches us how you can spot the difference, for example, between a leader who actually is building a future versus leaders who just are protecting their own position, their own seat. And this is an issue that we have dealt with time and time and time again, and it's the it's the sort of central sort of lever that the kufar and that our enemies and, again, this isn't just between Muslims and and our enemies. It's this is for all people, really. This is a this is a dynamic that plays out had played out throughout the whole history of colonization, where you have local leaders who are collaborators or local leaders who are more interested in their in their internal rivalries than they are in the external threat. So I just want to sort of talk about this overarching theme that I I sort of perceived in this recent section.
And, again, it it it applies to the sort of totality of this story and this history and how that theme never ceases to be relevant. So with that, I will hand it over to brother Omar, and I hope everyone enjoys this session and benefits from it. And, again, anyone who has anything to say from the speakers, just go ahead and raise your hand if you have something to say. And for the audience, we've explained this before. We don't give the microphone to people that we don't know.
We don't know what your level is at intellectually. We don't know what your level at is in terms of your understanding. We don't even know if you've read the book. So we're not just going to randomly hand the microphone. We want these sessions to be very organized and orderly and try to maximize the benefit for the listeners.
So if you are interested, if you're if you're not assigned a microphone and we don't know you and you're interested in participating in these discussions, then do come over to the Telegram book discussion so that we can we can get to know you. And then, inshallah, potentially, time, we'll be able to give you a mic. Okay. Brother Omar, onto you.
Thank you so much, Ustel, for this brilliant, introduction. So, this really gave some ideas as to how can, how we can navigate, this session inshallah. So, first of all, we have to remind our listeners that the book although we have chosen the book, the crusades to Arab eyes by Emil Maruf for the discussion, the main reason we chose this book is that it exclusively relies on, quote, unquote, Arab sources, and we've, explained before that it again, using the word Arab is not entirely accurate because, from our side, which is the Muslim side, many of the of the of the protagonists or the the main characters are not even Arab. They're Turkish, Kurdish, that kind of thing. And so it would have been more appropriate to use the word, the crusades through, Muslim eyes.
So he read that exclusively on Muslim sources. However, Amin aloof is a, is a literateur. He's a novelist. And so you cannot help and this is, gained through the supplementary reading that we've been trying to introduce to the book club because at first, I was trying to just add more information so that we can make the discussion richer. But, however, when I try to read other sources just to, like, complement the the the the data, I found out that many of the incidents that took place, they were omitted by him.
I'm not sure why exactly, but I'm believing that it, he was trying to construct some sort of plot that would be appealing to the to the reader, whether they are European or or Muslim or what have you. And it was better that way to construct this plot so that there's some sort of climax being built up to all the way towards the the the the the battle of Hattin, for example, or the conquest of Arca, marking the end of the of the Faraji occupation. So this this lack of of of of storytelling on his part, just to make the story better, actually served some sort of narrative that's not the the narrative that is accurate, not not entirely reflecting the true nature of the of of what happened. So for example, we see an example, and this is not mentioned on
the book.
We see another example of the Muslim rulers. They're not always being at loggerheads with each other because at first, we started that everyone every Muslim ruler ruler was, you know he he he's he's constructing this narrative in the book that everyone was just trying to like, as I said, they're gatekeepers. They're more afraid of allies than they are afraid of their enemies. So we see that in Duqaq. We see that in the one.
We see that in in sometimes in Tuftukin. But, for example, al Abdul, which is he was the the the ruler of the the Fatimid, the zero Egypt, He didn't stand by watching the Faraj occupy Palestine. Right? He he sent campaign after campaign after campaign, all of which they failed trying to save Palestine. He sent campaign after campaign trying to save Palestine, all of which failed.
But this is not the point. The point is that he tried. This is not mentioned in the book. Why? Because he was like, this is not good for the storytelling.
We want to say that the the Muslim rulers or the Arab rulers were sleeping. They weren't paying full attention to what happening. No. Al Abdul was was paying full attention, and he was trying. The fact that he failed doesn't account in in I mean, but it does account for us.
Why? Because we have our own philosophy of of what success success means. Success means that you keep trying. That is the that is what's important, And that is not that is the the the measure by which we measure how rulers try. For example, people most of the people know everyone knows Salahab bin Alayyid.
Right? Everyone knows him. East and West. Fewer people know his predecessor, Muhammad, his teacher, his his his mentor. Right?
And even fewer people know, Ahmed ibn Zinqi, the father of Nur ad Din Mahmud. But if you come to ask someone about someone called Sharaf ibn, Naudud, for example, no one knows him. Although this guy and the book, in the chapter as we should see inshallah, he made tremendous efforts, and he had he had a very desperate he had a very tragic, you know, death, but he was one of the very first brick builders in the project of of of greeting from the Farunch. So the fact that he didn't succeed in our Muslim philosophy doesn't mean that he was a failure. It means that he was trying to build on the way.
So we see an example of Muslim rulers not being at loggerheads with each other, for example, at the siege of the of Fatimid Tyre. Right? The the most of the of the coast of Bilad Hashem was under Fatimid rule, and they fell, yeah, in one city after another. Tyre was was one of the very last to fall. Yeah.
It kept holding out against the French for a very, very, very long time, But, of course, yeah, there's so much one can do. So Fatima Thayer requested the aid of Seljuk at Damascus. When we say Seljuk at Damascus, we mean nominal loyalty to the Seljuk, but as we as the our listeners, if they will remember, Bilad Hashem was nominally under Seljuk rule, but, of course, each, each emir of a city was their own boss. Right? They would pray for the sultan in in private prayers, but, essentially, on the ground in real life, they were totally independent.
So the ruler of Damascus was someone called Turtukin, the Al Qa'bat Turtukin, and he was a Muslim. He was Sunni. He was not a wali or a governor of the Fatimids. No. He was nominally under Seljuqs.
But Tyre, Fatimid Tyre, requested aid from Seljuk at Damascus in the face of the Ferengi siege by Baldwin the first. Right? The attempts were valiant, and they paid off because Tuttokin was one of the strongest rulers of Yadisham at the time, and he was able to conduct some raids on the Farajic possession possessions to relieve Tyre. And to be honest, Tuktukin was able to force Baldwin to return back to Akkri, which had fallen before, and thus Tyre was saved. And not only was Tayyah saved, but al Abdul and Tuktukin, they reached an understanding.
This is the very first time because, again, we have to remind ourselves. Most people, the the common, the common, what do you say, the common story being told is that only at the time of did the reunite into a cohesive force. This is not the case. We see here this was before Salah had been maybe seventy, sixty years before Salah had been was even on the on on the scene, and we see that Egypt and understanding. Potomac Egypt was Shiai.
Beladdishem was Sunni, and this did not stop the the the the interactions, and this did not stop the collaboration between the two powers in the face of the French. Right? This understanding even caused Baldwin the first to try and invade Egypt later on. I'm not sure why he would try to invade Egypt using 200 knights, but for some reason, he thought he could do it. And, course, this attempt was futile, and he died along the way.
