The Macro Method to the Micro Madness in Syria

Well, first of all, let me say that in my opinion, anyone who is, you know, instantaneously and continuously giving analysis of any ongoing and developing situation, it's very likely they're not giving analysis at all, but they're giving propaganda and narrative. They're interested in trying to ensure that a particular, interpretation of the, ongoing events prevails. Okay? That's not analysis. In order to analyze, you need real information, and in certain situations, real information is difficult, if not impossible impossible to to come come by. By.

Particularly Particularly in in a in an active conflict zone, you know. It's very difficult to get precise and verifiable and verified information. I think it's very important sometimes to just wait before you open your mouth about something, Or at least to not react to every headline, or every incident, or every event that takes place, and then try to extrapolate from that singular incident or event hypotheses about what's happening or what's going to happen. This is just a general rule that you should try to adhere to, and I try to adhere to it.

If you don't do that, then you're like a weather forecaster, who's telling people that, we're entering a new ice age just because it happens to be snowing at that moment, you know? You know, if if the snow continues at this pace, then the whole world will be buried within six months. So beware. This is obviously not analysis. And that kind of thing can spread very quickly, and then it becomes harder and harder and harder to locate inside the noise what's true and what matters.

You know, it's like trying to to to listen to a single musical instrument inside of a symphony orchestra where everyone is playing at the same time, everyone's tuning their instruments, you know. I'm trying to hear the fife and I've got three tubas and a kettle drum in my ear. And then the other thing is, similarly, that you should not talk about a topic just because people want you to talk about it, if you're not actually qualified to talk about it, you know? I've always tried in my life and on this channel, to only discuss things that I can discuss confidently and with reasonable certainty. Like, and and I can only confident confidently discuss something with reasonable certainty if I have valid information and if I have valid knowledge about that topic.

If I don't have that, then I generally won't discuss it. You know, many people have requested that I talk about any any number of things that I'm not comfortable talking about simply because I don't know enough about them, or I don't feel that I know enough about them. I mean, think people get used to everyone having an opinion about everything, especially online. And a lot of channels just want to produce content, so they don't care. They'll talk about anything and everything.

Anything that's currently in the headlines because they know it will get them views. Because they know it's a trending topic, so they know they'll get a lot of clicks. But I think that's irresponsible, and that just adds to the total confusion. Now, as for the situation in Syria, I have generally avoided talking about Syria from 2011 until now because I think the whole situation is incredibly unclear or anyway has been. Back in the mid twenty tens, I was involved in proposing strategies for the resistance in Egypt after the takeover of the government by Abdul Fattah Hasisi and exploring tactics of, you know, system disruption targeting the interest of neoliberal western predatory investors.

At that time, many people wanted my input on the Syrian war, but I honestly did not see anything that I could say usefully. I didn't see anything that could usefully be done in that situation, much less anything that I could contribute to it. I haven't trusted anything happening in Syria since the economic reform protests rather abruptly turned into armed militias demanding the overthrow of the government. Particularly since I happen to know that The US had been trying for years to stir an uprising in Syria. So at that time, in my opinion, everyone in Syria was lying and has been lying for fourteen years.

Everything about that situation is a lie except for the destruction. That's the only thing that's not ambiguous. So when I do look at the situation in Syria, the situation right now with the HTS advances in Aleppo and Hama and so on, what appears to be the collapse of any discipline or commitment by the Syrian army, I'm not following or monitoring closely the hourly updates that are coming in. That's, to me, is just noise. In my opinion, all of the domestic players are like boats with no motors, no rudders, no oars and no sail, having a race, and all of them are just being moved by the currents of the sea that they're in, not by anything within their own vehicles.

They're not moving themselves, not the government and not the rebels. So watch the water, not the boats. In In other words, in a situation like Syria, I have to look at the macro dynamics to make sense of the micro dynamics, not the other way around. And the macro dynamics, to make it simple, are that the GCC, that BRICS, and that the A National OCGFC are interested in the region stabilizing, the region prospering, and the Gulf States have a vision to extend their sphere of influence across the coast of the Mediterranean from Egypt to Turkey. The primary necessities for achieving this are the end of the Palestinian conflict, the elimination of militant groups, but it also requires ending the conflict in Syria by one way or another.

Pursuing the achievement of those necessities can include a variety of strategies, and those will be adaptable and they'll be flexible and they'll change and so on, depending on the circumstances, depending on the conditions and so forth. I think that the Gulf States have long felt that regional stability overall requires the isolation of Iran and a thorough reduction of Iran's influence. They want Iranian interference in Lebanon and Syria to end. Part of that is because Iranian interference in those countries is inherently destabilizing. And part of it is because they don't wanna compete for influence with Iran in the region.

