Middle Nation Book Discussion | The Crusades Through Arab Eyes | Session Ten: Lessons from Nuruddin
So this session is going to take a bit of a different turn. Ustad Shahid was not available last time, and it was determined that we need to have his input regarding PR and regarding the the the the importance of PR in in the context that we're studying in the story of the Ferengi campaigns on The Middle East and how that can be related, to our current context. So, this is going to be more of an extension of last time's discussion, and we're hoping that the remarks that the will be adding will be beneficial to the discussion as a whole, inshallah. So we're just now waiting for to join. Until he joins, a reminder for our listeners what exactly or which which parts of the story that are of interest to us today.
The first part is the the ability of Nur ad Din, Nur ad Din's takeover of Damascus, more or less bloodlessly. There was no blood spilt in that takeover at all. However, it was a a culmination of a constant bombardment of PR that enabled him to finally stand with his army at the city walls and enter the city by complete or through complete agreement of the population and many of the al helwalaq, the people, the decision makers. So Abak, the ruler of the city, was more or less isolated. And by the time Uredin had arrived on the city walls and entered the city, PR had had done its desired effect, and he was able to take the city bloodlessly.
And it was a victory as important as any battle in the in the in the story that we're studying right now. So this is an this is one aspect. The other aspect is Nordhyn's treaty with the the the the eastern Romans in order to isolate their interference or isolate them from isolate the the the the region from their interference, like prevent their interference in the region. Because at that point in time, they were going to ally with the Firangia against Noreddin, so he made a he signed a deal with them or a treaty with them whereby he would attack some of the Roman Seljuk possessions. They were Muslims, but he attacked some of their possessions in exchange for the the the Eastern Romans not involving themselves in the politics of Bledeshem.
And so the immediate threat of the Eastern Romans in Bledeshem was averted, And after a while, a treaty or a truce was signed between Noordadin and the and the Roman Seljuks whereby the possessions that he attacked and and he took from the Roman Seljuks were returned to the Roman Seljuks, and so it was a win win for everyone. So these are the two these are the two aspects that we're going to to discuss today, and I would like first to to to start with Ustad's remarks on PR, and then we will have a bit of a Q and A. So, welcome, and, to you,
Okay. Assalamu alaikum. Everyone. Can you hear me?
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Do pray do do pray for us, Hosanna.
I mean, okay, inshallah. Okay. So first of all, let me start by by offering again my my apologies for missing the last session. I really didn't wanna miss that, and I I I appreciate brother Omar for extending the topic for another session because we're really getting into the most crucial period of the Muslim response to the Frang invasion or what's known as the Crusades. The leadership of Nur ad Dinzenge to me represents sort of the embodiment of all the lessons that were learned over the course of this whole cat catastrophic history.
He recognized several things that had been overlooked by other leaders or misunderstood to one degree or another prior to his coming to power. He realized, for example, the scope of the real threat that was posed by the French. He recognized the self destructiveness of internal division among the Muslims. Nordhine understood the importance of informal power players better than anybody. He recognized perhaps, most importantly, the, quintessential religious nature of the conflict, and he was able to synthesize all of these things together, all of these realizations, all this understanding into a realpolitik strategy.
You know, everyone knows about Salahdin and rightfully so, but for me personally, I've always found Nur ad Din to be the most compelling and the most admirable figure in the history of the Crusades. There's just there's so much to say about him that it's hard to know where to begin. Walahi Nur ad Din was some kind for me, ad Din was some kind of political or geopolitical savant, in my opinion. The man was absolutely amazing to me. Nur ad Din himself was a righteous man, and not only was he genuinely a righteous man genuinely, but he also understood the strategic importance of being a righteous man, and the strategic importance of being perceived as a righteous man.
He understood that integrity is a political weapon. It's a defensive weapon and an offensive weapon. You can accomplish with integrity what you can never accomplish without integrity, and he understood that very acutely in my opinion. I'm not gonna go back over all of the all of the events that were covered in the last session. I think we can go through some of the examples of what he did.
I know that the main topic here is to discuss PR propaganda soft power and so forth, and the importance of narrative control. And Nur ad Din was absolutely masterful in this, and in recognizing the importance of this, and also in understanding how to deploy it, to deploy narrative, and how to deploy PR strategically. When you read the book, one of the things that becomes painfully clear is how a lot of the Muslim leadership at that time sort of treated the fringe as a recurring nuisance, you know. You had skirmishes here and there, you had rage, you had territory going back and forth and so on. But Notre Dame took it much more seriously, he didn't treat it like that.
He recognized that the French invasion, was supposed to be some kind of a civilizational project on their side, a long term insertion. They wanted to create a new reality, a permanent reality, and establish themselves, in the region permanently. They were building the castles, the alliances, the trade patterns, and so forth, new loyalties, and so on, and he recognized that they had every intention of staying. This wasn't a temporary or transitory presence. They wanted to actually become the dominant authority in our lands.
It was it was kind of the earliest iteration of colonization. So if you understand the enemy, if you understand that the enemy is actually trying to become permanent in your land, then your response can't be sporadic or occasional, the response itself has to become permanent too, and Nordhedin and his father understood that. So Nordhedin saw the presence of the fringe as structurally geopolitical geopolitically structural, so when you understand that, then you have to reassess your own side and your own response to the franj, because if you just see the franj as a nuisance, as a sort of a rogue violent actor in your region, then you can maybe justify using them against your own regional rivals, is what we saw up until now. You use the franca as sort of spoilers. But if you recognize that their presence, is trying to be a long term structural presence, then no, you you you realize now that your internal division is actually a weapon in their hands against you.
Rivalries between the rulers, jealousies between cities, petty petty politics, a lot of what we've seen up until now. You see again and again how the French benefited from this fragmentation between the Muslims. They didn't need to be geniuses. The French didn't need to be geniuses. All they needed to do was be there when the Muslims competed with each other.
You know, this is how they really benefited. So Nur ad Din understood that unity was absolutely essential. And he didn't mean unity the way that a lot of people talk about unity. It wasn't sort of soft and squishy. You know what I mean?
He treated unity as a mechanical requirement for victory, a condition for victory, for success. You know. He saw he saw the very basic reality that without unity you cannot properly coordinate and you cannot properly sustain any pressure, you can't hold any ground, you know, you can't discipline your own people, you can't even fund anything for the future, for over the long term, you can't really build your future, this is practical morality, this is what he understood. He saw that division isn't just immoral or offensive morally, but he saw that the the strategic importance of unity surpassed almost everything else. And like I say, it wasn't about, you know, we all have to love each other or something like this, it was the practical coordination is necessary, the unified cohesion of action is necessary.
You need to be able to operate like one functional machine, this is what he understood. Notre Dame recognized that, as I say, what I call unofficial or informal power, you're talking about the people who don't sit on the throne necessarily, who don't necessarily have governmental positions, but they determine what the population accepts as legitimate, you know, because you can be a ruler but you're actually weak. You can maybe the only reason people are obeying you is because they fear you, or maybe they only obey you because you're bribing them, you know, or maybe they're they're they're only obeying you because they're just waiting for you to decline or weaken or or or die. But Nordhedin understood that in order for rule to be durable, you have to have legitimacy, you need moral authority, you need the public's emotional commitment, and that commitment is shaped by specific groups in the society, scholars, judges, preachers, poets, administrators, merchants, notable families, and so forth. These are the people who set the tone for the society even if they don't hold governmental positions, you know.
And they have the power to undermine you or they have the power to strengthen you because they have sway over the minds of the people, and Nordhedin took that very very seriously. He didn't treat it as sort of unimportant people because they're not in the government. He understood that that power is is built through sort of the the control over, you can say meaning, the control over meaning, and the the like gate gatekeeping meaning, you can almost say. And like I said, Nordhedin recognized very importantly the religious nature of the conflict, which was of course not only correct, it was not only correct that it was a religious conflict, is not only correct and true, but also practically speaking, politically, realpolitik speaking, a religious framing is a mobilization system for the population. It gives it a shared language that compresses the complex context of the conflict into a comprehensible meaning that everyone can understand, and that produces discipline.
A religious framing can unify people across their tribes, their cities, their classes, their rivalries, everything that we've seen up until now, because it was really missing that fundamental religious framing, people were able to we saw the division that we've seen up until now in this in this history, all this petty competition. But the religious framing can create stamina, it can create bravery in the population, commitment in the population, and so forth, and Nur ad Din understood that. He didn't just believe the the reality of the religious framing, but he also understood that the religious framing causes social cohesion on a practical strategic level. In my opinion, this is what he he understood. It gives you a shared operational moral framework to produce coordination and endurance among the people because you're talking about now, he's understanding it to be a long term struggle, not we're dealing with these annoying roguish bands of marauders, these these crusaders, we just have to deal with them here and there and it's a nuisance.
No, he understood it as they were they're looking to be here for good, they're looking to control things around here, so we we need to address it in a very permanent long term, long horizon way. And as I said, Notre Dame synthesized all of this understanding into this realpolitik strategy, and this is what makes him really special, this is what makes him special in history. He wasn't just a scholar, he wasn't just a ruler, he wasn't just a, you know, a warrior leading the battlefield leading on the battlefield and so forth. He was trying to build an architecture of cohesion and legitimacy for the whole land, for all of the Muslims in in the who were under the under the threat, and who were dealing with the with the fringe, while he's still also dealing or maneuvering with the dirty word of the the dirty world of politics. So Notre Dame knew how to negotiate, he knew how to punish, he knew how to persuade, he knew how to how to intimidate, he also knew how to compromise, and he knew how to guide the the population towards a real how can I say?
A real they were he was able to convince them that victory was possible, that liberation from the French was possible. So it it gave that gave them a unified purpose, like a long term purpose. And he did that, like I say, we were talking about we were talking about PR. So he deployed the PR, the narrative control, the soft power, the propaganda, whatever you want to call it, rhetoric, whatever you want to call it, the framing. Let me first of all, let let me let me just clarify something first of all about propaganda because it has a it has a bad name because we always associate it with the West most most of the time.