And he didn't even return back to Jerusalem. He he he died returning back to Jerusalem, and his cousin Baldwin the second, he was the the count of Edessa. He took over and became king of Jerusalem, having the title Baldwin the second. Okay? This was was one aspect of the collaboration.
Another aspect of the collaboration so now we see interregional, like, between across the region, between Egypt and and even in between and. Right? Because Al Mosul, the Emirate of Mosul and, again, we have to highlight here the importance of the Emirate of Mosul. The Emirate of Mosul, if our listeners will remember, every every powerful army that was sent over by the subjects when they wanted or they decided to intervene in the politics of Beirut Hashem was all was always sent from the from the Emirate Of Mosul. Why?
Because this was a very rich emirate at the time. It had resources. It had proximity to to the Salgic lands, meaning that it had the ability to to to gather up armies, to to to even export armies to Gilead Hashem, and it was also it had proximity also to Gilead Hashem. So it it was sort of in the middle between all the regions, and it was able to be a pain in the back of the Farronch, and it prevented them from accessing even going further into Muslim heartlands, which were head by the subjects. Right?
So we see we have seen before, of course, Jawli, the the Emir of Mosul, and before him or or after him, we have seen many Emirates. So we have we had Jakarmash, we had Jawli, and we even had the very first one introduced in the story. I think his name was Kabuka. Right? So these were fearful leaders, and they were they were feared by the Farronch and, of course, by the leaders of.
This is the point that was making about Muslim leaders fearing allies, sometimes even more than fearing their enemies. So, at this particular point in the story, we are introduced to, the Emir Sharfid Din Mahdud ibn al Tantakim. Right? This is a guy who I believe is very under he's he's he's he's not pursuing his due in terms of Muslim history. Right?
He was the emir of Mosul, and if immediately, when you see someone being elevated to the emirate of of Of Al Mosul, you understand immediately that this is a man who is capable of leading armies. He's a strong manager. He's he's able to manage assets, and he is willing to go to Bereldesham to set to set things straight with the French and sometimes with Muslim rule rulers in Be'lat Hashem. So, Shahrar al Din Mahlud, he led an alliance, and he tried to capture Edessa not once, not twice, but three times. And this tells us the importance that he he he understood, and this also gives us the the the the the excuse that sometimes people deny at the very fur at the very beginning of the story that he wanted to make sure that Edessa in his back was under Muslim hands in order to to be sure that he was able to roam in B'lal Al Sham without being surrounded by from all parts.
So Edessa was always a pain in the back of the Muslims because it was in their backs when they were heading to Be'er El Shem. So he tried to capture El Shem three times, but he couldn't take it. And we see him now during the attack of El Dessa, Ridwan, which returned back again to Ridwan, the the king of Aleppo. So Budwan used these opportunities or one of the opportunities when Modu was attacking Edessa, and he tried to attack Antioch, and he tried to claim some of Aleppo's possessions. And, of course, Thancred, the emir of of of of Antioch at the time, he retaliated so aggressively, and due to the once shortsighted and highly selfish policies, no Muslim ruler was willing to aid him.
So we have this dynamic that I am trying to assert my sovereignty, and I'm trying to assert my place without resorting to any help from my fellow Muslim leaders, which is, in my opinion, a very counterproductive strategy to say the least. So no one is asking you to to to leave your seat behind, but at the same time, being so selfish and not compromising at all or sometimes even compromising with the French, but not compromising with your fellow Muslim leaders results in that kind of situation. Right? No one was willing to help Rutan because no one was believing that he would help them in return in the future or that even sometimes Rutan when when when when an army was sent, and as we shall see later on, an army was sent by the sultan of the subjects to aid Aleppo. He he would close the gates of the city in their faces.
So this is the kind of guy you wouldn't like to interact with. You wouldn't like to help. Even if he's trying to assert his own sovereignty is and even even if he's trying to protect Aleppo from the, he's doing it in in in the worst way possible. Right? So that this is how we see Muldoon entering the scene and how he yeah.
How good one was was trying to protect Aleppo in his own strategy, but it was a very failed strategy. Now as a reason as a as a result of this happening, Maldud trying to capture Edessa and Rutwan trying to attack Antioch in in in the in the shadow of this campaign and then being attacked himself and not being helped by any Muslim ruler, the residents of Aleppo were fed up with this whole thing, with this situation because they they they thought that Ridwan was was going about this the wrong way multiple times. Right? At at some point, if our listeners would remember, the Farrange asked for one, and he complied. Unfortunately, they asked him to remove the the the crescent from from top of one of of of from the top of the Great Mosque Of Aleppo and place a cross on top of it, which, of course, infuriated the Alapans because the Alapans were very they were very proud people of their own city.
Right? And we would see how this will turn out. So the Alapans were fed up with host with this whole thing, and they asked Rutan. They told him that we're sending a delegation to the sultan of the subjects asking him for help. Right?
We're going to Baghdad. And they went indeed to the caliphate, and they made a commotion, and they interrupted the Friday prayers twice, one time at the mosque of the sultan and another time at the mosque of the caliphate. And it incidentally, at at this particular point in time, the Eastern Roman Empire had had been at loggerheads with the Farangs. Right? They because they were sort of under under the understanding that they will the Farangs will take some lands, capture some lands from the Muslims, and return them to the Eastern Empire.
I'm not sure why the Eastern Emperor, the Eastern Roman Emperor thought that French would, you know, take the city and deliver it to him. But for some reason, he thought so, and they they were having, you know, clashes on border territories between Antioch and Cilicia. So this this led the Eastern Roman emperor to send an envoy to Baghdad at the same time as the arriving at the same time as the Alethan delegation. And the employee was asking for a military alliance between so an an alliance consisting of the subjects and the Eastern Romans against the French. And, of course, when the Aladdin delegation heard that, they were infuriated because they were thinking they said out loud so the the the the the Eastern Roman emperor is, like, is is more protectable Islam of the than the the than the caliph.
And, of course, this is, like, this is nonsense. This is nonsensical because the Eastern Roman emperor was not, you know, fearful fearful for Islam or trying to protect Islam. And sometimes in modern times, the same situation happens. People think that, some some sort of, non Muslim ruler trying to ally with the Muslims when he is, you know, he's trying to protect Islam. No.
The Eastern Roman Emperor simply was looking for looking out for his own interests, and he thought that he should now seek the the the assistance of the Muslims against the Faraj, whom he led pass through his lands in the first place. So, yeah, I mean, I'm not sure why they they were fooled, but for some reason, they were fooled. Anyway, as a result of this delegation yes, sister Samir?
Brother, thank you so much for the summary that so far that we've been through the history, but I I just wanted to add just like you mentioned how the people there started, you know, saying those slogans, how the is the Roman what's the emperor or whatever. He's the better than the the sultan or the caliphate. Also, there is this thing about how now that this period is considered as a period where the Muslims areas were stagnant. They were not doing anything. Like, when you when they narrated, they narrated, like, they have normalized the the the the existence of the the French in the area.