By Iran joining BRICS, restoring ties with Saudi Arabia and so on, they can get Iran to cooperate in voluntarily abandoning or withdrawing from or otherwise neutralizing their own proxy militias to prove that they're team players. But I don't believe that the Gulf countries will be satisfied, with having Iran, at least not under the current regime. They don't want them continuing to operate outside their borders in any significant way whatsoever. They don't just want their militias going, they want Iran to recede entirely from the region. Now, Iran has really only invested in militias as their main strategy for gaining influence.

So if they go along with abandoning their armed proxies, then they'll have to really play catch up in terms of gaining influence through soft power and money and so forth, and I think it's unlikely that they could even compete with the cash and with the influence that The Gulf has already established. Now, giving up the militias is something that they really are going to have to do one way or the other, and I think they are doing it. Simply because if they don't do it, this is why they have to do it, they risk being targeted seriously for regime change. I mean truth be told, think everyone who matters is ultimately going to work for regime change in Iran anyway. Because the regime just has too much baggage and and its sort of orientation generally doesn't really lend itself to cooperation and integration.

So okay, this is sort of the context in the region. And all of this being the case, I think that Syria is up for grabs. Iranian influence in Syria has to recede, and The Gulf wants to acquire Syria into their own sphere of influence, but that trespasses Turkey's sphere of influence. So there's tension over that. And I think that Turkey wants to assert their dominion.

And I believe that The Gulf and Turkey do have some degree of understanding about the regional vision and they're willing to cooperate with each other. But there's a long standing history of rivalry over leadership between The Gulf and Turkey, and Turkey doesn't want to be sort of taken advantage of or underestimated. They wanna preserve their territorial integrity or the territorial integrity of their historical regional power. And Syria is within that virtual territory, particularly if you're on the sideline. It makes more sense to the Turks that Syria should be their vassal state, not Saudi Arabia's vassal state or what have you, or The UAE and so on.

So I think that Turkey is willing to cooperate, but they're not willing to seed space that they believe for a variety of reasons belongs in their dominion of influence, and that's Syria. So what about the rebel groups? What about the resistance? Well, whatever you want to call them. The externally backed armed factions in Syria.

Where does it leave Bashar al Assad? Well, you have to understand, any non state armed group is only ever, their function, is only ever to improve the negotiating position of whoever's backing them. They don't take over. They're just an element, just a kind of leverage that will bolster their bosses when the conflict, that they're perpetuating inevitably gets resolved through negotiations. That's the only political function of non state armed groups.

Anyone who thinks that this or that armed group is gonna actually take over this or that country, well you're fooling yourself. Even if some figure from such a group eventually gets installed as a ruler, well, won't be the ruler, the ones who backed the group all along will be the ruler, he'll work for them. The pieces on the chessboard never decide the gambit and that's all the group these armed groups are, they're just pieces on the board. So what about, Assad? Well, the whole Syrian civil war illustrated that the, GCC wanted him removed from power.

And I don't think that there's any reason to believe that they feel any differently now about Bashar al Assad. I mean, someone has already shown their hand by being aggressive and hostile towards you, you should know that if then they take a different approach to you later on, they're still seeking the same thing. They're still aggressive. They're they're still seeking the same thing as when they were aggressive towards you. They're just using a new method.

I think that as Azad's position is not really any different than any other player in Syria, any even the armed groups. In other words, what will happen to him depends on the decisions and on the agreements that are made between the external players. And the relationships between the external players, the external decision makers who have a say in Syria, their relationship has changed considerably since the war began, it's not 2011. So the consensus might be or might have already been determined that Bashar al Assad is no longer viable, that Assad remaining interferes with the overall regional plan. This is what I mean about the flexibility and the adaptability of the strategies that they have to use.

None of the elements in that strategy are stable. In other words, one of the pawns, none of the pawns are secure. Any of them can be sacrificed. Whether they are sacrificed or not will only have to do with the circumstances, not their individual value. As circumstances change, the fate of the pawns change.

So yes, potentially Bashar al Assad will go and HTS or whoever may take Damascus. But the battle for Syria is between the external players jockeying for control and influence over Syria, that's what's happening. Regardless of what's happening at the moment, it still remains to be seen how it will all play out, but what appears to me to be the objective is as I said, an end to conflict and militancy, a containment of Iranian influence, and then just determining the balance of power, balance of power and influence inside of Syria between The Gulf and Turkey. It's actually still possible that Bashar could save himself if he, you know, genuflects to Erdogan, but I don't think that the Khaleid wants Bashar al Assad to be there at all. See, there's so many ways that it can play out, there's just no point in predicting except just to understand what the ultimate objective is regionally.

And if you know that, then you can better understand, I think, the motives and the sort of options that are available to all the players. There are ways that it can play out that are very smooth and organized and so on, and then there are actions that some of the players could take that could make it very messy. But I think even the the messy options would only be temporary obstacles. The A National OCGFC, the Khalid, appeared to be proceeding at full pace, with regional stabilization. Now, my opinion, Bashar al Assad should go, and I completely agree, with the containment and isolation of Iran as a practical necessity.