And so we automatically assume that it just means lies, and it means manipulation, and so forth. So let me just clarify that because every civilization teaches their people a story, you know. Every civilization teaches their people a story about themselves and about everybody else, an interpretation of reality, a framing, you know, every ruling order in any society anywhere, they have to give their public an interpretation of reality, a framework for understanding reality. And that interpretation and that framework can either be truthful or false, it can be noble or it can be corrupt, it can be moral or immoral, but there's always an interpretation. If you leave your society without any disciplined, controlled interpretation of reality, then other other interpretations are gonna fill the void, frankly.
So Nordhedin didn't leave that to to chance, you know, he built what you could call an apparatus, a a propaganda apparatus, an apparatus of delivering meaning, conveying meaning and understanding and framing to the population. So he built legitimacy as an institution in and of itself, not just around him personally, but as an institution itself. Consistently, he cultivated a reputation for himself of justice and personal restraint. He he he tried as I say, he tried to be known as someone who feared Allah. He tried to be known as someone who respected the scholars and who served the public.
He didn't behave like a tyrant. This is extremely important. This is this gives you an idea also of the different way that you that that Muslims would approach what we call propaganda or PR versus the way the West does. We'll probably talk about that more later. It wasn't just genuine virtue and genuine taqwa, but it was also a form of power building.
Because when the population believes that the ruler is just, then this this changes everything, this changes the whole relationship with the ruler, their obedience becomes willing and voluntary, you know, their patience becomes stronger, their willingness to fund things, to give money, to give financial support to whatever the ruler the projects of the ruler are, they're willing to do that more, and they're also ready to fight, They're more steadfast, not to mention they're also more how to say? They're more forgiving or they're more compassionate with regards to the mistakes that the ruler might make. This you you create a much closer, dearer relationship between the population and the ruler. I think that the best example that we have of someone like this right now in the world today is probably Ibrahim Chawroi. There's probably nobody that has quite that same status operating in politics or operating in government anywhere in the world today more than Ibrahim Charroy who sort of fits the bill with regards to that that that sort of dynamic.
Because people are gonna tolerate what whatever hardships they have to tolerate if they believe that the leadership is clean, if they believe that the cause or the projects that the leadership is trying to engage in, if they believe that that's clean, if they believe that it's moral, if they believe that it's just, if they believe that it's in their interest, you know. They're willing to tolerate difficulties and hardship if they believe that that they're not being exploited, or rather I should say they they won't tolerate it, they won't tolerate hardship, they won't tolerate sacrifice being expected of them if they believe that they're being exploited, and if they believe that the government doesn't care about them in any way whatsoever, and is not looking out for their interests, and it's just, you know, looking out as sort of a like a nepotism or something like that, that they only care about their own. Then the the population, can't expect them to sacrifice for you. So this is what I mean when I say integrity is a political weapon. I mean it very literally.
Integrity increases your operational capacity as a ruler, and it reduces friction between you and your and your population, which which protects any project that you might be involved in, any cause that you want to pursue as a government, as a ruler, and so and so forth. This reduces opposition, it reduces sabotage of whatever you're trying to do, it reduces defections, and it reduces cynicism because that's one of the worst things that can happen in a population is when the population is cynical. So when you're like this, when you have political when you have moral integrity as a as a leader, then this reduces cynicism. So you understand what I'm saying? I'm saying that, the the PR that Notre Dame was engaging in wasn't without substance.
It was backed up. So he was walking the talk, so to speak. This is why his piety mattered. It wasn't just theater, you know, it was a foundation that made everything else possible. Everything else that he was trying to do politically, it made everything possible.
So he disciplined a narrative about what the crusaders were and what the nature of this conflict was, and he made it public, and he he he elevated the struggle against the French into a shared moral and religious project of the entire population. Because, you know, one of the most dangerous realities for us at at at that time as Muslims at that time, one of the most dangerous realities that the Muslims were dealing with at that at that time psychologically was complacency was complacency, and that should sound familiar. People just getting used to the fringe being there. They were used to the fringe presence, you know, people were just adjusting their lives around the reality of the fringe being there, people were treating it like it's just, you know, part of the weather or something, and Noordadine fought against the normalization of the fringe presence in the people's minds psychologically, And like I say, he did that by making the moral meaning of the conflict present in the public in public life through commissioning chutbas, you know, sermons, the religious leaders, through education, through public messaging, so that the general climate of the cities fell under his influence.
The the general climate of the population, the general sentiment of the population were getting the message through, as I say, the the the people who generally craft meaning for them. So that made it hard for any other leaders to hide by behind any excuses. You understand? So he he sort of bypassed the the governmental structures or the the official power and made appeal directly to the unofficial power, the the the the informal power, and that made it very hard for elites to treat the fringe in a way that conflicted with the growing impression of the fringe Nur ad Din's campaign was causing in the people's minds. He was changing the mindset, he was changing the mentality of the the population.
So he made betrayal of that that framework, of that depiction of the franj, and of that depiction of the struggle, if you betrayed that there was a social cost for the elites and for any rulers and so forth, for any governors and whatnot, any sultans. That soft power, that's what we call narrative control, like in the in the Middle Nation relative power index, that's narrative control. So he was able to get the people through this soft power, through this narrative control, to have a whole different framing of the understanding of what this conflict was, and that it wasn't just something that you just have to put up with, it's something that you have to adapt to. He targeted the the manual what what we would call now the manufacturers of consent. This is one of the most important lessons for us, I think.
Notedin didn't only as I say, he didn't just negotiate with rulers, he worked through the scholars, he worked through the the respected figures who shaped legitimacy in the society. He understood that the reality is that the public this this is something that I think a lot of people don't understand, this is and this is very important to understand. People don't obey the ruler directly in their hearts. When we talk about obeying the ruler, okay, yes, it does mean directly obeying the ruler, but the people are not obeying the ruler directly in their hearts, they are obeying the moral world that they live in. They're obeying a framework in which it makes sense to obey the ruler, and that world is shaped by specific people in the society that that that's shaped by the like I say the scholars, the judges and so forth, the respected figures who align with the leader, and that increases the leader's authority without needing any violence or coercion or whatsoever.
So, Nordhedin sought to align these people with the project of unity and the project of jihad in the classical sense, disciplined struggle for the sake of Islam, and he built a climate in which the serious voices of society were all singing the same tune. You understand? And when the the serious voices in the society all sing the same tune, then detraction and opposition immediately looks like betrayal or sabotage or or or treason. This is how you isolate the traitors and the hypocrites without having to hunt them down by your soldiers, you know, because you basically annihilate opposition and what to say, opposition and and and cynicism and criticism and attack against the the rulers and against the government, against the leadership by aligning the whole society in favor of of their project. So now you're you are the the odd man out if you are now against that, and you immediately look like you're with the other side, you're with the enemy.
And Notre Dame used institutions as media, he used institutions as media to relay the message, to deliver this message to the population. This is also a concept that I think many people miss. They think when you think about media, you think about newspapers, you think about TV, you think about social media, what have you. But institutions are also media for conveying messages. Schools teach people what's normal, courts teach people what's acceptable and legal, masajid teach people what is their religious duties and so forth.
Endowments, teach people what the society values, you understand? Public works projects teach people whether the leadership in their society actually serves the public or doesn't care about the public at all or exploits the public. So Nur ad Din invested in public legitimacy through institutions, because when the society sees justice, they see justice operating in the society, they see it as a as a living breathing reality in their daily life, then they will internalize a story of order and a story of justice, a story of fairness, a story of righteousness or what have you. But when they see corruption operating in their society, they see moral corruption, legal corruption, political corruption and so forth, when they see that operating in their society on a daily basis, in their daily lives, then they will internalize a story of unaccountability, and that should also sound familiar. So he understood that public trust is built through the repeated lived experience of your own population.
You understand? He understood that the narrative cannot actually be disconnected from reality to such an extent, you know, because if you have to if you have to rule by means of inflicting cognitive dissonance among the the those whom you are ruling, then your time is not going to be very long. If you want to if you want to build a movement you can't just live on rhetoric alone, you have to actually create structures, you have to actually embody the values that you claim on the ground, and if you don't do that then the public is not going to respect you. They won't respect you, they won't trust you, they won't listen to you, and eventually they will regard you as traitors to the very project or to the very cause or to the very nation that you initiated all of that, you know, on the on the on the pretext of initiating all of that, on the pretext of serving that nation or serving that public or serving that cause, they will see you yourself as a traitor to that cause. So Notre Dame's moral authority was reinforced by his own tangible governance, and there's a there's an important psychological point here because people must be able to imagine victory in order to endure what is necessary to achieve victory.
I'll say that again, people must be able to realistically imagine victory in order for them to be willing to endure everything that they must endure and everything that they must do in order to achieve that victory. They they have to be able to taste the possibility of liberation in reality, and Noordadin cultivated that possibility in their imaginations. He made future liberation feel like an actually approaching reality, not a fantasy, not I have a dream, you know. He treated it as a project that had steps, a realistic project that just had steps, steps one, two, three, four, five that we have to do, not a dream that you just fantasize about, not empty hope. This is how you shift the public mood from despair and complacency to, discipline, because discipline is what you need.
Discipline is what you need, not hope, discipline, not not empty hope and not utopianism. So he didn't allow the public to drown in a sense of helplessness or hopelessness or complacency, and he offered them a framework. This is what we're doing, this is why we're doing it, you know, this is how we will get there, and this is must this is what you must be ready to sacrifice in order to get there. That's leadership. Now you can translate all of this into a kind of a power logic that you can use anywhere.
If you understand what what Notre Dame was doing, then you can apply this anywhere, you can apply this understanding to history, to modern politics, to community building, to activism, and so forth, even in your own personal life. You see what I'm saying? Because power isn't just about force, power is the capacity to produce outcomes in your own environment, produce outcomes in your environment. Nordhedin increased his capacity to produce outcomes by strengthening several areas that were under him, the his own authority, which means the ability to impose binding decisions that others must accept or can accept or do accept rather, as legitimate, imposing binding decisions that people accept as legitimate. That that's important.
The legitimacy of it is important. That's the thing that actually makes it binding. He increased his control of critical inputs, of money, of manpower, of supply, of administrative compliance, all of this is building his power, and like I say his narrative control, the ability to shape how the public interprets events, he strengthened that, He strengthened his immunity to retaliation, the ability to act without being easily punished or being easily undermined, he he strengthened all of that. He strengthened his adaptability reserve, the ability to withstand shocks, the ability to recover, the ability to keep moving. This is all from the Middle Nation RPI, the relative power index.