And this this is how it's narrated in most of the historical books that they were not doing anything. Even though, as he said, there were so many things happening behind the scenes or small skirmishes. Remember, there was no social media at that time or anything. But the the Muslim leaders did not just accept the fact, but they were doing things that not everyone would know, or, they would, we know about this history because of the, the the the writer. He got the the chronicles from, you know, those, influential people that wrote those historical records.
But the layman, the people there, they did not know, obviously. They would not know all these things except after, later on way later on. So what I wanted to say is this period is thought of as a a period where the Muslim did not do anything. Like, they accepted the fact that the French has just come and settled it, and they have made their own kingdoms. And we just were the the rulers just accepted it, and which is not the case as you've just mentioned.
And this also leads to the fact that the French were so arrogant of their wins that they have even thought of conquering Egypt with what how many soldiers that Baldwin king Baldwin used to try to invade Egypt, thinking that the Muslims are weak and they are divided. And, you know, yes, they were, but they were not to that to to to that level. And I think it was 200 or 300. I don't know how I think 600 in total.
200. Yes. Yes.
Yeah. Who tried to invade Egypt, which is really shows you how arrogant they were on their on their winds and and how the Muslims were not really just accepting the fact that the the the the French are there to stay. It there was some resistance, and yet it was not, you know, highlighted in modern times.
Yes. I think this is a tendency on our own part to generalize. So people really like so the layman, especially, they really like to say, look, it's the same happening like yesterday. The Muslim rulers are da da da da. That's it.
Like, this is not the yeah. You cannot make that that statement. This is absolutely lazy to say the least. Right? So they would say, oh, alright.
Then then how did the did the Faranj do that? They did that because some of the Muslim rulers were seeking their own self interest, and this allowed them to do what they did. But to say that everyone was accepting of that and even even the same people, sometimes the same people would do something to aid the out of self interest, and then they would do something to to stop the, also out of the self interest or sometimes in the interest of Islam. It's not wrong to say that because they they actually did that. But to say or to claim that everything was always on the side of the, this is what I don't agree with because simply it is not true.
You have to understand the long game here. You have to understand every single incident that took place, contextualize it, and see how it led either to the help, to the aid, or to the stopping of the occupation. Yes, Ustad?
Yes. I was just gonna say exactly what you're talking about. I mean, this this is a really important thing for us to to wrap our heads around because, you know, especially with with all of this sort of hype from the West about democracy and of the people by the people and for the people and so forth and all of these sort of grassroots movements and NGOs and whatnot, people want to be involved in one way or another in politics. They wanna be involved in one way or another in decision making, and understandably so since their lives are are impacted by it. But they don't do the the the requisite sort of education and gathering of information that if you want to be involved in politics, you have to understand politics.
You wanna have a role in decision making, but you can't only be concerned about the the impact upon you of the decision that's being made or the policy. You have to understand all of the mechanics that are behind the decision even sort of coming up. You have to you you really have to educate yourself and research and understand like, we've talked about many, many times on Middle Nation, you have to understand the power dynamics, you have to understand the interests, you have to understand the bargaining chips that are at play, and and really try to comprehend the reasoning that is required in in terms of making a a sound judgment about what's going to what's going to be best for the population in terms of long term stability, long term securing of sovereignty, and so on. And people want to be involved without educating themselves about these things. They just get they either approve or disapprove of a decision that's being made at the at the higher level, but they don't understand any of the issues that are at play that the that the people at the higher level have to navigate.
And so if you want to because this this shows us that the the society at large, the population at large, is a political force. They are a part of the scenario. They're part of the power dynamics. But, unfortunately, very often, they are the least informed and the least educated and the least responsible and the least mature element within the power dynamics. And you do have power as as a population.
The people, the public does have power, and it is upon them to to act responsibly. And in order to act responsibly, you have to properly educate yourself. You have to properly be informed. Otherwise, you're you you basically become a sort of a rogue element, and you can either be helpful or or or unhelpful or destructive. And sometimes that just happens without even any intention of being either one.
It's it's always the intention of being helpful. But if you end up being helpful, it's usually just by accident because you just don't really understand what's happening. And this is one of the reasons also why people at the higher level tend to view the public as just something to be propagandized and manipulated so that we can control them because we know that they're not going to take upon themselves the responsibility of properly educating themselves and understanding the situation in all of its intricacies in order for them to actually mobilize in an intelligent manner. This is why the the people at the top tend to tend to just sort of control and manipulate the the the general public because the general public has not proven itself to address or to engage with politics in a responsible manner intellectually to where they can actually make a useful contribution, and they just have sort of have knee jerk emotional reactions to things. But if you if you if you want to be involved in politics, and either way you you end up being involved in politics because you exist and you are an incredibly important force, if you want to do that responsibly, then you have to take on the the duties and obligations that come with that responsibility.
The first of which, of course, is actually educating yourself about, as I say, the intricacies and the complexities of the power dynamics and the relations that are at play.
Yes. I mean, to to to to give a very very simple example of what is that the same, right, about the the self education part. So we we wouldn't be having this, I wouldn't call intelligent, but this not very simple discussion if there weren't other sources being read to complement what was what what what we're discussing right now. Right? So in order just to understand history, right, you had to read the incident itself from different sources, try to think about it, try to weigh in all of the circumstances that were taking place at the time, and then make a sound decision.
This is about something in the past, not something right now. And this is about something who about which we almost know everything. So now you don't know everything. You haven't read enough sources. You haven't watched, you know, recent history enough.
You you don't know what is happening at the higher levels. So you can't possibly go out and say this and that without properly educating yourself, like, start this thing. So we have to remind the the listeners, the Muslims in general, to keep this in mind, that you have to properly educate yourself. Now this is there's an important point here that we have to also mention. So we were talking about how in how not all of the Muslim rulers were, you know, doing you know, making taking making wrong decisions or making wrong taking wrong decisions or making wrong choices.
But, also, we have to to turn our heads to the to the strength of societies at the time. This is a very important aspect that I think we should discuss more. So we we will see, in sha'Allah, multiple incidents, the first of which is the Alakan incidents. Right? So Ibn Khasheh, the in Alakkaw, he was the the leader of Alakkaw society.
This one this man was a patrician. He was from a from a from an elite family. They were wood traders, hence the name Ibn Khasher, the son of the of the wood trader or the or the wood the the the wood the woodsman. And he he he understood the intricacies of Aladdin society. He had multiple audiences with Rudwan.
He had multiple audiences with many of the Emirs who succeeded Raghun. So this was an important figure, and he was not alone. Right? He he had the the backing of whole the whole of of city of Aleppo. So this is a very important aspect that societies Muslim societies, as Ostad mentioned, they are a political force, and they I think at this point so, again, we can generalize not all societies, of course, but they were they had some sort of understanding of what should be done at least in a very, very vague manner.