And I think Iran actually understands this too. Turkey has considerable leverage and they have every right to secure their interests. In my opinion, the only real danger is for the historical tension and and rivalry for leadership between The Gulf and Turkey, that that could potentially spoil things. Personally, I believe that The Gulf should bankroll and Turkey should lead, and they should operate as equal partners in the establishment and the development of a sort of soft empire, the the soft empire that is being put together in the region right now. Now, I know a lot of people get mad about the idea that their countries are gonna be dominated by other countries, like by the Khaleid or by Turkey or what have you, Because they want national sovereignty, they want independence and so forth.

But I'm afraid that the real world doesn't function like that. And historically, this what I'm talking about has actually been the model of Islamic territorial empire. Limited autonomy within a province, with a loosely centralized control, by the capital. It's basically the same. Palestine, Israel will be subordinate, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria will be subordinate, Egypt, Sudan and so on, all will be subordinate.

But that subordination will not be tyrannical and it won't be exploitative in my opinion. Each will have a role, each will prosper, each will develop in the long term. And there will be collective sovereignty, which is what we really need. I think that everyone would like to see a different regime in Iran. I've said it before.

I think it's probably inevitable, but I also don't think that anyone wants that to be accomplished, by means of war and violence. The regime in Iran has been a beneficiary of strife and of conflict in the region, and they have a symbiotic relationship with Israel. They have no vested interest in stability, and they're trying to demonstrate that they can change right now. They're trying to demonstrate that they can be a team player, but I don't think it's gonna work. The regime's instincts are unlikely to change.

Frankly, know that the official narrative about Iran makes this sound bizarre, but it's true. If the Palestinian conflict is resolved, the regime in Iran is on borrowed time. They actually need Israel in order to survive, at least in their current form, the current form of the regime. So either the regime in Iran will fall or it will or it would change to such an extent that they will have fallen by other means. In other words, they will have to become drastically different than they have been since 1979.

And I'm personally doubtful that they can do it. I hope that they can. But at the end of the day, in my opinion, everything that we're seeing all points to the achievement of the regional vision that I've been talking about. And really, I think it's quite remarkable. I mean, the level of commitment to transforming the region, the pragmatism, the realpolitik, and the assertion of collective sovereignty and collective leadership to take charge over the affairs of the region is truly impressive in my opinion.

And even though we're going through tremendous upheaval and turmoil, I think that there's every reason for optimism. All the radical fanatic extremist elements in the region which have always been sponsored by, backed by, and largely created and implanted by the West in the region are being dismantled. And it's gradually returning to its natural state, returning to its natural state. As I've said many times, we need to look at the current events in as if in retrospect, from the inevitable point of Muslim victory. And from that perspective, I think that what's happening now in Syria can be seen as a significant step to the gradual establishment of regional cohesion and cooperation, even if Bashar al Assad remains, or even if he is removed.

Syria does appear to me to be increasingly under the influences of players that can secure its stability, as opposed to Western influence and as opposed to Iranian influence and extremist elements. Personally, see things coming together, even if the exact path that they're taking can't really be discerned or whatever obstacles there may be or twists and turns and so forth, I think that the direction is clear. And I think it's a positive direction. The more that western and American influence withdraws, and I include Iranian influence as western influence frankly because it typically serves the same goal as western influence, which is instability and division. As these negative influences withdraw, I think we're gonna see the region go from strength to strength.

This is also one of the reasons why I haven't rushed to talk about Syria. Because as I see it, things are simply following the overall trajectory of the regional plan. I mean it wasn't implausible at the beginning, the beginning of the rebel offensive that it was gonna just be a gambit to then decimate the rebels in a counter offensive, which have would have also been an alternative approach or an alternative strategy to stabilizing the situation and ending the conflict in Syria. But as things stand now, it does appear that either Bashar al Assad will be removed or else he will be subjugated and subordinated more securely by the weakening of his regime and reducing his ability to act independently, in Allahu Ala, which way it will go. My only real concern and my hope is that we won't see Syria partitioned in any way.

I don't think that would be a positive measure and I think that they'll probably try to avoid that as much as they can. Either way, think it's important to, again, to remember that the rebel groups in Syria, no matter who they are, and even the government in Syria, they're not the ones who are going to determine the ultimate outcome. The ultimate outcome in Syria is being determined by the external players, partially by means of the rebels, partially by means of the government. Turkey, the GCC, Iran and the A National OCGFC are the waters that the waters that are moving the boats in Syria. They're the main ones, not America and Israel, in my opinion.

Now, they're they're involved to one degree or another, but with very diminished power. Control is being taken back over the region by the region itself. And I think ten years from now, even five years from now, we're gonna see a more stable and a more thriving Middle East than any of us have seen in our lifetimes.