These are metrics from the relative power index, and Notre Dame was working on all of them and strengthening all of them, and then he reduced three sources of weakness, at least three, which is, for example, his dependence upon unreliable partners, his exposure to sabotage from internal rivals, and he reduced his that any perception of vulnerability that he might have that would invite opportunists or or opposition or competition or rivalry or or disobedience or defiance. So this is what you're seeing in the book, in Amin Malouf's book. Notre Dame was reducing the fragility and increasing the cohesion of the Muslim lands that were under his sphere of influence. When you control the public meaning of a struggle, then you make unity easier, you make sacrifice easier, and you make betrayal and cynicism and opposition and sabotage harder to do. That's through narrative control, that's through soft power, that's through PR.
You may not you may not necessarily recognize it as PR, and and that's probably, like I say, partly because our approach as Muslims to PR is different from the Western approach to PR. Let me say what else. Though, to bring it to today, to bring it to today, to the modern day, we are absolutely flooded as Muslims, we are absolutely flooded with narratives. On a on an unprecedented scale, we are subjected to a torrent, you know, an inundation of negative narratives that we are not controlling, narratives that we are not controlling but we are participating in, narratives that fragment us and divide us and weaken us, narratives that keep us reacting and defensive all the time, you know, narratives that that that how can I say this? Narratives that we respond to through taqwa signaling, you know, how the Kufars have have virtue signaling, well, unfortunately, the Muslims have their own version.
Taqwa signaling, where you make your own morality and your own virtue, your own taqwa, your own faith into a performance on social media, and you don't and you don't even mean it. It's just for for performance. And we're subjected to narratives that convince people that we're powerless, that convince people that the Muslims are powerless, that we're weak, that we're the Khalid, the the ummah is already destroyed, you know. We're subjected to narratives that convince us that our leaders are all evil, that our leaders are all hypocrites, that our evils our leaders are all evil hypocrites just as bad or or or worse than the leaders in the West, and that our own people are are also, you know, barely functioning as Muslims, barely have any imam and what have you, you know. And the the the narratives out of the West that make you ashamed or defensive about Islam rather than proud of it, Narratives that make Muslims treat the ummah like it's some kind of a myth, like the ummah as one body, as one nation doesn't exist, that we're all different, you know, that we don't that it's just a myth, that that we talk about a unified ummah.
And when you when you're subjected to all these narratives, and you're not how can I say, you're you're participating in these narratives, and you're sharing these narratives, and you are helping to deliver these narratives to our own people, how how do you wonder now why it's impossible to coordinate? Why we can't coordinate? Why we can't sustain any projects? Why we can't build institutions properly? Why we can't protect our own interests, you know.
Look at Notre Dame, subhanAllah, you're not going to build strength by treating narrative as secondary. You have to you have to prioritize this, and especially because most of us don't have material power, most of us aren't rich, most of us aren't from the in the in the sense of military power, political power, financial power, so forth, but you are participating in narrative every day. You're participating in narrative construction and delivery every day, and you're not going to be able to build any strength while you're allowing the enemy to define your reality and define your frameworks. You're not going
to be able
to build strength as long as you are allowing internal petty conflict to become some kind of, I don't know, rage bait or click bait or whatever, a a kind of a a just a way to generate content or generate following by by petty conflicts between between Muslims, getting involved in drama and so forth. You're not gonna be able to build strength while your your your public your public makers of meaning are compromised, are cowardly, or are bought, or unserious if they engage in nonsense, you know. You have to treat legitimacy as a source, as a resource. You see what I'm saying? In our time, legitimacy has been demolished by part of it is by the fact that we simply don't interact with each other face to face, we don't actually even know each other.
So you don't even know who who has legitimacy or not. So all legitimacy is, well, maybe maybe yes, maybe no. Maybe this person means it, maybe they don't. Maybe they're maybe they're just saying what they're saying for money, maybe they're saying what they're saying just for clicks. You know what I'm saying?
And then the even the even the figures who have, like, official authority, well, they're all viewed as corrupt, you know. There's there's there's immense public cynicism across the world, across whether you're talking about Muslims or non Muslims, people assume everyone is lying, people assume everyone is lying. Unless they're saying the worst things, unless they're making the worst slanderous accusations about people, then you automatically assume that they're telling the truth. But as soon as anyone talks about anything that's that's right or good or righteous, you assume that they are liars. You just assume.
You assume that every leader is exploiting, you know. You assume that every religious voice is just a performance. And so when legitimacy collapses, your ability to mobilize anyone for anything completely collapses. You understand what I'm saying? And and and legitimacy is built through exactly what Noordadin showed us.
You build trust through discipline, you build trust through justice, through consistency, through sacrifice. People can smell insincerity, but they can also smell sincerity. They can they can sense it, they can they can can sniff it out if you're just performing or if you're telling the truth, if you're, you know, but it but it but it as I say, it's it's a matter of walking the talk. So if you want to lead people, then you have to pay a price. If you want people to sacrifice for you, then you have to be willing to sacrifice for them.
You build an apparatus of meaning through you can do it, and anyone who's here right now in this chat, and anyone who's in the Middle Nation channel so forth, as I say, you are already participating in narrative construction and narrative conveyance, you're already participating in that. So you can participate in helping to build for the Muslims an apparatus of meaning online in social media, and that doesn't mean lying, it doesn't mean manipulation, it means clarity. That's what our propaganda means, that's what our PR means, it means clarity. It it means repeating the truth in a way that sticks with people. It means training people, to interpret events through a coherent moral lens.
You understand? If your community consumes its interpretation of reality from hostile sources, from your enemies, then your be your community is gonna behave in a hostile manner to themselves, and this is exactly what we see. This is why education matters, this is why this is one of the reasons why we're even reading this book. This is why public discourse matters and how you handle public discourse, this is why disciplined communication matters, why why why disciplining your tongue and your mind and your thought processes, and disciplining yourself even in silence, this is why this matters. Now, Nur ad Din was doing this through scholars and through hadibs and so forth.
In our time, as I say, we have many channels for this. We're all we're on one right now, and the principle stays the same. Identify the informal power players and take them seriously, even if if you're one of them. If you wanna build a community, then you have to know who shapes the mood for the rest of your community, for the rest of the Muslims in your area or around the world. Who shapes trust?
Who shapes credibility? Who shapes what people consider respectable? This is an untapped or what not I won't say untapped, but neglected category from the Influencers, people who are online, people who are participating in narrative. We're letting them just say whatever they wanna say. They'll they they can talk all sorts of nonsense, and they're never disciplined for that.
You are corrupting your own the the the narrative of your own people, of your own ummah, of the of the Muslims. You're corrupting a narrative, and you are fighting against a victorious narrative that will bring us to liberation. You're actively fighting against that when you're not participating in it, and when you are participating in and when you are conveying narratives that are framed by our enemies. So if if you're if you're you're makers of meaning, if the people who are crafting frameworks, the people who are crafting narratives, or or not even crafting but just conveying, if they're captured by utter nonsense, then the whole society is gonna be captured by nonsense, the whole community is gonna be captured by nonsense. You have to fight the the the normalization of your own defeat, your own irrelevance, your own the the ability to be dismissed, and and and frankly, you have to fight against deserving to be dismissed because of your lack of seriousness.
This is one of the most poisonous things in the modern Muslim world. People are just adjusting to what is what is already an obsolete situation, which is our subjugation. This is already becoming obsolete. In many parts of the Muslim world, it's already obsolete, but we're but but we're still delivering and sharing and conveying narratives that emphasize our humiliation and our subjugation. You understand?
This build you you people will build their entire life around low expectations if you do this. Low expectations. You you start treating weakness as something permanent, you know. So so Noordadine understood that this mental state, this, you know, he everything that Noordadine was doing with regards to narrative and and PR and so forth, this falls under what we call epistemological sovereignty. He was taking back control over narrative frameworks, over understanding, over how things are defined, and this is what we try to do at Middle Nation.
You have to you have to fight against the story that you are being told, and and and you have to rely upon your own sources of knowledge. You have to fight this psychological surrender to their narrative. That's where a a shared how can I say this? In order for you to have a shared victory at any point in the future, you have to first have a shared expectation that it's possible, like I said earlier. You have to have a shared expectation that victory is possible, and then that shared victory can become a shared reality.
You understand? Any actual practice that you implement through discipline is part of this. It's not just a slogan. This is this is unity. You know, when when we talk about unity, this is this is what I mean.
A unity, when you talk about a shared reality, a shared victory, well, this requires practical unity, not as a slogan, not as rhetoric, not as well, we all have to love each other and and whatnot. You have to be unified even if you don't love each other. Like I say, it's not just a slogan, it it it means in practice, it means standing together like one single solitary structure shoulder to shoulder like Allah told us with the Muslims from all over the world no matter where they come from, stand with the Muslims, the people and the leaders, whether you like them or you dislike them personally. It means holding your tongue sometimes, you know. It means confronting the critics of our people from among our enemies rather than conceding to those critics.
You understand? And it means not speaking badly about your own people and not letting your own people be spoken badly about. You shouldn't allow this. So Noordadin was righteous, and he understood that the that his own righteousness has strategic importance, the strategic importance of righteousness. He understood that integrity is a political weapon.
He understood that legitimacy is not just spiritual, it is practically operational. He understood the public meaning of the conflict, the way that the way that the whatever conflict you're talking about, in his case, obviously, we're talking about the invasion of the occupation of the French, but it can be any conflict. The the public meaning, defining and understanding the public meaning of any particular conflict, this is going to be decisive in determining whether your people are willing to endure and struggle. He understood that the scholars and the respected voices in the society can either fortify your project or sabotage that project, and everyone has a responsibility towards that project if that project is good. He understood that institutions teach people what's normal.
He understood that victory requires a disciplined narrative that you convey through multiple means, including through the or how can I say that the that the that the narrative that you are wanting to press or push to the people, it has to actually be reflected in their lives? You know? Saladin was the or is the visible triumph that we all talk about, and that's why we all know him. He's the visible triumph of the Muslims against the fringe, against the crusaders. But Nur ad Din was the architect that made that triumph possible.