Right? They didn't know, of course, all of the intricacies, but they they understood that the way Ridwan was handling things, that was not proper anymore. And and what what helped this what helped reinforce this understanding is that the sultan eventually did send an army trying to to to help Rutan and help Aleppo. So we now know that this may have been in the interest of Aleppo because the sultan is a Muslim, and he was sending a Muslim army to aid a Muslim city. So this is something that we have to to pay attention to because we will face it one more time with Tyre, and we will see if it we will face it also one more time in.
So the delegation, as we mentioned, was promised by the sultan that an army would be sent under the leadership of Maldud to help Aleppo. RID one asked for the aid of this alliance, this Maldud alliance against Tancred, And they said, okay. We're we're we're we're coming to to your aid. But when they actually did arrive, he didn't allow them into Alaco due to the constant fear of the power of the Otabakov Mosque. Of course, this one was Maldud.
And the alliance shortly broke up and the campaign failed. Mahdud did try to take Adessa a third time after that, but he also failed. So what's interesting here is that Mahdud, as we mentioned, understood that in order to start truly freeing the Levant or Aleppo and he he had to own Aleppo, Adessa, in his view, had to be free. Now here is where we start saying that the Utabics were working together, and Beledeshem and Iraq were working together. So Moldud and Tuktukin, the leader of Damascus, they were able to face the Faraj and defeat them in the battle of Simbar, the Simbar of Rich.
Right? And this was the first time Mosul and Damascus worked together, and we see immediate effects of this alliance. Immediate effects. Right? Mosul was a very strong Emirate.
Damascus was a very strong Emirate. When they put their differences aside and they worked together, they were able to easily defeat the Farang. So so we have examples of how you can manage successfully in in terms of Maldud and Protokin aligned together, and we have examples of how you cannot manage successfully like the the case of Terbuqa, for example. Right? And all over the Muslim heartlands, Muslims were thrilled to hear this to hear the the the the the news of this, like, the the news of this victory against the French.
Right? And everyone was under the impression that Maudud and Khutakim were going to clear the Levant from from the from the to expel the the French from the Levant. And so Muldoon was hosted by Tuktokin in Damascus, and they were displaying to the public that they were brothers in Islam, that they were and they were going to to continue the cooperation. And during a Friday prayer, was was praying, and he was he finished his Friday prayers, and there were some people praying in the in the in the Omayet mosque in Damascus. And one of them jumped Maldud, and he stabbed him multiple times, and he died hours later.
Now no one knows who is behind this hit, so we have two main suspects right now. The first of which is Rudwan, and the second is Doctor. King himself, the host, because who else would would fear the presence of a of such a strong Muslim general in the Muslim heartlands. Of course, the French are are are are are are suspect as well, but they're the least because they still can't order a hit from Muslims on Muslims in such a manner. And it it's as a result of this, what you would call this huge setback first of all, this is the reason most of the people don't know about Maldives, because the man if he had completed, no one knows what is what would have happened.
But this was the man. That the the the big the the this was the beginning of the of the journey that ended by a Daher Bebers or even by Al Ashra Khalil around two hundred years later. This was the starting block, and this was it's because of this reason that no one, almost no one knows Sharif I Dinmont, non non non Muslims and not even Muslims. They don't know the man. Although he put his heart into the cause, and he was willing to to to to to ally with different Muslims who closed their in his face.
And he would have his army, you know, roaming Be'ad Hashem, and this required logistical planning, and this required putting up with some with things that not all Muslim leaders would have to put up with during the time just in order to help the Muslim cause. He did that, and Allah chose him by his side for for for a reason we don't know. And this is how, yeah, this is how history works. So as a result, the suspected that was complicit in murder. And therefore, now we hear about Muldud Tuktukin and Ilghazi.
Ilghazi was one of the two brothers holding Jerusalem when took it from the Seljuks before the Ferengi occupation or during the Ferengi occupation. So this is a very important figure, and we will see him later on inshallah. So the sultan suspecting that Tuttukin was complicit in Muldoon's murder, he sent a new emir of Mosul, and he wanted to discipline the the the the the leaders of because he was thinking, now I'm trying to help you. I'm sending an army after an army to aid you in your in your your battle against the French, and you kill the generals. You kill they killed one of the best generals sent thus far, which is Moldut.
So what are you actually doing? So he was he was saying that enough of this, and I will I will remove all of the the the the leaders of Bledeshem, and I will put Bledeshem directly under my control. Of course, this was very very shortsighted from the sultan because how could you possibly dream of that? This we're not during the time of Malik Shah anymore. So, yeah, you have to be realistic in your approach.
However, he sent a campaign, and, of course, Muslims and non Muslims in B'Aladdin Shem, they allied themselves against this campaign. Right? The emir of Mosul was someone called Al Buzuki, and he was suddenly faced with the Faraj and the Muslims allied together against his army for the very first time since came to Bila Dusham. So, of course, the campaign didn't achieve its goals despite Al Bursokry's best efforts, and he tried to divide and conquer, but he was ambushed, and he lost most of his army. Now back to Aleppo.
We're focusing the camera on Aleppo. After Dreadwon died, the situation became an entire mess in Aleppo. Right? Because, one, his sons one of one of his sons was a was a mad prince. Literally, he was a mad prince.
Right? He was not yet 17 years old, and he was just killing away all of his enemies. And Al Hasheb, the famous of Alapu, told him that you have to you you can't this is not this is no way to to run a state. You can't kill off everyone. This is not how things are done.
And, eventually, this mad prince was killed by one of the servants of of of of the palace, and his own brother was installed, not even seven years old. So the situation was a complete mess in Aleppo. Right? And so the the Alepans under the leadership of al Hashem finally settled on calling in on calling to take control of their city because they didn't want the Damascus to rule them, and so he was the perfect candidate. Was holding at the time a city called Mardin in the North Of Iraq and Bledshem, somewhere in the middle, and they settled upon him.
This is the part in the in the in the discussion group that I was wanting to mention because now we have a very important, what you would call an Islamic principle agreed upon by the scholars. So it's it's a I this is in a book by al Mawadi, one of the famous scholars of the third or fourth century, Hijri century, and it says a very simple line. Now was not the perfect candidate. He was a drunkard, and he yeah. He he didn't what you would call he didn't exempt he he wasn't anywhere near for example.
Right? He didn't exemplify the righteous Muslim ruler who would who who would we see the example of in, for example, or. Right? But he was a capable military leader. And so the the the the the point I'm trying to make written by al Imam al Mawadi is that in Islam, a very common example or a very common understanding concept is a a good ruler is obviously better than a bad ruler.
Right? A good ruler is obviously better than a bad ruler, but a bad ruler is always better than chaos. By the word chaos, we mean no ruler. Okay? So I can't stress this point enough because people are Muslims and non Muslims alike, but Muslims especially, they seem to misunderstand this concept severely, saying that it can get can possibly get worse than than than where we are right now.
