The Predicament of Sudan

Back between 2013 and 2016, I was writing almost exclusively about Egypt and the resistance movements opposing the coup against Muhammad Morsi. During that time, I sort of gained a reputation in the Arab world as someone who could advise on opposition strategy and tactics. So I would often be contacted by opposition activists in other Arab and Muslim countries who wanted ideas on strategy for their own movements. And I was in communication with opposition activists in Sudan at that time going all the way back to 2016 because in 2016, I more or less stopped writing about Egypt when Egypt signed a loan agreement with the IMF that was the biggest loan agreement that had ever been granted to a Middle Eastern country, which more or less sealed the fate of Egypt's economic sovereignty for the foreseeable future. Now the problem was when I was communicating with the brothers in Sudan, my reputation out of Egypt was misleading because there was an impression that I was just some sort of revolutionary who was primarily interested in any movement or any group that was just seeking to topple authoritarian regimes.

That's not what I was. That's not what I am. That's not what I ever advocated. So ultimately, the brothers in Sudan were not satisfied with my advice because I told them that trying to topple Amr Bashir was not a good idea. Now at that time, the civil disobedience movement in Sudan was opposing neoliberalism and austerity policies.

So in that regard, they were already better informed than most of the Egyptian opposition groups. However, they believed that toppling the regime of Omar Bashir would end those policies and it would pave the way to freedom, democracy, equality, peace, justice, and everything that sounds good. They couldn't see past the figure of Omar Bashir and they imagined that the policies, the neoliberal policies that he was imposing which had for instance seen the price of medicine increased by 300% and had more than halved the value of the Sudanese currency. They imagined that those policies were the idea of Omar Bashir, that he was to blame for those policies and that removing him would change everything. They couldn't see that those policies were being externally imposed upon Sudan and that if Bashir was a collaborator in imposing those policies, he was just one of many.

Here's a message that I conveyed to opposition activists in Sudan at that time. Sudan's economic problems exist within a context and are not solely attributable to the regime's corruption. Loss of oil revenue, lack of FDI, etcetera are real things. Capitulation with IMF austerity policies aims to appease foreign investors, any of whose potential projects will benefit the Sudanese private sector elites. All of these factors will continue to exist if the government is toppled, but the public will be distracted by the false optimism stemming from the successful overthrow of the government, but the actual situation will be unchanged.

Look, Sudan lost 75% of their oil revenues when South Sudan was created, And at that time, oil revenues constituted roughly 90% of Sudan's total GDP. At least 30 to 40% of Sudan's gold is smuggled out of the country by the small scale miners who extract it. Sudan has been demolished by years of economic sanctions from America and the EU, and foreign investors were chomping at the bit to devour Sudan once the sanctions were lifted. I told activists at that time that one of the think tanks in America that was lobbying very strongly for the lifting of economic sanctions against Sudan was the Cato Institute, and the Cato Institute is largely funded by Koch Industries, and Koch Industries has significant interests in minerals and mining. So they supported lifting the sanctions because they knew that once the sanctions were lifted, Sudan would be so vulnerable that, for example, Koch Industries could move into Sudan, take advantage of their minerals and mining, and exploit them with absolute unquestionable authority and dictate the terms of any sort of trade or investment.

So the economic context in Sudan around the austerity measures was enormous, and that context would not change if the government changed. Any new government would inherit all the same problems. And furthermore, if you toppled Amr Bashir, any new government that would be installed would be installed by the very segment of the society who is benefiting from austerity and neoliberal policies, and they would ensure that those policies would continue. And this is what I've talked about many times, the role of the in a society, in determining who the ruler will be and how they will rule. Sudan is a perfect example of that.

If you do not deal with the in the society, it just doesn't make any sense to topple the government that they appoint because they'll just appoint another one. Now I also said at that time that if you succeed in toppling Omar Bashir, you will almost certainly get a military government in his place, which of course is exactly what happened. And you will find it tremendously difficult to dislodge the military from the seat of power. The army in Sudan has considerable control over many key sectors of the economy from agriculture to transportation to industry. And so a military government would be able to conduct deals with foreign investors with absolutely no transparency whatsoever and no accountability.

I told them that toppling the regime would result more likely than anything in an intensification of neoliberal policies and austerity measures, which again is exactly what happened. Now the good news, if we can call it that, is that Western companies do not dominate the economy in Sudan. The largest, foreign investors in Sudan are China, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. That makes these three governments, the Chinese government, the government of the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, the highest ranking members of the in Sudan. While this is not ideal, it could be worse.

The ultimate outcome of what's going on in Sudan right now is frankly a foregone conclusion. Whether, the Burhan regime remains or whether the RSF takes over, policies will largely be determined in Beijing, in Abu Dhabi, and in Riyadh. Now while we would certainly prefer that policies would be determined in Khartoum, it's still better than the policies being determined in Washington or Paris or London or the headquarters of the IMF. And what I think is going to happen is that the RSF will probably take over, and they are beholden to the Emiratis and the Saudis. And I think that The UAE and Saudi Arabia wanted this to happen given the fact that they have issued a statement calling for a resumption of the process of transitioning to a civilian government.

That's their response to this coup. They didn't necessarily condemn it. They just said, let's quickly get back to forming a civilian government so that we can carry on with business. Now as for what opposition activists in Sudan can do now or in the future to address austerity measures and neoliberal policies, I would say, address the policies, not the politicians. And you have to try to craft viable economic alternatives for Sudan rather than just believing that a change in the government will solve your problems.

Because when I was talking to opposition activists back in the day, not a single one of them had a clue on how to actually practically realistically address Sudan's economic predicament. You must deal with the reality of what Sudan is facing economically and recommend specific policies. Now undoubtedly, you will definitely see unfairness from the new government that is backed by China, UAE, and Saudi Arabia without question. So what you need to do is pinpoint which policies are unfair and in what way and recommend specific ways to improve those policies to make them fair and try to direct your appeals for change towards the in Sudan through petition, through protest, through organizing activism, and even civil disobedience if necessary. And bear in mind that The United States will be looking for any opportunity to counter Chinese influence and Chinese interests in Sudan even if that means sinking your country into violence and chaos.

So whatever you do, I would advise you to avoid as much as possible radicalism and militancy. Address your policy concerns without aggression or hostility as much as you can, and make your focus the private sector, not the government because it's the private sector who is benefiting from the austerity measures and from neoliberalism. And it is the private sector whom the government listens to the most and obeys.