That was Nur ad Din. So I think I've I've talked a lot. I'll I'll go ahead and turn it back over to brother Amar. I again, I I apologize because I missed the last session. I had a lot of things to say as you can see.
I had a lot of things that I had planned to say, but I missed that session. So, again, I appreciate brother Ahmad for extending it extending the topic so that we can talk about it a bit more. And I'll be completely quiet for the remainder of this space.
No. I think it's actually yeah. It was actually a good call that that we extended it so that you can talk in abundance about the topics there because yeah. I mean, there there are a lot of ideas that I don't really know where to start. But I think the the the most, yeah, the most blaring point made was the fact that the of the transformation of the whole thing.
Right? The transformation and the realization. So first of all, for first, he realized, Nur ad Din Mahmud, the the nature of the of the situation and the permanence of the of the the Ferengi presence, and I think we this became extremely obvious to him after the second crusade or after the second Ferengi campaign. So to remind our listeners and maybe our speakers, last time, it was related that in November, Ibn al Khalansi, the the historian of a famous Muslim historian, had for the second time in his lifetime witnessed the arrival of of of of of the from Europe, from, like, behind the sea, coming in overwhelming numbers and trying to take his city of Damascus. Right?
Amin Aluk says that Abd al Qaransi must have been he was 25 during the first campaign, and now he was 75 during the second campaign, and how it must have felt that he was you know, it was being repeated all over again in his mind's eye. But for us, I think we need to understand how it seemed to Nur ad Din Mahmud. Now he was it was merely four years since the death of Ramadan Dinzinki in '40 sorry. It has been merely two years even. Ramadan Dinzinki was dead in '48 was killed in November, So it has been only two years, and Nurek Demond was trying to consolidate his position in Beladdisham.
And within two years, he found out that Conrad the third and Louis the seventh of Germany and Europe respectively were at his doorstep in Beledeshem coming and trying only to take, Damascus, not trying to take Aleppo. And it became obvious to Nordhadim, as Ostad said, that they were were here to stay. This is this was the second wave after after almost half a century. This has been the second wave. And so he it must it must it must have been clearly obvious for him by that time that these guys aren't this is not just one wave, and it's not a one time thing.
No. They're coming, and this is the second wave. And there's reason to believe that there would be a third and a fourth and a fifth and a seventh and how and and so on and so forth. Right? And it was true.
We will see in the in the story of the Faraj how during there was the third, and then during his brother, there was the fifth, and then and so on and so forth. Right? So it the brilliance of as per is the realization that the per that the the the presence of the was permanent. It had a permanent nature. It didn't have a a a temporary or transitional nature.
And the second thing, of course, is the utilization, as Ustaz said, the utilization of the of the image that he cultivated of himself as a protector of the faith, as a defender of the faith, as a unifier of the faith. And this is made very clear when we we hear a neighboring Muslim ruler saying that Muhammad pursued many tactics with this Muslim emirs or this Muslim ruler's population in such a way that when Muhammad finally asked him, quote unquote. Right? Nur ad Din Muhammad was not ordering him or commanding him. He's asking him to join him in his jihad and struggle against the Firaj.
This Muslim ruler said, I'm having no there's no I'm I'm almost out of options. I there's no option for me. There's no possibility for me to say, no. I'm not going to join you. I can't do that because if I do that, my population will will be severely turned against me, and this is not something any Muslim ruler wants to do.
So the realization of the informer informal power players, as Ustad said, in the struggle was a very important realization on Null I Mahmud's side. And, again, this has to come back to the fact that the importance of the scholars and then the importance of the of the and on the importance of the sermon givers and and so on and so those people had a very important part to play in the Muslim world due to Naddam al Mulk, the vizier of the Seljuqs. This man had made an important an important achievement in the Muslim empire, although it didn't take place the effect didn't play didn't take place immediately during his lifetime. It took place after his lifetime by establishing what we what we know as the Muslim madrasas, the Nidamiyyat. Right?
Those madrasas were schools where important figures in the Muslim Ummah graduated decades and decades after the death of Nizam al Mulk. Right? So we know al Imam al Ghazari was an was a graduate of this school. We know that Salahiddin al Ayyubi was taught in that school. We know that very important Muslim figures when when you whenever you say read someone someone's biography that he was a graduate of the of of Bardet or the of Damascus or the of Ismohan or or or that means that this guy is indebted in his philosophy, in his take of life to this this this absolute of a vizier.
It's yeah. It's not too far to say that this was the one of the most important viziers in the history of Islam, not to say in maybe anything in the history of the world. So this rule that the Muslim scholars took in the Muslim ummah was clarified, was made very strong, was made was moved very forward in a in a in a very forward manner just by, you know, putting pressure and making it extremely powerful to give those callers much more space in the public domain because this is the this is the soul of Islam. Right? The the the are the the the, what you would call, the middle layer between the rulers and the populations.
If they are understanding what the rulers and they are the makers of the public mood and the makers of the public domain, what's acceptable and, like, what is saying, what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, and the and the ruler is able to to collaborate with this with this layer, so to speak, then you would see Nur ad Din Mahmud. Because time and again, we would see Nur ad Din Mahmud saying that he that he was he he made his social circle, his his close confidence, many of this those covers. And so they saw with their own eyes how this man was pious, how this man was aesthetic sorry sorry, how he was, like, driven living the rough life that he was not interested in in Dunya or anything like that, that he was genuine when he said that I want to free the from the and that I will pursue some tactics and some political decisions that might not be the best, but it is what I can do with what I have. And they would believe that this was indeed the case. And so we didn't really see in the lifetime of Nur ad Din Mahmud any opposition from his base camp.
Right? So we heard before that, for example, Balak, the the ruler of Aleppo, was was was killed actually during the quelling of an uprising. Ahmed ibn Zinke, Nur ad Din's Nur ad Din Mahmud's own father, was killed also during the quelling of an uprising. But Nur ad Din Mahmud, he didn't face any uprisings during his reign. Why?
Because he was, like Ostad said, integrity was part of his was part of his weaponizing of his rule, of his camp or of his campaign. The the the slogan that he was, you know, raising or putting up was that I'm I'm an integral ruler. Whatever I put my population through, I would put myself through, and I have a very clear obvious goal. I will pursue this goal with whatever means that I have and whatever that I can do. So, yeah, I I completely agree with the analysis given by Ustad, and I I believe that it it yeah.
I mean, this is the best way that it could have been given is to give it a separate episode. I do have some questions to Ustad, if Ustad will allow me. So the first the first question would be, in light of these achievements, Ustad, in light of these achievements made made by Nur ad Din Mahmoud, this cultivating of the image, this transformation of the reality, this control of the narrative, you know, this collaboration with the scholars and this immense immense effort that culminated because people usually look to Salahidin al Ayyubi because people all over the world, Muslims and non Muslims alike, they are always, you know, you could call this availability bias. Right? Because this is the the the the result that I saw, so I will completely disregard whatever happened before, and I will believe that this was the only victory achieved, which is the battle of Hattin.
They didn't realize that Saladin Ayyub had been thirteen years in the making of Hattin and that before him had been twenty years in the making and that before both of them was establishing, you know, a power base in Bledishem, but people will only see the result established by So this is the availability wise that I'm talking about. But what I'm trying to ask is this immense effort that was put by Nur ad Din Mahmud in the aspect of PR. In comparison to that in comparison to that, do you believe that our modern day regimes in the in the region put enough emphasis on the weaponization of PR, on the usage of PR, on the of course, they understand the the importance of PR. I don't think that they don't understand. But their usage, do you think it can be compared to the usage of Nur ad Din Mahmud of PR in his own lifetime?
The short answer would be no. But it's it's it's more it's a bit more complicated than that or more complex than that because when you're talking about PR, you you have to you you're looking at who's the target audience of the PR. And usually when we criticize the the Muslim regimes or the Muslim governments or or Muslim leadership, when we criticize them for their failure their PR failures or their their lack of attention to PR, we're usually talking about global facing PR, international audiences, particularly Western audiences and particularly Muslims in the West. People who are on Twitter, basically. That that the Muslim governments are supposed to be doing more to improve their image among the Twitterati, basically.
And I think that we would have to acknowledge that they don't really care about that whatsoever. They they haven't paid any attention to it whatsoever. No one really cares about from the Muslim governments, you're talking about GCC or Egypt or anywhere else, really, even, you know, Malaysia or Indonesia or anywhere. No one really cares about public opinion outside of their own citizens. Now if you're talking about their domestic populations, they're all airtight in their in their PR.
They're absolutely airtight in their PR and their propaganda for their domestic populations. It's arguable though to the the the extent to which this is how can I say? The extent to which this reflects the approach of Nur ad Din. Because quite simply, none of them are Nur ad Din. None of them are a man of his character, in my opinion, in I'm not I don't mean to denigrate them.
Nur ad Din was a was a remarkable human being. So to say that someone isn't Nur ad Din, well, who is? I mean, he was a remarkable figure in history. It it sort of baffles me, for example, why he isn't included when people talk about the great leaders. When people talk about like, say, Omar bin Abdulaziz or something, and they don't mention Nur Din.
And I know, as you said, I know why they mention Salahid Din. Everyone knows why they mention Salahid Din and he deserves to be mentioned and remembered. But Nur ad Din was a remarkable human being. But domestically, I think that the that the governments like their propaganda is very strong in to their own domestic population, their own citizenry. And they have established again, it will vary from country to country.
But say if you're talking about Saudi Arabia or you're talking about UAE or you're talking about Qatar or whatever, their people are in lockstep behind them, more or less. Most most of the most of the actual citizens are in lockstep with their government. They have full belief in confidence and trust in the integrity of their government in terms of integrity with regards to advancing the the the best interest of their nation. The the particularly, their prosperity, their material interest, their advancement, their increasing and expanding their sphere of influence and so forth, the the the actual citizenry are more or less in lockstep with their leaders. Maybe to an extent that that you didn't even see back in the time of the crusades prior to Notre Dame.
However, we have to acknowledge that none of them have established, I think, even with their own people, anything like the moral legitimacy of a Nur ad Din. Anything like the the level of moral integrity, the the presumption of righteousness or the perception of righteousness and the perception of them serving the cause of Islam and so forth. But that's that has to do with what you are trying to achieve with your PR. You know what I mean? It's not that that's not necessarily their priority that they're trying to be religious figures.