No. It can always get worse than where we are right now, and this is exemplified by this situation we have right now. Right? So RID one was definitely yeah. Having RID one was definitely better than having no one at all or having some some mad prince who's killing off everyone and would almost surrender Aleppo.
Because in the chapter, we see that Aleppo was in constant on the on on constant brink of being delivered to the front end Antioch especially. Right? So and this is the reason why Al Hashel was calling on or calling on any Emir to take control of the city because and he didn't take control himself because he knew that he was not the man for the job, but he knew that anyone who had strong military capabilities would do the job. Never never mind that he was a drunkard. Never mind that he was you didn't pray.
Never mind. This is irrelevant right now. We want someone who is capable enough to hold the city. This is the most important aspect right now. And this is what happened.
So what I'm trying to say is al Hashem al Qadhi al Hashem, he built on this concept that a good ruler is better than a bad ruler, and a bad ruler is always better than no ruler or better than chaos. Al Hashem, he assumed a great deal of responsibility in handling this in the in handling the situation, and we have to remember that this this this same man, al Qadr al Hashem, was the one who headed the delegation that had been sent to Baghdad at the beginning of of of the discussion. Now would assume the city, and he would fight a battle against brother of Antioch, killing him and thereby saving Aleppo for a while. However, Al Ghazi did not, you know, capitalize on this, what you will call, on this victory, and he didn't proceed to Antioch, probably because he didn't want to take on the Eastern Roman Empire. And, again, this is a part or this is a point that's not being mentioned in the crusades to Arab eyes, and it's not even mentioned maybe in the supplementary sources.
But we have to understand this. Antioch was a source of trouble for anyone holding it. Right? The Eastern Romans wanted it. The Muslims wanted it.
The Faraj wanted it. Right? And the Eastern Romans had, in their minds, a very strong claim. So whenever someone took it, he was going to face or he would he was, yeah, putting himself on a collision on a on a collision on a on a collision course with the Eastern Roman Empire. So this is why from now on to the end of the history of the crusades, will see the Muslims very reluctant to take Antioch especially.
Why? Because they didn't want to face the Eastern Roman Empire. But what what we would hear always in the books, either in the Crusades or through Arab eyes or in other sources, that they didn't capitalize. No. It's not that they didn't capitalize, but they weren't sure completely sure that they would be able to take on the Eastern Romans.
No one was able to do that. The Eastern Romans, they were weakened at this point in time, but they were still able to field armies much larger than any of the power players in the region. The only ones who would consider taking them on were the Fatimids. And the Fatimids were severely setback at that point in time. So no one would want to face the Eastern Romans.
And we will see, again, examples in the future, either with or with alhamdin al Ayyubir alhamdulillah, holding alliances with the Eastern Romans, trying to isolate them from the scene completely. They didn't want to take them, and they had every reason to do to do so. Right? Now, as we said, he he he was a drunkard, and the the the the sources mentioned that it's probably because of his drinking that he died. Now he had a a a nephew, Barak, who took over the the the the the city of Aleppo after his death.
And Barak, again, was one of the people or one of the leaders on the caliber of Mawdud Shahr of Adin Mawdud. He was a very dynamic character. He he was able to save, again, Aleppo from falling apart after after Elijah's death. He was able to capture the prince of Edessa, Jocelyn. He was able to capture the second, the king of Jerusalem, and he would he almost changed the politics of forever.
Right? But, again, Allah has his own plans, and one of his own, what you would call, one of one of his own subordinates rose up against him. And during the siege of the city of this subordinate, an arrow a straight arrow killed Balak. And truly, his death was a blow to Islam because, again, this set back the whole product of freeing Ladishem for a while. Right?
And it it's at this time that Tyre for the third time for the third time was besieged, and they they, yeah, I mean, they were counting on Balak coming to to aid them. And, of course, they were besieged from the sea by the the the the merchant cities of Italy. They were besieged by land from the Ferengi armies, and no one was coming to their aid. The Fatmans weren't able to send their their fleet to them, or the fleet was, you know, held held back by the the the mercantiles and republics of Italy, and no land army was coming. And so the city of Tyre surrendered.
There was an incident before this incident where the city of Tyre was able to hold up. And, again, this is an example of the strength of the populations of cities. So there were brilliant examples of cities rising up against the the status quo, taking matters into their own hands, and doing the right thing at the time. Yes, Ambramen?
I think something very, very important, Twilight here is logistics because it's relevant in terms of tier, but also when analyzing. Because when tier survive the first time, yes, the people rose up and they played a crucial part. But, also, they weren't locked out of sea. There wasn't a blockade. So the city was gonna die if they surrendered regardless of what they could do.
And we are seeing today perils of that where our leaders are securing trade routes. They're securing ports. In some cases, they're doing it ruthlessly, but nonetheless, it is crucial. So we're seeing, like, this prevention or firewall of maintaining crucial trade routes, crucial logistics. And the importance of nonstate actors in general, like we're seeing populations playing a role sometimes, assassins.
Or in the case of tier, we're seeing even commercial sort of like a corporate, you know, move where the Venetian merchants are the ones that assembled a huge fleet in exchange for splitting profits with the occupying power of Jerusalem. And we're seeing, again, armies or yeah. Basically, armies or ships or fleets being raised for the interest of capital in collaboration with the occupying power. There are many parallels with today of how the military industrial complex and its foreign policy in The Middle East. And the importance of revenue streams.
Like, for example, how he stabilized his occupation through tributes, threat controlled caravans, taxes, and whatnot, which was obviously displeased on a set of Muslims.
Yes. For sure. I mean, trade was an important aspect, and it I think you correct to assess that it was one of the main reasons why the Italian republics the Italian American republics were were willing at all to help the the French occupied Vedeshem. Right? And this is even reinforced by the idea that whenever they stroke they struck deals with the Muslims, they would immediately renegade on their deals with the Ferengue.
Because at the end of the day, what they were what they were interested in was maximizing their profits. So if the Muslim rulers offered them the same terms that were offered by Ferengue, they would say, okay. So we don't have to field armies. We don't have to send fleets. We don't have to do any of that stuff, and we'll have premium markets pass.
We will have our own hotels. We will have competitive prices. We will have everything that with without the military effort. And this was, again, smart these were smart moves on on the part of the Muslim rulers, and we will see this especially during the Ayyubid period. During Ayyubid when they ruled Egypt and Bereshit.
We will see them and especially the brother of Sultan al Aib. This man was a brilliant, brilliant, brilliant strategist. He might not have been the the the best military general, but he was a very brilliant strategist in terms of, you know, establishing long term relations, avoiding unnecessary conflicts, that kind of thing. He was very brilliant in that part. And he, of course, had his shortcomings behind, but striking that those kind of deals, it helped helped strengthen the Muslim the Muslim position.
Now so, again, returning back to the to the to the strength of strength of Muslim society. So we now have two examples, the example of Aleppo sending the delegation to Baghdad and Ashasheb, assuming de facto responsibility of the city. And then we see the people of Tyre holding their own against a Ferengi occupation Ferengi siege. I'm sorry. And then another Ferengi siege which ended up in the surrendering of the city because they couldn't hold on hold their own forever.