Now in terms of outward facing, international facing, global facing PR and propaganda. If you talk about, say, The Gulf States, they are heavily invested in their image with particular sectors, with particular audiences. Meaning investors, tourists, obviously, with regards to sports and so forth. They're they're heavily invested in that and they're extremely successful in that. And they understand also.
They have understood. I don't know at what point it it dawned on them. I don't know at what point they had the epiphany that the West doesn't care about morals whatsoever, that all of their moral arguments are are completely false or or superficial. But they they at some point, they understood that. So they understood that that doesn't even need to be part of their messaging when they're talking to the West.
When they when they message the West, the the message that they put forth in the West is we have shiny things. We have very fancy, luxurious, shiny things come. We know you don't care about, you know we don't have to assure you about the treatment of political prisoners. We don't have to assure you about women's rights. We don't have to assure you about human rights or what have you because you don't mean it anyway.
And all we have to do is dangle something shiny in front of you and you'll come. So that's what their that's what their PR is like around the world or in the West anyway. They just dangle something shiny to the West and they come. So they're very successful in the PR that they are interested in. They are not interested whatsoever in the political opinions of people in the West.
Because anyway, as I say, they have already concluded that those political opinions of people in the West amount to nothing. They have they have understood that that the the political opinion of people in the West doesn't really pose a threat to them as long as they are focusing upon making themselves attractive for investment, attractive financially, and the making themselves attractive financially and attracting interest in an investment in their financial and business projects, that is how they can protect themselves from negative political opinions. Because you could say that, you know, twenty years ago, twenty five years ago, negative political opinions about the Muslim world was extremely dangerous for the Muslim world. Because you could justify wars and bombings and invasions and occupations and so forth on the basis of negative political opinions about the Muslim world. That's no longer the case.
And one of the reasons why it's no longer the case is because they have focused on the the the the other type of PR, the other type of marketing, which is to appeal to what the West really cares about, which is money. So as long as we can be attractive to you in the in the business world, in the business sector, in the in the sphere of business, then we protect ourselves from your aggression and your hostility, your violence. So I think they've been successful in that regard. Obviously, you can you can go country to country to country. But again, I would say that no no country is more successful.
And this is interesting because it's a small country. It's not a particularly, at this point, geopolitically important country. But Ibrahim Charuay has extremely successful international facing propaganda, international facing PR. Everybody knows that Ibrahim Shahriar is a righteous man. Everybody knows that.
Anyone who knows anything about Ibrahim Shahriar has even heard his name, associates him with being a righteous, upstanding, anti imperialist, anti colonialist leader of integrity. And the people in his country feel that way more or less as far as I know, but this is even an example of how good their PR has been. And I don't even think that that's something that they have generated themselves from the leadership level. I think that's something that the people themselves have generated in support of him. Now, the other country that I would say has in the region, in The Middle East, that has had very successful propaganda internationally has been Iran.
Their their public perception internationally is exactly what they want it to be. They have successfully created an image of themselves that is vastly different from their actual reality. For example, Iran is the, sole hero defending Gaza, the the sole wonderful hero supporting the Palestinians and so forth. Meanwhile, they never laid one brick on top of another to build a single structure, a single building, a single hospital, a single school in Gaza. They haven't done anything whatsoever to actually actually help Gaza financially or in any practical, real material way whatsoever.
But everyone in the world thinks that they are the great defenders of Gaza, the great defenders of the Palestinians when they haven't lifted a single finger. They haven't they haven't contributed a single dollar to actually helping Palestinians in their daily lives. But the the public perception of them is that they are they are themselves a collective as a nation embodiment of Salahdin himself. So their their PR internationally has been very successful. I can't say anything about their PR domestically, but I think that we have have seen some indications that their ability to convince their own population about how much integrity they have and how wonderful they are, that may be fractured.
But again, this is hard to say. I don't have internal information about what actual public opinion is inside of Iran and nobody else does either. But so yeah. Generally speaking, I I don't think that that any anyone is at the level of Notre Dame in terms of their PR, in terms of the substance of their PR, and that's partly because no one has the substance that Notre Dame himself had. However, I would also say that there's some degree of change in that regard, specifically in in with regards to Saudi Arabia.
They have gotten Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to be honest. UAE, not so much. UAE is as I as I've talked about before, they're playing they're they're they're between Saudi Arabia and The UAE, they're playing a good cop, bad cop, and the role of bad cop is sort of appropriately assigned to The UAE. And they're doing all the dirt, and they're and they're taking all the hits. Saudi Arabia is looking very good.
So in this regard, they're maneuvering quite well in the PR game on on the international level. They are presenting themselves as leaders in diplomacy, leaders in stability, that they have a vision, you know, the the the vision 2030 and so forth. So Bin Salman has has done a very good job, I think, in turning things around with regards to appealing to or or rather creating a good image, a better image for Saudi Arabia internationally. But again, that still comes down more or less to a specific agenda or a specific goal in the region, which is more material based and more with regards to authority and financially and in terms of business and this and this sort of thing, prosperity and so forth. It's it's more or less of a secular type of a vision, you can say.
It's not that infused with religious language at all the way the way that Nouradines was. And I think personally, I think this is this is an area, this is a lesson, this is a part of the the lessons that we can take from Nouradines, which I I pray and I hope that our leaders will take upon board will take on board. It may not come with this generation of leaders, it may. I mean, we know anyway that a that a leader changes over time and and for example, Bin Salman is quite young as a leader. So who knows how he's gonna be in ten years, fifteen years, twenty years.
He's he's gonna be there for good unless something happens. May Allah protect him. But, you know, the leadership that we have now is is you can compare it again to the example, as we've talked about many times in relation to this book, the succession of authority, the succession of power, the succession of leadership goes from Aymara Din Zengi, who was not known as a particularly virtuous righteous man, but an effective one. And then it passes to his son who was a better man than him religiously, morally, in terms of his taqwa, in terms of his iman and so forth. So we hope and pray that the effective leaders who may be not morally as good as we hope, that that what they build will pass to a generation of more righteous people as we have seen happen in the in the story of Amaradin to Nur adin to Sarahadin and so forth.
But just yeah. In answer to the question, I think that they're more or less successful in the PR for their domestic population, not generally as successful in in their propaganda or their PR internationally except to towards those specific targeted sectors that they're interested in.
Thank you, Stan. And not generally as successful overall with their domestic populations like as successful, sorry, as Muhammed due to due to the difference of substance and the difference of caliber. So, yeah, thank you so much for clarifying that. And you even answered the second question, which was that which regimes do you think were more successful in the modern context? So you said or mentioned Ibrahim Trowry, and you also mentioned Iran.
And I think we cannot, you know, finish this part. We were going to move on to the Eastern Roman treaty question very soon, but I cannot me being an Egyptian, I cannot help but ask, do you believe that Nasser during the pan Arabism era, you know, the sixties late fifties, early sixties, and all the way to the late sixties. Do you think that Nasser was was was a master propagandist or not?
I I to be honest, I'm not I'm not really informed or educated enough about about that aspect of his rule, but I think that you can judge him let let me answer it this way. We can judge the success of his public perception project by looking at how reviled he was by the West, how despised he was by the West, and how how much they hated the man, and how much they they wanted to topple the man. So that would indicate to me that he was quite successful in mobilizing his population for whatever project he had in mind. And I think that that history bears that out. And, you know, Muslim brotherhood notwithstanding their their criticism and their cynicism and and and their hatred of the men as well.
You should you should be careful when you find that you and your enemy are hating the same person. So when the Muslim brotherhood hates Nasser and the West hates Nasser, it it speaks well for Nasr in my opinion. But I I I couldn't really say I'm not I'm not as educated about his own particular PR projects to answer it in any other way.
Yeah. That no. No. I think, yeah, that could be a very informative answer. Like, so who hates the guy?
So, yeah, it makes more or less it doesn't mean that
you about it. But I'm sorry. I'm sorry to interrupt you. But there's another example we can look at. We can look at another example, which would be Erdogan in Turkey, not so much now, but in the early days of the of the AK party.
They had a very, very successful PR program within Turkey. And Erdogan and the AK party together have have had a tremendous effect on the the the psyche, the collective psyche of of of Turkey and the political psyche of Turkey, in that now you have to make some sort of a nod to religion, even if you're a rabidly secular party, even if you are from the, you know, the sort the sort of hold holdovers from Ataturk way of thinking because of what the AK party in in Turkey did under Erdogan and their very successful PR campaign, and because their PR campaign was more like Notre Dame's in that it reflected the reality that they of what they were doing. They did it through institution building. They did it through public works. They did it through actually trying to improve people's lives and so forth.
So this gave power to their PR, and it created a perception. And I think that there's also, excuse me, a very powerful element that is still remaining internationally in terms of their PR, which is around the world, the Muslims have held a very high opinion of Erdogan and regarding him as sort of the Sultan of the Muslims, almost a Khilafa of the Muslims, and that he's gonna resume the Khilafa and so forth. You know, all sorts of things that are have a have to one degree or another a mobilizing impact to to to one degree or another that is fading for Erdogan and for the AK party, both within Turkey and internationally. But in the early days of the AK party, in the early days of Erdogan, they had a tremendously successful PR project or PR campaign that actually rehabilitated the the collective psyche of the Turkish people, in my opinion.
Yes. Wonderful. Wonderful, Stad. Yes. I think, yes, they were able to transform the society because Ataturkism was was very, very prevalent in Turkish society.
Like, they had he he was this violent transformation of the Turkish society that he made, it took it was it was decades in the making and it was deeply rooted in Turkish society. And I've witnessed myself many, you know, testimonies as to how the the Ataturkism was was deeply embedded in Turkish society. And recently, I think it's the the the AK party or Erdogan have been able to somewhat dilute this this this presence of Ataturkism in the Turkish society and somewhat change the public psyche of the Turkish society. Great. So the the the next question would be in light of Nur Mahmud's and this this actually, this point was mentioned by you in one of the videos, but this was several several months back.
So just to reiterate the incident, Nur ad ad Mahmud had concluded a treaty with the eastern Romans upon their arrival in Be'lade Shem because they were aligned with the Fereng, and they were decide they decided that they would all face Nur ad Din Mahmud in battle. And Nur ad Din Muhammad immediately took action, again, out of a textbook laid down by his father, Ahmad ibn Zinqi, and the the same strategy that had been emulated by Onur Mohin al Din Onur, right, that he would go directly to the the the the eastern Roman emperor and conclude a treaty with them, a one-sided treaty with them. And so this was the same approach taken by Nur ad Din Mahmud. So he concluded the treaty with the Eastern Roman emperor saying that he will Nur ad Din Mahmud will attack some Roman subject possessions that were that would divert the Roman subjects from their constant bombardment of the Eastern Romans in Asia Minor. And in return, the Eastern Romans would remove themselves from the power play at least in in for the time being in Beyiddashem.
So Nur ad Din Mahmud was able to avert the immediate threat of the presence of the Eastern Romans in Be'lady Shem. And, eventually, a con a treaty another treaty was concluded with the Roman subjects, and their possessions were returned to them. And, you know, no one died. No one was hurt. No one died except that the immediate threat of the alliance between the Eastern Romans and the Feroz against Nuureki Muhammad was averted, and that was the important part.
Like, the the the power play in Bledishem was still more or less a power play between two entities, Noordi Mahmud and the Ferengi. Now in light of this incident, how do you believe that we can reflect this incident on our as a Muslim ummah and our leaders today, how can we make use of this incident in our dealings with this? Because back then, the Eastern Roman was considered to be the superpower of the day. Right? It was not as strong as it had been, like, before because it had been severely weakened, of course, by the time, but it was still stronger than any of the parties involved in Bilaishem.
So it was considered a superpower in that neighborhood. So in regards with in regards to dealing with the superpowers of of today, like the a national of sea, GFC, which is the the the core concept that the Middle Nation is trying to expose, or, for example, BRICS, the rising power of of BRICS and how it's dealing with the world right now. How do you think we, as a Muslim Ummah, can benefit from this treaty established by Muhlid al Mahmud to avert the immediate danger? How can we make use of this incident in our modern day context when dealing with superpowers such as the a c OCGFC or BRICS?
Okay. Well, first, I think that that you're you're you're correct in making a comparison, and it's it's quite insightful to even make that comparison because the people should understand if they don't already, that's that that's the empire that we have now. That's the empire the the the other empire that we're dealing with. The global superpower isn't The United States Of America. The United States Of America is captured by the actual empire that exists, is a private sector empire, which is the owners and controllers of global financialized capital.
So that's who we're dealing with. And I think that the Muslim leaders, to one extent or another, but particularly in the GCC, I think that they have recognized this. They have recognized who the real power is and that it isn't America as a nation. It's the the the owners and controllers of global financialized capital. So if you look, Notre Dame's agreement with the with the Eastern Romans was a master class in selective accommodation for strategic consolidation.
That's what he did. The lesson isn't from from what he did, the lesson isn't, well, we can trust the outsiders, we could trust the Eastern Romans, or in this case, we can trust the a national OC GFC. The lesson is when you face a bigger threat, you can freeze one front to build decisive capacity on your main front without surrendering your core aims. So in in modern terms, you can you can break that down to sort of three three rules. One, you treat diplomacy as a way to build cohesion or or rather diplomacy, because you want to build cohesion, you use diplomacy to buy time.
You use diplomacy to buy time to build cohesion, which is exactly what they have done. I'm talking specifically now about like like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Egypt, like, and Iran and so forth. They buy time for the building of cohesion by means of diplomacy, and this is also what Nur ad Din was doing. Nur ad Din used agreements to try to reduce immediate pressure so that he could unify, so that he could discipline, and so that he could strengthen internally, the Muslims internally. So the the the modern application of that would be if a state is stretched, if they're under pressure, they can structure deals that will buy them time to build local industry, local food resilience, local currency insulation, and so forth, local tech capability, and internal legitimacy.
They're not negotiating how can I say it, they're they're trying to not be in a position let me say this properly? They need they understand that they need time to build strength so that they are not permanently negotiating forever from a position of weakness. So you buy time so that you can build strength, so that you will eventually be able to negotiate from a position of strength, and we've seen that happening now over the past, say, two decades or or especially it's been sort of accelerating, it's more obvious now because they have achieved a degree of strength. So for example, when Saudi Arabia negotiates, they're not negotiating now from a position of weakness on most issues, not on every issue, but on most issues they're not negotiating from a position of weakness which is why they can hold their ground on, for example, the the the insistence upon a Palestinian state and so forth. So another lesson from Nur ad Din's agreement with Eastern Romans is that you can make your agreement so that it is asymmetrical asymmetrical in your favor over time, not necessarily right at the beginning, but you understand the over time longer horizon outcome of this agreement.
You see what I'm saying? So you understand that the best agreements are not the ones that look fair necessarily on day one. They are they they quietly shift dependence and independence over time because of this agreement. Just like again, we always go back to the example from the of Hordebiyah. It may have looked on day one as a weak agreement, but over time it was asymmetrical in favor of the Muslims.
So again, the modern application of that as a general rule with the OCGFC, with a national OCGFC, you need to avoid making arrangements with them that will actually deepen your permanent financial dependency upon them through debt traps, through privatization leverage, through critical infrastructure exposure and so forth. Now with bricks, you you take what how can I say? You take what is gonna build production and trade capacity, and you try to avoid swapping one dependency for another. So Brix needs to do that, and everyone who's dealing with Brix needs to do that. We don't need to just shift dependency from one to another.
The aim is to have options, to have more partners, to have more routes, to have more payment rails, to have more domestic capacity, so that you have sovereignty in your decision making. And then another rule would be again narrative unity. And and how can I say this? Transactional flexibility, you can say. Transactional flexibility that that your narrative of unity is not undermined by transactional flexibility.
See, Nur ad Din understood that you you can make a tactical deal. He he was he was able to establish the trust of the population enough that he was able to make a tactical deal without dissolving, his own standing, and without dissolving the, narrative that he had, constructed and conveyed and delivered and convinced the people of with regards to the meaning of their struggle. So as I said earlier, he he framed the struggle as a religious struggle. He framed the struggle as a long term civilizational struggle against a civilizational project by the French. So you could say if he had not established his credibility, if he had not established his integrity, if he had not established the public trust and confidence, then if he makes makes a deal now with the Eastern Romans, that could make him look like that could make him look bad, that could destroy everything.
But he had he had worked so hard to establish that trust and establish that confidence that he knew that he could make that tactical deal with the Eastern Romans without dissolving his credibility. That's that's quite rare in leadership. And I think that we are seeing, obviously, we see all the time the people ex crucifying the Muslim leaders because of the deals that they're making, because of the agreements that they're making. And and and there's a lot of, in my opinion, a lot of suh adhan about that and a lot of colonized thinking that you you think that they're negotiating from a position of weakness because you haven't been following events. You don't understand that the deals that they're making, they're making largely from positions of strength, and they're making those deals, as I say, to buy time for the building of strength.
So you have to keep the the the public story as anchored as possible. You need to focus on, and they are largely doing this, and again, you have to talk about whether the whether this is the story that is being told or the PR that is being targeted for a domestic audience or for the international audience. But I think that domestically, in all of our countries, the the story or the PR is anchored. It is anchored in concepts of sovereignty, of dignity, of stability, of development, and of protecting the interests of your nation. Whether that is like I say, generally speaking, they're not speaking in terms of the ummah, they're talking about the interest of the region, the interest of Saudi Arabia, the interest of Qatar, the interest of Iran, the interest of Turkey, what have you, but they also couch it in talking about the interest of the region generally, the region overall.
So, again, with with transactional flexibility, You're talking about partnerships, sort of hedging, diversified alignments and so forth, phased deals that that have impact over time. It's not just a you make the deal today and then you have your impact, the impact builds over time. So long as they don't compromise the the the public's core red lines, the core red lines. So if you if you put it in the in the sort of middle nation logic, power logic, like from the RPI, the agreements are justified when they increase, as I said before, decision authority, control of inputs, narrative control, and adaptability reserve, and also reduce direct dependence, the exposure to disruption and so forth. So again, Notre Dame's genius was that the deals that he made served consolidation, and they and they reduced the the structural weaknesses, the power weaknesses that we talk about in the in the relative power index.
So there's a lot to learn from what he did. It was extremely strategic, extremely tactical, and extremely wise, and he if he had not done that, there would not have been a triumph of Salahdin and Allah knows best.
Yes. Absolutely. I I completely agree. And this had been, like, this had been the the the boogeyman of the of the of the period. Right?
The involvement of the of the Eastern Romans the power politics of the region in such a way that decisions would be made against the interest of the Muslims. So we've seen this happening with Ahmed ibn Zinke, and we have seen it happening again with Muhammed ibn Mahmud. And these aren't, you know, situations where the decisions made by both men could have been held against them because simply, this is this is not, like, a good choice, bad choice kind of situation. No. This is a bad choice, much worse choice kind of situation.
So people in general and Muslims, particularly, should be more aware of that kind of of of of situation. Like, you don't necessarily have to have the best situation alternative available even though if it ultimately was leading to the betterment of the Muslim situation. Sorry, Gustaf. Go ahead.
No. No. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I just I just wanted to say, again, if we if we bring it up to the modern modern day, and if we if we make a correlation or, an analog to the Eastern Romans, with the, a national OCGFC, which is, an appropriate analog to make, or an appropriate analogy to make, or comparison.
The announcement of the, Saudi's Saudi Arabia's project 2030 and, bin Salman's vision for the region, for the entire region, because he's not only talking about Saudi Arabia, and the detente that was created between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And all of these these steps that were taken, if that had not happened, when it happened, which are invitations to collaboration with the own OCGFC. That's what those are. That's what those projects are. They're invitation to collaboration with the OCGFC.
If you agree to stability in the region, you can profit. We are gonna help you in one way or another with the transition because we have recognized we we understand that your countries and your economies are in decline, and there's not really a future economically for the global economy to be based in the West anymore, and you need it to transition. So we will go ahead we're on board with this. We're on board with the transition. We can help to manage the transition, and we can position ourselves as a sort of a central point, the our region, the region of Be'lat Hashem, the region of the so called Middle East and so forth, as we have a whole blueprint for how we can work this.