A strong legion needed to be there, but, yeah, needed expecting the populations to always face this was not realistic in any sort of manner. Right? So they had their own in one siege, and they were able to to to to expect to to prevent pi from falling in the front. But when you have the Italian American republics and the land armies and no one coming to your aid and Barak was dead and the Fatimids were the the the Fatimid fleet was cut at bay, what what would you do? So, yeah, I I I give the the the the the population of fire.
Goodness just for holding up, not dying. Because at the end of the day, Muslims should live. Cities come and go, but lives are more precious. And in the third example is the city of Ascalon. Now Ascalon, it was under the governorship of someone some government governor called.
And, again, this man was not totally independent, but he had autonomy. He had remarkable autonomy, and he was perfectly happy to pay the fair lunch tribute whenever they came under the wall of the city. Of course, the city were not pleased with this taking place. Although if if it kept the Ference at bay and the circumstances were thus demanding, it could have been the right decision. But, apparently, Egypt was able to still hold its own against the Ference taking astronaut.
That's why the city were not pleased. And so chancellor Caliphate paid tribute multiple times to the Fereng. And and when he sensed that the population were filled up with the situation because, again, when you pay the tribute, where where are you collecting where are you collecting this money from? It's probably from the the city itself. So when they were filled up with the situation, they sent to Egypt telling them that the guy is not up to the position he's in, and he please send us someone else to to take responsibility of the city.
Send us someone else. Right? So they're not just saying remove him. We don't want him. No.
They're saying they're they're asking the the the the state. They're asking the the leader of the state to send someone else. This is a very important part. And al Abdul duly complied with the request, and he sent someone else. And heard of the army coming, and so he closed the doors.
He caught up some of the residents of the city, put them in jail, and then sent immediately to the French. And, of course, this is the wrong decision. There's no, you know, no ways about it. And he asked for their aid. They sent him a garrison of two three hundred soldiers.
He installed them in the city, and this all resulted in the city completely scheming to remove chancellor Khalifa to remove the garrison, and they were successful in that. So they removed chancellor Khalifa in the garrison. They they staged some sort of coup during one of the nights. They killed the 300 soldiers. Was caught.
The the the the new governor sent over by took the city, and Ascalon was saved for another forty to fifty years because in in in fifty years, Ascalon for fifty years, it was a pain in the back of the French. Now who took over Alapu after Al Ghazi after Balak was the son of Al Ghazi, someone completely below the standards of Al Ghazi and of Balak, of course. This guy, he didn't want anything to do with Levantine politics. He wanted nothing to do with it. Right?
He he took all the prisoners who were captured by Balak, released them in exchange for money, left Aleppo for its own, you know, for its own for its own destiny, went back to Mardin, the the the the seat of power for his family, the Orthopedic family, because and the the this those two were belonging to a family called the Orthopedic. So he went back to Mardin. He didn't want to do anything with Aleppo, and that was it. Everything was undone. Right?
And so, again, Alako was, yeah, on the brink of falling to the Faraj, and this would have been a huge setback for the entire region. So Al Hashem again sent this time, he didn't go to the sultan. He yeah. And he he was yeah. And he he he he lost all hope in the and the people in Mardin, and so he's he went directly to Mosul.
He said, emir of Mosul, at this time, he was called someone called and asked him to come directly. Please come take take responsibility of the the of Aleppo, which demanded there was an army, a French army laying siege to Aleppo. And when Aksum Pere Borsocki came, he the the Ferengi army, of course, they were afraid. They went back to Antioch, and he took control of the city. And he didn't capitalize again, Colossi.
Mean, I think it's it's fairly understandable right now that no one will be able or even if Antioch was was was for the taking because many times, the leader of Antioch would be dead. The the the Antioch would have no prince, and the Muslim rulers would be reluctant because they didn't want to face on to take on the the eastern ruins. So Akhsunkirk was satisfied with saving Aleppo and establishing his own seat of power in it. And, again, Aleppo was saved. Now there is a very important point that we need to write now, Reis, which is in within the matter of maybe two years, k, a series of of assassinations took place.
Brother Ahmed mentioned them. You know, he passed them by, and I I they are in the notes, but I wanted to, like, push this point to the very end of the notes because it deserves some time. So who who who performed those assassinations? At this time, the word assassins became you know, came to the forefront, came to for into the center of the stage, and we see them assassinating or they they performed hits on Mawdud. They performed hits on They performed hits on his successor, his son.
They performed hits on Al Khasheib. They performed hits on Al Qadir Harawi. This is the very first time in history that people would be fearful of speaking out in public against a sect in society, a sect in in in general because they were afraid that they would be assassinated in broad daylight. So how how can such a phenomena come to come to to exist? In order to to to to know how this came to happen, we have to go to backtrack a little bit.
So in Islam, there is the prophet Sayyid Muhammad ibn So he is descendant of the clan of many Hashem, the Qurayshi clan of many Hashem. And his daughter was Fatima, radiAllahu aloha. She was married to Ali ibn al Tolib, his cousin. All of those were Hashemites. Right?
So their descendants is Al Hassan wal Hussain, their descendants of Al Hassan wal Hussain radiAllahu in Jamia, they are called They are people of the of the noble house of the prophet because the prophet didn't have any sons of his own. So the the the the the the bloodlines that we have related to the prophet are all through And so these people, they had respectable status in Muslim societies because they were descendants of the of the. Right? And so the Umayyads, at first, they they would clash with them often because they thought that they were always trying to take power. And afterwards, the Abbasids, and the Abbasids were descendants of who is the uncle of the prophet the paternal uncle.
So they were cousins of the Al Al Bayt, and they still they were also on a on a collision course with them. And and so Al Al Bayt were always you know, they were under the suspicious eyes of the of the authorities, although not all of them sought power. Some of them sought power, of course, and some of them were, yeah, pleased to to to just be involved in religion and be scholars and and and and so on and so forth. But many of them were under the suspicious eyes of the of the of the state. And some of them were were would go into hiding.
Right? And so if we remember the ambassadors, they had some sort of conspiracy, and this conspiracy were was the reason they came to power. Right? They had very secretive scheming, and they schemed for, like, thirty years until they were able to take power from the Umayyads. And they laid the foundations for secretive scheming in Muslim history, to be honest.
And so we would see many people under the guise of Alabite, whether they had the the blood of Alabite or not, they would scheme secretively in order to gain power in the region or sometimes in the whole Muslim empire. And this is the reason why many of the regimes that would come under Al Al Bayt or or come under the advice of the Shia, we would never know really if they would have the the blood the bloodline of Al Al Bayt or not because they would be always secretive of their background. We didn't know because the state would always have them under suspicion, so they would hide their bloodlines altogether. One of the most successful of those regimes were the Fatimids. So the Fatimids started having their their their their campaign forced secretively in Yemen, in Iraq, in India even, and in North Africa.