And they sold that to the OCJFC. And when I say sold it to them, I mean pitched it to them and convinced them of it. And had they not done that, which is which is comparable to Notre Dame's deal with the Eastern Romans. If they had not done that, all of the Palestinians would have already been expelled into Egypt, and Egypt would accept it would have would have accepted. The the the in the West Bank, they would have already been expelled either into Jordan or somewhere else, and and that would have been accepted.
Iran would have already been completely demolished. There would have been an actual war, not theatrics. That would have already happened. Lebanon would would would have been demolished. The entire region would have been set on fire before now.
I don't know if people can, you know, most people don't have much of a memory. You can't even go back two years or three years. But when this when when the genocide first began, there was every indication that that that this was going to erupt into a region wide conflict, that the that the entire region was gonna be set up set up in flames. And there's no reason why that would not have happened except that these deals were made prior to, October 7. The the the the the the reality is that these deals were made and the OCGFC were convinced that stability in the region was now, more profitable and more in their interest, and it was more, rational and more reasonable and more intelligent for the region to become stabilized than for the region to be set on fire.
Had had that deal not been made, and had those deals not been made, and had that not had that approach not been taken, then the region would have been set on fire and it would be burning until now. So there is absolutely a correlation between what Notre Dame did and what the leaders of today are doing, whether people are cognizant of it or not, whether they recognize it or not, whether they want to recognize it or not, this is the reality.
Yes. So we hope that this would be, inshallah, a step in the right direction even if the the fruits are not to be buried maybe in our lifetime. But, hopefully, our children and our grandchildren will see this the outcome of these deals and outcomes of this understanding and, yeah, enjoy it, inshallah. So I wanted to ask if brother Abdul Rahman or brother Kareem have anything to add or questions to ask.
Oh, no. They don't have to be questions to me, brother. Let let people talk. Everybody let let everybody share their thoughts.
Yeah. If if the if the brothers would like to add anything,
just that. I would
be more than happy to hear.
Also, maybe, brother Amar, if you can just mention the rules and guidelines of the space for our listeners.
Yeah. I'm just waiting for time because yeah. Alright. In the meantime, brother Abrechman is able to, like, adjust the setting on his side. So as we mentioned every time and and as we would mention every time, this is not a free for all discussion, guys.
This is a Middle Nation book discussion group, which means that you have first to be part of the Middle Nation and understand what Middle Nation advocates and the mindset within Middle Nation. And second, you have to be in the book club reading the book and discussing and engaging with the members of the book club. But we do not give the mic freely to anyone just, you know, walking in because this is we differ in that manner from most spaces on x. This is not a free for rule. So to those people who have we have denied the mic, the we we there's nothing that we personally hold against you.
It's just that we do not know you yet, and you did not engage with us on the group either in the book club or in Medination. So that's why we we do not give them my credit. Has something to say?
I no. I would I would I would just add to what you're saying or as as by way of explanation. This is exactly what we're talking about, and that we need to have a different approach to how we deal with social media and how we deal with our public discourse. It has to be disciplined. It has to be orderly.
It has to be controlled. We have to do exactly as Noreddin was, basically taught us, which is to be orderly, to be disciplined, to be controlled, and to be, unified in the delivery of our narrative, because our narrative is a true narrative, and our narrative is one, a narrative of victory just as Notre Dame did with his people in his time. So, if we don't know what you might say, you might say something ludicrous, you might say something ridiculous, you may not, you may some say something very intelligent, you may say something that's very much in line with what's what's correct and proper, but we don't know you. Just like the brother said, we don't know you. You haven't been in our discussion on Telegram even oh, it's open to the public.
We don't know if you're reading the book or if you've read the book or if you're even familiar with the history or what have you, and we're not going to allow. We have to have some narrative hygiene on our platforms to where we can have a unified message and a unified understanding to make sure that everybody's on the same page. And I would encourage anyone and everyone who has a platform to do the same. You have to learn how to be disciplined in your public statements, way that you speak in public, the way that you present yourself in public, and the narrative that you are conveying in public. And so we run a tight ship in that regard.
And as brother said, it's nothing personal. And if you want to participate in these spaces, you know what to do. You can come over to Telegram and and and we can get to know you, and then we'd be more than happy to to let you come on on onto an x space or alive or what have you. So just to just to reiterate what brother was saying, we need to take a disciplined and an orderly approach and an organized approach to all of our public behavior, including what we say on any sort of a public space and any sort of a public platform.
We're just asking you to be serious and to take this matter seriously, not come in and say whatever you feel like you want to say. You have to be first informed. Brother Karim, do you have anything to add?
You know, I think it's very important also to notice with these leaders, like, quote, unquote, the they didn't, like, chase, you know, being a leader. There was this first of all, it's, of course, heritage. So, you know, was raised under, so he learned from him. He, you know, understood from him. It's not like some democratic elections.
And I remember this point used to be highlighted, you know, by, like, who's gonna be more capable leader, someone who, you know, has never heard, had never been in the circles, or someone who was born in the, you know, palace, who was going to all the meetings, was seeing the dealings of his father or being part of the talks, being part of the, you know, whatever negotiations were ongoing. Right? So you can see the the leadership was not something that he had to chase, but he was basically given it and people wanted it from him. Right? Even the circumstances, like, if you remember when his father passed away, Rahmatullahi, it was very chaotic instance.
Right? And, like, he had no other option but to take it. It wasn't like he was very hungry for being a leader or, you know, but it was the situation, the circumstance that arise. There was no other option than that he had to take action. Right?
And, also, very interesting, what I think mentioned is, like, how people can sense justice. Right? How people can sense piety, how people can sense just a good person. Right? And you want to follow them.
I think this is something that, you know, is so important, right, with people. Because, like, when you look at our leaders at hamdulilah, but when you look at the people in the West, right, and people who represent the society in the West, it's, like, really pathetic. You know? Most of the people who rule them are people who they want to have nothing to do with. Most people who they mock.
Right? Most, like, leaders who they, you know, they tell you that, you know, into politics, the worst people get and, like, those are the people that rule you. Right? So it's completely different than when you have someone who represents you and you who you align with, who you want to support. Like so I also imagine that sorry.
Nouridine himself might not have every aspect of his PR or propaganda. I do not think there was so much deliberation as that it came naturally from the position he was put in from the character that he was. Right? Like, people usually maybe sometimes try to overthink this stuff and, you know, the different aspects of how to capture this and how to capture that. But some people, they just have it inherently due to the way they were written, due to the way they actually are.
Right? So I think a lot of the things when we look at it like, of course, there are lessons that can be taken from it, but we also have to understand that it's just who he was. Right? It's not something that he learned or that he had to deliberately, you know, contemplate or strategize or try to think about every aspect, not that's him and, you know, his way of life and his way of, like, his the inspiration that he might have gotten and so on and so forth. Right?
So another aspect, I think, to this PR talk that needs to be taken into consideration. Yeah. But most of course, you know, that everything that needs to be said, I think, well, these are just the two main points that, like, somehow, you know, stood out for me personally.
Yeah. Brother. I think you're right. I think I think that that, again, we have an example in, today of Ibrahim Shahriar. Because, as I said when I was talking earlier, I I don't think that that they are necessarily running a a PR campaign from the from the government.
I don't think the government is necessarily trying to to present Ebrahim Tarroy in a certain kind of way. People love him, genuinely. People love him, and people he's inspiring to people. And so they they are taking it upon themselves to share and to basically run what we would normally see as a as a as a PR campaign on his behalf out of their genuine love and respect and admiration for the man. It's not necessarily something that he is coordinating.
However, I think that it's most likely that any leader, any because there's nothing wrong with this. There's nothing cynical about this. Recognizing the importance of your own integrity as a criteria for authority, for legitimate authority, for your own legitimacy as a leader. And I can and and this and this isn't this isn't exclusive to Muslims. This is for anyone.
And I can give an example. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, it's very famous now that he was at one point offered a bribe by the Americans. Literally money, you know, cash money in a briefcase, and he refused because he understood if I take this money, I'm ruined. I'm completely ruined if I take this money. If I if I accept that money, then I have corrupted myself, then I have no legitimacy with my people.
And then the and then it was a very crucial moment for Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew, under his leadership, if he had allowed himself to be corrupted, he would have not only ruined himself, but he would have ruined the entire project of building Singapore into what it is today. So I think that that that it's actually important for people to understand on your on an individual level, on a personal level, whether you are a leader or not, whether you're anybody. Understand the importance of your own moral integrity, and that that this gives you legitimacy with everyone in your life. If you're if you're just a private individual, this gives you legitimacy and it gives you credibility and it gives you authority with anyone in your life. And if you're a leader, then this gives you authority and credibility and legitimacy with your population and internationally potentially.
And I think that that it's a mistake for anyone to not understand the actual strategic real world importance of of having integrity, moral integrity, and and actually living by a set of principles and a and a moral code. Because when you when you don't do that, no one really does take you seriously in your personal life or on on the level or, you know, at at at the at the level at which a leader operates?
Yes. Integrity is currency. So I'm hoping brother Abdulrahman is is able to to join in right now. I'm not seeing him in the speakers. So please, brother Andrahman, if you are able to ask for the mic.
I will give you a minute or two to try to ask for the mic before we wrap it up, inshallah.
So, we miss sister Samira and sister Nisa. If they could have have been could have been here to participate in the conversation, it would have been great.
Yes. Absolutely. They would have been a great contribution to the whole discussion, especially that sister Samira is we always had back and forth points and discussions regarding the the the comparisons between and and it was actually enjoyable enjoyable to have.
There's a comment for, by the way. Well, I haven't read it. I'm just not going to read it, and I think it's something to do with Eranso. We will skip it. A lot of best well, yeah, someone was from the listeners wanted to ask a question.
So I was just thinking maybe we can address it before brother joins.
Don't mind. Brother Abdullah, are you here? Are you ready to speak?
Okay.
So I wanna add to the point about how there was this generational handover from Ahmadine to Noredin to Salahdin. I wanna take a step back and say it even started with Al Ghulsvi because he created this sort of union between Aleppo and Mosul that Ahmadineen later on so not not directly inherited, but he he projected his power from there. This was his his power base, and he created his sort of brittle state that Noredineen went on to inherit and secured it, solidified it, fortified it, made it, you know, bulletproof. And then picked up the reins after and, you know, we know how that ends. In regards to regimes in the region being successful with PR, I would say that differs in my for me, what I noticed, it differs based on the living conditions.