In North Africa, they were most successful, and thus they started their state there in modern day Tunisia. And then they expanded their power to include old or huge parts of North Africa. They would have Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, of course. They didn't have Morocco. Modern day, of course.
I'm talking about modern day states. So they had Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and then they kept trying to invade Egypt for sixty years until they were able to invade it. And they were the ones who established my beloved city of Al Qahira. This is a small, like, side note. So Al Qahira was established by the Fatimid and Mazelidini left.
Right? And then they expanded their power. The peak of their power was during their their immediate arrival of in Egypt. So they were able now they had North Africa. They had parts in Yemen.
They had Bledeshem. They expanded their power to Bledeshem because everyone who who held Egypt knew that they couldn't safely hold Egypt unless they had Bledeshem in their possession. And so they the peak of their their power was during and and and Al Mustanser. And then everything spiraled downwards after that because of the famine and all of that. During the the the the reign of, he had two sons, Nizor and Al Mustari.
And he he he he said that his son Nizor would be the successor of his the successor of his he he would be his successor. And as such, the the Shias in Asia said that they would be in favor of Nizar over Al Mustali. Of course, the the the powerful wizir of the powerful wizir who was the father of al Abdul, our protagonist who was who was now ruling Egypt, his father, Badri Gameli, was on the side of al Mustali, the other son of al Mustanser. And they they make al Mustali caliphate or the next caliphate. And Nizar was kept in jail, and then he he was killed.
Either way, Berengamani or Al Abdul. I think it was Al Abdul who did that. Now the Shias in Asia were on were saying that, no, Nizar was the rightful ruler, and we will continue to be supportive of his claim to the throne even though he died. They they they they supported his cause, and they were called the Nizards. From this sect of Fatimid Shayats, the assassin order was created.
Someone called Hassan al Sabah took refuge in a castle called Alamut, and he was able to establish a state within the state of the Seljuqs because they were the ones holding Asia at the time or most of Asia, most of Muslim Asia. And they and Hassan al Sabah was able to hold this castle of Alamut, this Fort Of Alamut and multiple forts. And for the very for the very first time in history, a state was established purely through communication lines between castles. They didn't yeah. Mean, they they were two states on top of each other.
His state was on top of the subject state in terms of they were he was able to create the state and manage it even though the subject held the lands between those forts. This was a was unheard of before that. And so al Hassan was able to hold these series of forts, and he trained the the the believers in this cause in such a way that they were willing to follow him blindly, and they were willing to assassinate those public figures he sent them to assassinate and die in in in in in and die in the in the process. And so they were called or the the martyrs, so to speak. I'm I'm not sure if that's the correct translation, but they were the the suicide killers.
So they would kill the public figures because almost always they would die in the process. So you had to be like I don't know, you know, how someone would come to this process, but however they they were able to come to that process. And so everyone no one was safe from them because they would they would infiltrate everyone. They would infiltrate infiltrate your guards. They would infiltrate the the markets.
They would infiltrate mosques. They would infiltrate the the the the bazaars. They would infiltrate every stable society, and they would perform their hits on the public figures. And so they they they were able to terrorize to such an extent that no one was able to public publicly speak against them. That's how terrorizing they were.
So if you would say that al al al al Nizaray or al Sma'a al Botania, that's how they were pulled. Al Nizaray, al Botania, they were doing this or that or they had to someone had to stop them. The next day, you could be you could end up assassinating, and it did happen. I'm I'm telling you. So they assassinated Abdul Hashem.
They assassinated Aqsun al Khalil Harawi, the very protagonist of the the the the early protagonist of our story who went to went to Baghdad after the fall of Jerusalem. They assassinated Mahdud, the very Yani, the the the one who would have turned the politics of the Levant forever. They they Yani. And they were the ones who made Raghdad Now we know they were the ones who made Rod one, one. Make some of the very weak decisions he made throughout his career.
Right? They were able even to establish a strong presence in Damascus, and was so afraid of them that he didn't want to to to to, like, anger them in any way, shape, or matter. So he, yeah, he he gave them whatever they wanted except, of course, the city of Damascus. But, yeah, mean, it wasn't also, Damascus was on the brink of being delivered to the after death because of the strong presence of those Nazaris in the mosques because they had very strong ties to the Ferange. Again, the sources mentioned that they had very strong ties to the Ferange.
Also, one of the victims of the assassinations of the Nizaris or the assassins was Nidom I Mulk. Now Nidam al Mulk was one of the strongest viziers in Muslim history. He was the vizier of the Seljuqs. He was the one he was the main architect of the Seljuk empire. Right?
He he served al Bar Salam and Maliksha, two of the strongest Muslim leaders in entire Muslim history. Right? So those two and they are called the Salaj al Alam. Why are they called the Salaj al Alam? Because they are the the the last two rulers to hold the entire Selic territories under their domain.
There were no fragmentations or anything like that. Right? And all of that was due to Nadam Al Mulk's Nadam Al Mulk being al Wazir. So the very first one of the very first targets of the assassinations of the Nazarius was Nedomil Mulk. And after his death, it's mentioned in the book and mentioned in the sources, and I think rightly so, that the, what we would call, the the subjects never were never able to to reclaim total control over all of their dominions after the death of this after the death of.
Of course, yeah, I mean, nothing stays the same forever, but his death, his what you would call his early death, yeah, fastened this process. I think, yeah, I think chapter five ends with that. Aleppo is on the brink of being delivered to the the to the to to Antioch, the Pharaoh in Antioch. Damascus is being on the brink also to to on the brink of deliverance to the the French in Jerusalem. And at this moment in time, enters the the the very first main character in the project.
Now we had. No one knew him, but he was the the the main the the the the first one unknown. But we have the first known one, which is. So next session, we will discuss about the background of, how he was able to trace the steps of his predecessors, Modud, and his power struggle with Ferengi, the Ferengi and with the Muslims in order to establish his state and to assert his independence and his autonomy in the state of Aleppo and Mosul. And how this simple yet brilliant idea is that when you have one leg in Iraq, in the in Northern Iraq, and one leg in Northern and have a clear line of communication between them having a test of course under Muslim hands.
The project to free from the would meet with set A place would be set, and two hundred years later, the Ferengi occupation would be no more. I would like to know if the speakers would like to add anything before we wrap up, inshallah. Or sister Samir or brother or brother Karim?
No. Brother, was just gonna say, I just I just really enjoyed listening to you sort of summarize and narrate everything that happened. It's it's really it's it's it's so engaging, the way that the way that you explain everything that that took place, not just even from the book, but also just from your own knowledge. Because as you say, there's a there's quite a bit that is missing from the book itself. I mean, there there's actually so many lessons to draw from from these stories as we've talked about, which is why we're doing it.