You know, the it is a lot harder for regimes to have successful PR internally if, you know, it does not translate to, you know, improving of living conditions or standard of living or things like that. So we have seen the Gulf rules, as was said, like, their people are fully, you know, behind them. There's no issues with that. But then you look at some other countries in the region who are maybe not as doing well economically or living conditions continue to deteriorate, then, you know, this propaganda is just full of rhetoric. You're not actually you don't actually mean what you say.
As for I I do agree with what it says about around being successful, but I wouldn't say internationally. I would say in in definitely in the West, which is their target audience, but I don't think they've been successful in the region at all in terms of PR and and the image that they project about themselves. It is a it a more popular narrative in the West. When it comes to and weaponizing PR, I think, he had used it as a political tool like the world had never seen before. But PR in in during that time served the purpose of basically getting everyone in line, whether we're talking about the elites, the scholars, the people, the rulers.
Everybody was behind using that PR. Would that have the same effect today? First of all, I think it would be very difficult to replicate that image. And second of all, I do not think a successful PR campaign, let's say, globally where, you know, we have the dominant narrative now would change any realities on the ground. That's just how I see it.
Because that's not like they are focused more about their domestic audience internally, and I think our rulers have decided that, like, the global narrative is just something that we cannot win. It's a battle that we cannot win because for the West, narrative control is, like, the most important thing. It is it comes before anything, you know, because they want to twist reality, shape alternative, you know, facts and whatnot. So, like, our rules have decided, You know, we don't care about the optics, what things look like on the surface. We're only interested in shaping outcomes.
You know?
Mind your voice cut off. Did you finish your point? Okay. It it seems maybe Maybe
he got cut off.
Yeah. I I let me just let me just sort of respond to one thing. When he said that Iran's, propaganda or their PR, within the region hasn't been successful, it's been very successful. I I didn't say that their PR was designed to make them popular. I said that they have, successfully achieved the perception of them, which is exactly the perception that they want.
And they are generally perceived exactly the way that they want to be according to whichever target audience you're talking about, whether it's in the West or whether it is in the region. They they they created a perception of themselves. I looked at the I looked at the comment, brother Karim, where the brother is asking about Iran, and why I said that that that they are not that they didn't didn't help the Palestinians because they didn't. They helped Hamas for a period of time until Hamas became a government, and then Hamas was completely funded by Qatar. They cut them off.
Iran cut them off as soon as they became an actual government and and and wasn't exclusively just a fighting force. Their support for Hezbollah and their support for the Houthis has resulted in thousands upon thousands of Muslim deaths and instability in the region. So this hasn't been helpful. And they were not sanctioned. They haven't been sanctioned as a result of their support for the Palestinians.
They they haven't been or or their stance on Palestine. The entire global Ummah has a has every Muslim nation has had the same stance on Palestine. You're not you there's nothing unique about Iran's stance with regards to Palestine. It's the position of the entire Muslim Ummah. It's the it's the position of every Muslim government in the world, including Malaysia, including Indonesia, and so forth.
They weren't sanctioned. They weren't isolated as a result of them supporting the Palestinians. That's a misunderstanding. And, that's the result of the narrative that Iran has pushed. So this is what I mean.
They have been very successful in controlling their international perception. It just happens to be the case that it wasn't in their interest under the circumstances to try to be popular. Their their it was in their interest politically to be viewed as a resistance government, a a revolutionary government, an anti imperialist, anti colonialist government while collaborating with the people that they said that they wanted to destroy and the people that they said that they hated. They've been collaborating with and working with and coordinating with the Americans and with the Israelis the entire time, the entire time, more than any other government in the region. So they've been extremely successful in in in subverting people's understanding of what Iran is and what they're about and what their role is in the region to where people understand it a certain kind of way, which is entirely disconnected from the way it actually is.
So they they've had a very successful PR campaign. And your question actually is evidence of how successful their PR campaign has been.
Yeah. Just because when we were speaking about the different, you know, sub indicators of the relative power index, was I think it's very interesting. Like, you know, brother Abdul Rahman was saying that they do not care about the narrative control. Maybe in a sense, but I do believe the the perceived vulnerability has diminished, right, like, compared to where it was ten years ago. I think that aspect of the region, like, has gone dramatically down, right, from I don't know.
It might have been, like, from a scale to, you know, zero to 10. I would have given it, like, ten, fifteen years ago. I don't know. An eight. But now I believe it's, like, three, four maximum four, you know, three and a half, three.
Right? Which means really the how much I can hurt that region without being hurt back or has really gone down. Right? And this is something very important. Like, it establishes relevance on the scene and the other players cannot take advantage of you as much as they wish they could.
Right? And, you know, Halasian, okay, narrative control is something that gives you a plus, but look at the perceived vulnerability of The United States. Right? That has gone dramatically up, right, you know, during the past ten years, twenty years, fifteen years, whatever it is. Right?
It seemed like as this player with impunity, you know, who can act without any and now you can see, like, nobody the vulnerability perceived by the global public has gone much up while the perceived vulnerability of our region has gone much down. You know? And I think that's very important to highlight and note.
Yeah. Relativity is key, and we don't live in a world of absolutes like we're going to vanquish them or they're going to vanquish us. This is I wouldn't I don't want to be, like, rude, but it's it's a bit ludicrous to think that. Right? This is not how things operate.
So people grow strong and then they go weak, and that's the of Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala. They this is how things go. But to think that vanquishing your army will will take place, you know, in in in in a lifetime or something like that, that's you have to be more mature in your understanding of things because if you have to if you want to achieve a personal goal, don't you achieve it in a week or two. You achieve it in years. So you have to to think in terms of of of states achieving their goals in the same manner because states are powerful, but they're not that powerful.
Allah is the whole powerful. So yeah.
Well, also also, brother. Yeah. Yeah. Also, annihilation isn't something that that moral people do. Annihilating someone who is hostile to you, this is this is a barbaric approach.
So civilized people, civilized nations, any civilization, any genuine civilization with moral legitimacy of any sort whatsoever, their interest is in getting along with people. We need to find ways that we can get along. So whatever your criteria is for how we can get along with you, then we're willing to do that. We're not interested in trying to annihilate anybody. We don't we don't need to exterminate our enemies.
This is a a Western way of thinking, and this is the way the West has approached the world. This uncivilized, barbaric, savage approach to the world, and civilized people don't act like that. Civilized people want to have some sort of harmony where there is discord, where there is hostility, we want to manage that and to protect ourselves and to protect our people, and to protect some sort of stability for sane people, for civilized people. We all live on this earth together and we're always going to. No one is going to be ejected from the from the planet.
People that we don't like, people that are hostile towards us or what have you. We have to resolve this in some way. We have to set some sort of a framework, some sort of parameters for our relationship because there's always going to be a relationship. Every nation is has a relationship with every other nation and it's always going to be that way. There's not a way around it.
This is the this is the fundamental it's so fundamental that it almost shouldn't even need to be said, understanding or reality in geopolitics. You can't decide who your neighbors are. They're always gonna be there. They're all you know, Turkey and Syria, for example, are always gonna be right next to each other. Iran is always gonna be there, and annihilating any any any party or any nation or any group or what have you that you don't get along with is not a solution that civilized, sane, moral people would ever consider.
You have to figure out how we can manage this relationship in a way that doesn't completely undermine us and sabotage whatever projects that we're working on, we need to establish some kind of stability through harmony and through negotiation and through agreements. We have to navigate how we deal with each other. That's that's the civilized approach, not, oh, this this this nation is is hostile, so let me destroy them. That's a complete breakdown of civilized approach, that's the complete abandonment of a civilized approach, and it should always be the absolute last resort that you that you have to take that that sort of an approach to any hostile actor. You should always try every way that you possibly can to negotiate and to navigate into a way that you can mitigate the potential harm or violence or coercion to which either party might be subjected.
That's the civilized approach, and that's what our region, and also I would say China to an extent or another takes that approach, and most civilized people in the world take that approach. It's something that is very foreign to the West. They they think that the only approach is to is through force. That's their that's not their last resort, it's their first resort. It's the first thing they go to.
And like brother Karim was saying, in terms of the the the instability in our region and the vulnerability of our region, it has declined significantly, and we have a lot more power to negotiate, and America has a lot less power to negotiate, and America now they can't really act unilaterally like they used to. The only people that you see them acting unilaterally with is Europe, their own friends, and they're not acting unilaterally with us anymore, except, you know, if you want to talk about, for example, tariffs and the trade war and whatnot, this is America acting unilaterally against their own interests. This is America acting unilaterally against themselves to isolate themselves and to withdraw from the global stage. So it it's never been our approach, and it's never been the approach of civilized people to seek the annihilation of their enemies. We just wanna mitigate the danger that they pose to us by navigating some sort of an agreement or some sort of a negotiation, some sort of a parameters of a relationship that will mitigate the the the risks and mitigate the danger that they pose to us and that that that their hostility poses to us.
And if it's possible to to dissolve their hostility, then so much the better.
Yes. That we are that way and that we have a long tradition of civilizational behavior as opposed to our antagonists. So I think today was a is a was a joyful discussion. Thank you so much, Ostad, for freeing yourself and giving us this those incredible remarks regarding PR and Greekpolitik and how we can make use of them in our modern day context. Thank you so much, brother Adar Rahman, and thank you so much, brother Karim, for your valuable contributions.
We're going to take a break, inshallah, during Ramadan in order to replenish our imam and to from Allah. And I would like to take this chance and opportunity to say to our fellow Muslim listeners, Ramadan Karim and and may Allah grant us all forgiveness during Ramadan and, you know, bless us with with the with the and and the tawbah during Ramadan. So so we will reconvene after Ramadan. And with that, I I again extend my thanks to my beloved speakers, and I will see you after Ramadan, all of you, inshallah. Thank you all.
Thank you all to our speakers and listeners, and assalamu alaikum. Brother,
and for brother Rahman, brother Karim, and for everyone who listened. And thank you again for extending the the opportunity for me to give my remarks since I negligently missed the last session.
Thank you so much. Thank you.
تمّ بحمد الله