I really hope that the that the listeners have benefited. I I I also wanna just sort of reiterate what I said at the beginning because some people might have joined late, and I saw that we did get some requests for microphones. Our our policy on on Middle Nation spaces is that we'll give the microphone to people that we know, people that we know being basically people who have been participating in the Telegram group. So we get to know your your intellectual level, your comprehension level, whether you're following the book or not, whether you're familiar with mental nation content and so on. And we don't just randomly give the mic.
We don't do our spaces like what you generally see on x. We want it to be a disciplined approach, an organized and orderly approach and delivery of information. So don't be offended that we didn't give you the microphone. We have no problem giving people the microphone as long as we know you. So the the the link to the Telegram book discussion is there.
You'll see it. You can, you know, join us there and participate in the discussion there so that we can we can get to know you a little bit, and then we'll we'd be happy to give you the microphone the next time we have a space. There's just a lot of like I said, there's so many there's so many lessons. And I have I have notes, you know, throughout all of the various points that you that you went through. I won't really go through them all now, but there's just so many issues.
And and like brother was was mentioning, I don't even remember what was the in what specific context or what what specific
Importance of trade. The importance of trade in
Yeah. The importance of trade. I mean, the the importance of having the infrastructure for for sovereignty, having having sort of your the the the rear fortified before you make an advance, you have you have to have all of these things. And this again sort of goes back to the public being informed and being educated about sort of what it really takes to engage in power politics or the the politics of conflict, where you have to you you have to know what's really at stake and what you need in order to be properly prepared to engage in in any sort of a direct conflict. You
have
to as as brother was saying, you have to secure your trade, you have to secure your ports, you know, your supply lines, all of these things. If if those things aren't there, you're not really in a position to advance. And it might look like sometimes that a leader or a state or what have you is not engaging in conflict because they're actually busy with the work of building that infrastructure, building that actual practical strength, and you you should. You know, if you're, again, informed and educated about how all of this really works, then you would understand that the building of infrastructure, the fortification of infrastructure, you know, trade, supply lines, sports, what have you, food supplies, military supplies, energy supplies, telecoms, all of that. We're talking about the modern age.
Securing sovereignty over all of those things is part of a strategy of conflict, a strategy of engaging against your enemies because you have to actually build your strength. You could just, you know, launch yourself willy nilly against your enemy. But if you're not actually prepared for that conflict, then you're you're obviously going to lose and end up ceding even more power and ceding even more territory than if you had just not engaged in the conflict at all. And then the other thing was about for example, you were talking about being a good ruler is better than a bad ruler, a bad ruler is better than no ruler. It should be understood, and we've certainly seen multiple examples of it in in our own recent history.
When you overthrew what when you overthrow what you consider to be a bad ruler, you do nothing but multiply your enemies exponentially. Now you have more internal enemies and you have external enemies. And usually, the case has been, certainly, again, our recent history, that when you overthrow what you consider to be a a bad ruler, you end up having a ruler, but it's an external ruler who's even worse. And usually, the the external ruler who ends up taking over your sovereignty is the one who even incited you in the first place against the rule that you overthrew. So again, there's just this this so many so many lessons.
Like, even the, you know, what you see always is like what I was saying at the beginning, that the the war within the war or the war beneath the war or behind the war of this struggle for coordination and cohesion between Muslim powers, between Muslim and and and not even just the the official or the formal powers, but anyone in within the who has competence, who has capability, who has vision and strategy, and trying to bring them into a cohesive, coordinated effort. This has been the struggle. And you see it just even in what we talked about today, that when that fractures, the franc benefit, and when they're coordinated and they work together, you see the the the situation in the field completely changes, and and the are shown to not be as capable as you thought they were. And it it doesn't take that much for the Muslims to rise, but it's Allah has sort of dictated that when we rise, it has to be together. We have to be united.
We have to be coordinated. And when we do that, it changes everything. So, again, there's there's really so many things. Like, if we were gonna go point by point, the the discussion would probably be two hours long. But it's it's so so beneficial to just listen to you, brother, narrate everything that that that took place again from the book and from your own knowledge, And I really appreciate it, And thanks to everyone who who joined.
Brother Abdurman, I think, has something to say. Shukran?
Yeah. I just wanted to add to what was saying. And I think a lot of the issues we have from Muslims in the Diaspora or in the English speaking social media world is this idea of hero worship. As brother Omar already mentioned, like, people only know about Salahdin, for example. So and in their minds, the the solution is to change the ruler.
You know? If we just overthrow this ruler, then the problem solved, or if we do this or do that. But history has shown that when especially when the situation is dire, especially when the system is fragmented and region is not united, that is the worst time to turn against your ruler and the worst to assassinate him, to overthrow him, to spread dissent against him because in these situations, the ruler's the only buffer really between you and your enemies. And as already mentioned, it is a force multiplier for your enemies.
Absolutely. Yes. Yeah. We we can't stress this enough, and I think it can be summarized. Like we said in the discussion is that people usually say there's nothing worse than the situate there's no worse situation than the one we're in right now.
No. Yes. There is. There is. And you have to understand this perfectly well because right now, what you don't like is that, like, for example, you're having one loaf of bread a day or one one, one, one spoonful of sugar a day.
There's nothing worse than that. No. There is worse that you have nothing to eat for for for days on end or for weeks on end even. So you have to not I'm not asking or we're not asking here to just, you know, settle for the status quo, but you have to understand completely your environment. You have you have to understand the long term effects of the decisions that you take, the the decisions that you make, and you have you have to understand what exactly you want to do on the long term.
Don't be always looking under your feet and saying, hey. We we we uninstalled this or that ruler. No. You have to understand then what? Because a very common theory in politics is that a power vacuum is not, yeah, I mean, is not long to hold.
Someone else will fill that vacuum. So you want you have to understand the very the the the very basic aspect of who's going to fill that vacuum, and are you going to be okay with whoever is going to fill that vacuum or not. But going willy nilly, as was said, and, you know, just removing this or that and then, you know, waiting for what waiting to see what will happen, that's very immature. It's very irresponsible on your part as a Muslim before anything else because you wouldn't do that in your own household. So we have to understand that the ummah is our own is our larger household, and you have to treat it as such as such.
And, of course, the the the that's the the we have to, again, stress the import again, the importance of the nonstate actors represented in the assassins. They will be very influential in the power politics of the region. We will see them with with with with and with We will see them, yeah, having important events or important influence taking place, so please stay tuned for that. And with that, we will end our discussion for today. I hope our listeners have benefited from the from the discussion.
As Ostad mentioned, we have a telegram group for the book. Do do enter the group, see the discussions. You have to read the book at least to be to understand what we're talking about, to understand who who are the characters and the power dynamics that we're talking about, and to try to relate them to modern day events and current affairs. And we will try to hold the session inshallah every other Saturday in order to give our speakers and ourselves time to reflect on the points mentioned and to, you know, build up a coherent story for the listeners, inshallah. Thank you so much for your patience and for your time and for the effort and for putting up with me all of that.
I hope I've constructed a nice enough narrative for our listeners and an entertaining narrative for our listeners, and see you next time. Thank you so much, and
تمّ بحمد الله